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I have a rendezvous with Death 
At some disputed barricade, 
When Spring comes back with rustling shade 
And apple-blossoms fill the air-- 
I have a rendezvous with Death 
When Spring brings back blue days and fair. 
It may be he shall take my hand 
And lead me into his dark land 
And close my eyes and quench my breath-- 
It may be I shall pass him still. 
I have a rendezvous with Death 
On some scarred slope of battered hill, 
When Spring comes round again this year 
And the first meadow-flowers appear. 
God knows 'twere better to be deep 
Pillowed in silk and scented down, 
Where love throbs out in blissful sleep, 
Pulse nigh to pulse, and breath to breath, 
Where hushed awakenings are dear . . . 
But I've a rendezvous with Death 
At midnight in some flaming town, 
When Spring trips north again this year, 
And I to my pledged word am true, 
I shall not fail that rendezvous. 
                                 -Alan Seeger 
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participation in combat will forever change a man.  No matter what he does in the interv ning 
years, he will never forget the horrors of those days under fire.  I hope that this work will 
perpetuate the memory and experiences of those men who were forever changed by their 
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          ABSTRACT:  The battle of Belleau Wood serves as a microcosm of the American 
experience in the Great War.  Several misconceptions surrounding the battle, born largely out of 
its propaganda value, created a legacy that overshadows the significance of the battle as a 
baptismal of modern twentieth-century warfare.  The experience, unprecedented in the an als of 
American military history, placed largely inexperienced troops into a situation where poor 
decisions, inferior tactics and faulty communication methods delayed orders and sent 
unsuspecting men into a cauldron of chaos and terror. 
                     Historians have painted a picture that implies that the battle had epic ramifications 
in that it halted the German drive on Paris.  This myth is born out of the desire of the American 
Expeditionary Force commanders to obtain a decisive victory on the battlefield.  Bel eau Wood 
provided that opportunity and gave birth to a legendary story of American military arms devoid 
of the dreadfulness and futility that characterizes so much of the fight.   These depictions 
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overshadow the horrific nightmares of the fighting that men carried with them t rough the 
remainder of their lives.  Those terrible sights and sounds baptized participants and an entire 
nation into the horrors of a new age of warfare.    
                   The main focus of this thesis rests largely on first-hand accounts of the fighting at 
Belleau Wood.  Examination of several eye-witness reports and unpublished memoirs and oral
histories reveal the true cost which bought in blood the glory that dictates most interpretations of 
the engagement.  This work also assesses human stories behind this epic battle in con ext to the 
common myth which depicts the fight simply as the engagement which saved Paris.  




The Legacy, interpretation and significance of Belleau Wood 
The flickering glow of illumination shells created an eerie view of the seemingly lifeless 
landscape.  Shattered trees, silhouetted on horizon in a grotesque posture, embodied the carnage 
and devastation that took place weeks earlier.  Belleau Wood was relatively quiet on this warm 
July night.  The momentary brightness appearing from the illumination rounds fire from behind 
German lines far beyond Belleau Wood interrupted the tranquility.  Burial detai s, working under 
the light of the glimmering flares lazily descending to the earth, carried out the grizzly task of 
dealing with the numerous corpses strewn throughout the broken landscape.  Many of the dead 
had been exposed to the summer heat for days and even weeks since the twenty-six day struggle 
to capture the woods had ended.  One veteran remembered: 
They laid like flies everywhere.  I saw them hanging dead in barbed wire, cuddled 
behind trees with head and shoulders stuck part way in the ground, fives tens, 
huddled in groups.  These countless hordes of lifeless forms were causing us not 
end of trouble.  It became impossible for us to any longer stand the smell of 
decomposed bodies.  They had by this time turned a sort of bluish black.1 
 
 First Lieutenant Howard I. Potter commanding G Company of the 2nd Battalion 104th 
Infantry Regiment took two men from his burial detail that had been working throughout the 
night to the battalion commander’s dugout to describe a scene encountered earlier that evening.  
The men, while walking over the broken landscape looking for dead men entangled in the 
shattered undergrowth, came upon the body of twenty-five year old Private Edwin Porter Kishl  
of the 16th Company 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, which was the outfit responsible for 
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driving the last contingent of German troops out of the northern edge of Belleau Wood on June 
25, 1918.   
 Kishler was killed on June 25, 1918 and remained unburied for weeks.  The scene 
remained indelibly etched into Potter’s memory when he wrote, “The circumstances described 
gave a very vivid picture of the manner in which Mr. Kishler met his death.”2  The memory of 
that night in Belleau Wood in July 1918 compelled him to record his experience in a lettersen  to 
the Commander of the Metropolitan Post of the American legion six years later.  In his 
description of the encounter, Potter wrote: 
He [Kishler] had apparently been commanding a platoon as sergeant or acting 
sergeant.  The platoon was rushing a machine gun nest on the side of a hill and the 
members of the platoon had been practically wiped out.  The machine gun was 
located between two large rocks at the crest of the hill and Kishler had started out, 
after the other men had been killed, to rush the nest with an automatic rifle.  He had 
another Marine carried clips of ammunition.  The other Marine was lying dead 
about twenty yards from the machine gun nest and every automatic clip had been 
emptied.  About ten yards from the enemy machine gun post Kishler was lying 
dead over a rifle with bayonet fixed, and when we turned him over there were at 
least a dozen bullets in his chest.  The picture made it evident that he had exhausted 
every automatic rifle shot he had and then attempted alone to rush the nest with a 
bayonet.  He had gotten within a few paces of the nest when the pattern of the 
German machine gun got him in the breast and he fell right over his rifle.3 
 
The positioning of Kishler’s body embodied the sheer desperation and savagery which 
characterized the battle for Belleau Wood.  Potter and his detail covered up the other members of 
Kishler’s platoon lying nearby, but left Kishler’s body unburied until this futile yet heroic act 
would be recorded.4  Such an account is a microcosm of the unbridled experience of the 
American military at Belleau Wood. 
Renowned author John Keegan identified the Somme region of North Central France as  
strictly British sector due to the unprecedented sacrifice and carnage that occurred there in the 
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latter half of 1916.5  Savage fighting in the entire region claimed nearly 450,000 British soldiers 
from ninety-nine divisions.  The melancholy legacy of such a sacrifice became, like the butchery 
experienced by the French at Verdun, a standard by which the bloodshed of the Great War has
been measured.  While historians undoubtedly agree that the United States’ contributi  to the 
First World War paled in comparison to other belligerents, one small region of French 
woodlands provided the American army a setting for what became an iconic engagement 
defining the American experience in World War One.  
 Belleau Wood, a name etched into the high pedestal of United States Marine Corps 
lineage and well known in the annals of American military history, has been directly associated 
with the deliverance of Paris during the tumultuous German offensive through the Chemin des 
Dames region.  For over ninety years historians and authors have written about the significance 
that the battle of Belleau Wood played in stopping what has been described as an unobstructed 
strike towards the French capital, often at the cost of revealing the storis of tremendous 
suffering and human loss that characterized this engagement.  The traditional portrayal f the 
fight for Belleau Wood was largely born from its propaganda value, which dictated the perceived 
significance of the engagement. The United States Marine Corps particularly sought the exploits 
of the publicity offered by this engagement due to the organization’s significant participation in 
this battle.  This important factor has largely ignored the notion that the battl  provided the 
American military its brutal indoctrination into the harsh realities and industrio  killing 
efficiency of modern twentieth-century warfare where acquisition of objectives set a costly and 
terrifying precedence.  The heavy loss of life was due to obsolete communication methods, 




 Nearly every historian who has written about the battle largely ignored a v ry 
fundamental circumstance that minimizes the strategic significance whi h ultimately changed the 
connotation of battle.  They also fail to even allude to the notion that the battle is significant 
since it provided the American Army an unmatched experience in the nature of twentie h-century 
warfare, where new tools such as machine guns and quick-firing artillery led to an unprecedented 
level of killing efficiency.  Instead the concept that the battle’s most significant aspect is the 
instrumental role it played in halting the German drive to Paris remains largely pervaded in 
modern interpretation.  General John Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Forces 
summed up his perception of the battle when he stated, “The Gettysburg of the war hasbeen 
fought.”6 Since this battle has historically been part of Marine Corps history, interpretation of the 
battle has largely emanated from that organization’s analysis of the batle’s significance.   
The human story of the battle has in many ways, died with the generation that fought it.  
Never before had American troops entered a battle where their tactics had been rendered obsolete 
by such a heavy margin.  Belleau Woods set the standards by which the American Army would 
carry out the haphazard tactics of conducting battle in France during the Great War.  Such 
methods carried men, unnecessarily, to their death and created a new level of chaos and terror for 
the men who survived to carry with them the nightmares and horrors of seeing friends die in uch 
a barbaric and undignified manner.  
The story of the battle for Belleau Wood cannot be complete without trying to piece 
together the human side of the battle.  Several academic examinations of the battle have pieced 
together the military strategy and tactical significance this engagement played in the overall 
course of the war.  In the process of such studies, somewhat sanitized portrayals of the human 
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experience covered up the terror and chaos experienced by the young men who fought 
desperately to take the woods.  
A common representation of the battle is one which puts battle-hungry Americans on the 
move against the best trained soldiers Germany had ever fielded.  In this portrayal, the 
underestimated U.S. troops attain blatant triumph over there highly experienced and unwvering 
enemy.  Much of this imagery originates from the propaganda the battle offered to the United 
States and specifically the Marine Corps, the organization which participated in most of the 
fighting for the woods.  This depiction has been perpetuated with very little retrosp ctive 
examination of the value the battle played in providing the American military an unprecedented 
experience. 
This work attempts to make the unprecedented human experience the chief instrume tal 
factor that made the battle so unique.  Several personal accounts of the engagemet exist ither 
in published form or buried in archives and untouched for decades.  Piecing these sources 
together creates a narrative exhibiting how twentieth-century warfare took lives and often 
innocence from the men who participated.  This side of the fight remains largely nontransparent 
in most studies.  American bloodshed in the fields of France during the Great War has been 
microcosmically represented through the precedence set by the battle for Belleau Wood.  Telling 
that story cannot be completed without examining the human side of the suffering and terror 






The legacy of Belleau Wood 
 
 
Ninety years after the last American serviceman left the shell-scarred wilderness of 
Belleau Wood, several misleading inclinations and oversights in the significance of the 
engagement pervades most major works regarding the overall significance of the battle.  First, 
the idea that the American stance, by sheer determination, was the sole factor that single-
handedly stopped the Germans from reaching Paris is a misleading concept largely born from the 
propagandist opportunity the battle provided for the untested Americans.  This analysis fails to 
account for key changes in the nature of the German offensive, in addition to the quality and 
make-up of the ranks of enemy troops facing the Americans.   
Second, the battle delivered a harsh lesson to an American military that hapzardly 
conducted battle in the age of rapidly-advancing twentieth-century warfare.  Specifically, the 
This painting entitled, “Belleau Wood: Where the Marines stopped the Kaiser on his way 
to Paris” was painted by Frank Schoonover.  It appered in the April 1919 edition of the 
Ladies Home Journal.   
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misuse and lack of coordinated artillery fire hindered any American ability to effectively conduct 
offensive maneuvers.  The fluidity of combat that U.S. troops were involved in used 
communication techniques compatible with static warfare and rendered largely obsolete by the 
rapidly changing battle lines. The ensuing loss of life and confusion that followed ffered a 
unique and terrifying experience for the Americans, yet to be fully documented.  This valuable 
point is overwhelmingly ignored in the battle’s historiography.  To appreciate the 
misunderstandings of this event, one must comprehend the manner in which the American public 
received the battle at the time and how misperceptions have remained codified by s veral 
historians who have attempted to document the significance of the battle.  Examination of the 
historiography of the battle, these major miscalculations combined with some of the never-
utilized primary sources paint a more accurate picture of this engagement. 
Upon examining the activities of the American Expeditionary Forces in France (AEF), 
one could contend that the U.S. offensive at the village of Cantigny on May 28, 1918 provided 
the Americans their first true indoctrination into twentieth-century warfare since it preceded the 
American assault at Belleau Wood by nine days.  The assault on Cantigny, however, followed a 
period of six days of calculated rehearsal, fresh troops, and an abundance of precisely-
coordinated artillery fire and tank support.  386 French Artillery pieces unloaded nearly 
5,000,000 pounds of ammunition on the lightly held village in the days preceding the American 
assault.  The attack also focused on maintaining a lightly-held position, static for days, allowing 
the Americans and French to gather valuable intelligence information.    
General Pershing and other French and American dignitaries, present for the c ming 
American assault, assumed a position of safety several miles away to watch this highly glorified 
test commence.1  The attack waves of infantry moved towards the village of Cantigny at 6:45 
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a.m. and encountered a shot-up German battalion.  Most of the enemy troops sought shelter in 
the cellars throughout the village.  Fewer than one hundred American casualties were recorded in 
the assault.  The overwhelming majority of the casualties occurred on the following days from 
heavy artillery fire while the Americans held their position.  The ensuing offensive encountered a 
German battalion. Most of the enemy troops sought shelter in the cellars throughout the village. 
Fewer than one hundred American casualties were recorded in the assault.  The overwhelming 
majority of the casualties occurred on the following days from heavy artillery fire while the 
Americans held their position.   
The significance of the attack is widely accepted by historians and authors such as John 
S. D. Eisenhower, Edward G. Lengel and Joe Perisco as a victory designed and carried out for 
the sole purpose of obtaining confidence and acknowledgment, by America’s allies of th  AEF’s 
legitimacy.  The fight for Cantigny simply had the luxuries of time and resources in order to 
ensure its success.  The battle for Belleau Wood, characteristically, sh red none of these factors. 
The publicity and media coverage of the American assault on Cantigny was quickly 
overshadowed by the massive German offensive launched across the Chemin des Dames region 
on May 27, 1918, which initially penetrated nearly four miles deep into the French and British 
lines.2  In addition to the overshadowed press coverage, rigid censorship at the hands of General 
Pershing’s policies chopped up correspondents’ reports into confined and subjugated dispatches.3 
From the moment the first reports of fighting in the region of Belleau Wood reached the 
home front, the media covered the assault on Paris, which appeared to be in extreme danger.   
Headlines splashed across the front pages of newspapers from the largest metropolitan settings to 
the smallest rural districts echoed the euphoria of what was seen as the single ncounter to 
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determine the outcome of the war.  In turn this exhilaration collectively rallied American 
jubilation behind what was depicted as an epic engagement legitimizing American participation 
in the war to end all wars.  
Coverage of the American involvement in the war due to General Pershing’s rigid 
approach to censoring information wired back to the United States by war correspond nts.  In an 
effort to thwart German intelligence from gauging the average number of American t oops 
present in France, no mention of division by numbers could be made.  The media could not 
identify whether or not units were made up of regular troops or National Guard troops.  No 
mention could be made which state units hailed from since many divisions were organized by 
states.  There could also be no distinction made between particular occupations such a  infantry, 
artillery or engineers.4  Pershing’s rules were non-negotiable and violators were quickly stripped 
of their credentials. 
The removal of large volumes of dispatches submitted by reporters covering the fight at 
Cantigny were followed by similar restraint by the AEF censors during the fighting a few days 
later in the town of Chateau Thierry which was located about seven miles southeast of Belleau 
Wood.5  During this brief fighting, reports covering the action were so drastically reduced by the 
censor’s pen that the action received barely any mention in the press.  Don Martin, a reporter 
from the New York Herald, cabled a furious dispatch to his home office complaining about the 
rigid censorship by saying, “Impossible to send real news.  Correspondents hobbled every way 




As the fighting in Chateau Thierry waned after the German seizure of the town, the 
media’s attention was diverted seven miles westward to the developing battle for control of 
Belleau Wood.  Coverage of the American Second Division revealed that the unit was comprised 
of Marines and Soldiers.  Correspondents were quick to point out that Marines made up a 
separate service and that nothing prohibited mention of the different services.  Pershing’s 
headquarters staff agreed in a rare moment of negotiation and decided to shift the element of 
their censorship policy forbidding the mention of branches such as infantry and artillery to be 
compatible with this development.7 
The announcement of the amendment to the censorship policy was announced just days 
before the June 6th American assault to seize Belleau Wood. The timing of these circumstance  
created a prime publicity opportunity for the American war effort.  Finally American troops were 
being placed in the path of the German drive on Paris, an assault that appeared to be the most 
legitimate threat facing the French capital since that First Battle of he Marne in 1914.  The 
scenario could not be more theatrical in premise or any more obstructive to the historical context 
and interpretation of the real significance of the battle, which place untested Am rican troops in 
an unprecedented situation where a brutal baptism by fire became inevitable.  
 The prolific opportunities available with the AEF’s amended censorship policy and the 
developing engagement west of Chateau Thierry began to draw in several correspondents.  Floyd 
Gibbons, an accredited war correspondent from the Chicago Tribune, had already made a name 
for himself by covering the hunt for Pancho Villa in 1916, surviving the February 17, 1917 
sinking of the British passenger liner Laconia by a German U-boat.  Gibbons had already 
published several reports covering American units occupying trenches in active sectors as part of 
the Overseas Depot training.8   
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The action near Chateau Thierry prompted Gibbons to converge upon the scene on the 
morning of June 6, 1918.  He arrived at the front a few hours before the Second Division carried 
out the assault on Belleau Wood.9  Gibbons immediately joined one of the attacking regiments 
just before the assault commenced.  Gibbons, aware of the importance of the coming attack, 
followed the doomed assault troops and was subsequently wounded in the process.  The 
experience that day was pivotal for Gibbons who later published a book that contained the first 
eye-witness account of the battle and perpetuated the euphoric essence reflected in the 
propagandistic media coverage of the battle.   His 1918 book, “And They Thought We Wouldn’t 
Fight,”  provided a portrayal of the campaign which many subsequent works echoed. 
The battle of Belleau Wood has not received much scrutiny to separate the misleading 
essence attached to it by the propagandizing media from the cold reality and tragedy of this new-
age of warfare.    The prime opportunity to tell the American public that their sons and husbands 
were forefront in the seemingly desperate struggle to keep German troops frm marching 
through the streets of Paris was the big story long sought after.  Furthermore, the propaganda 
opportunity this situation offered to the Marine Corps remains even more significant n the 
perpetuation of the misinterpretation of this battle.  The common perception of this engagement 
has been born largely out of a Marine Corps analysis of this battle.  Most of the works published 
about the battle have, in some way, had a link to the Marine Corps and very little has been done 
from that perspective to analyze the battle devoid of the propaganda-driven documentation which 
has largely dictated the misguided  position this battle has assumed in the parlors of American 
military history.   
Historians and authors remain consistent in perpetuating two main misconceptions born 
out of this propaganda opportunity ardently materialized by the American press.  The first 
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misconception involves an inaccurate assessment of the German ability to continue to exploit the 
initial success of the offensive the led to the fight at Belleau Wood.  The other major oversight is 
the tragic handling of offensive actions by the Americans at Belleau Wood and the ensuing 
experience that resulted from such injudiciousness. 
The earliest reports to reach the United States appeared on the front page of newspapers 
nationwide and relayed the perceived threat on Paris.  On June 1, 1918 the headlines in The 
Daily Capital Times from Jefferson City, Missouri reported “ALLIED LINE HOLDING 
GERMANS AT MARNE, BELIEVED THE GREAT DRIVE ON PARIS HAS BEEN BLOCKED 
FOR THE TIME BEING.”10  The Des Moines News Times in Des Moines, Iowa reported on the 
same day “CRISIS AT MARNE IS TENSE, HUNS CHECKED BUT ATTACK ON EITHER 
FLANK.”11   In New York The Syracuse Herald contained a headline stating, “GERMANS STOP 
SOUTHWARD DRIVE ON MARNE, BUT GAIN NEW GROUND IN THRUST ON PARIS.”12  At 
the time no one could have known that the posture of the German drive in that sector had 
significantly changed before an American counter attack could have begun, yt casualties from 
the assault on Belleau Wood, that occurred on June 6, 1918, were higher than in any other 
American engagement up to that point. Author John Toland summed up the initial media 
coverage of the war stating, “To read these papers, one would have thought it was the most
important battle of the war.”13 
Initial reports were full of euphoria and even inaccuracies, including the immediate 
capture of territory that actually took nearly one month and thousands of casualties to obtain. 
This accompanied misleading assessments of German forces facing the Americans in that sector.  
In an account of the battle which appeared in The New York Times on June 9, 1918, Edwin L. 
James stated:  “MARINES DRIVE GERMANS BACK; FOE SENDS UP CRACK DIVISIONS; 
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AMERICANS’ ADVANCE FOR TWO-THIRDS OF A MILE ON 600-YARD FRONT PUSHES 
ENEMY TO FRINGE OF BELLEAU WOOD—PERSHING CONGRATULATES 
COMMANDER.”14  The Lima Daily News in Lima, Ohio reported on June 7, 1918 “AMERICAN 
MARINES ON MARNE FRONT DEFEAT CRACK TROOPS OF PRUSSIANS.”15  These are the 
first reports that the Germans in the region were among the best the Crown Prince Frederick 
William Victor Augustus Ernest had among his ranks, an inaccurate assessment upon further 
examination of the few surviving German documents.  
The Germans in that sector were among the ranks of General Richard Von Conta’s IV 
Reserve Corps, a part of the German Crown Prince’s own army.  They were initially comprised 
of hardened veterans and ranks of elite German shock troops; however, the heavy casualties 
sustained in the previous five days of battle leading up the engagement with the Americans at 
Belleau Wood had drastically reduced the ranks of the German units to abysmal proportions.  
When losses were replaced, they came from whatever conscripts and inexperienced t oops were 
available, a significant development in placing the American experience at Belleau Wood into an 
accurate context.16 
 The chaos of battle and the hastiness with which orders were issued and carried out by 
the Americans gave rise to one of the most significant misconceptions to initially come out of the 
battle.  Although recent historians have reassessed the evidence regarding initial combat reports 
and correctly reconstructed the order of battle, the nostalgia triggered from these colorful and 
inaccurate narratives remains the nucleus of the battle’s significance for many authors and 
historians.  Numerous times throughout the coverage of the campaign dispatches falsely reported 
the capture of key objectives.  The Democrat Tribune in Jefferson City, Missouri stated on June 
7, 1918, “MARINES HOLD GROUND; HAVE NOT BEEN ROUTED FROM SPLENDID 
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RESULTS OF YESTERDAY-HOLD ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION.  THE ENEMY CRUSHED 
BY THE SWIFT AND ACCURATE FIRE OF THE “HUSKIES”- SHOW WONDERFUL 
MORALE IN THE FACE OF FIRE.”17  In fact the Americans had been thrown back from the 
woods, their central objective, with an unprecedented number of casualties.  Th  Daily Free 
Press in Carbondale, Illinois reported as early as June 7, 1918 that the Marines had captured all 
objectives attacked.   
Another important oversight in the historiography of the battle is that nature of the 
Germans facing the American Second Division.  The German assault drove a wedge in the 
French lines so deep that they occupied almost the same ground occupied during the famous 
Battle of the Marne in late 1914.  Retrospective examination of the few available German 
records reveal that the German drive in that sector had out run its ability to sustain ch an 
offensive and the threat to Paris had greatly been reduced even before American and German 
troops exchanged the first shots in and around Belleau Wood.  The German Army’s ability to 
supply forward lines, mounting casualties greatly slowed the offensive. 
The newspapers, responsible for the majority of the erroneous information read in 
American homes, painted a largely misrepresented American perspective of the battle, which 
bred the legacy of misinterpretation persistent in the present time and largely t the cost of 
comprehending the true horrors and brutality of what occurred in that rural sector of French 
farmland.      
The notion that the engagement single-handedly saved Paris became so associated with 
the battle among the opinion of the American public that a monograph written in 1919 by the 
U.S. Marine Corp’s chief historian Major Edwin McClellan stated:   
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Without minimizing in any way the splendid actions of the Twenty-sixth Division 
at Seichepray and Xivray in April 1918, or the brilliant exploit of the First 
Division at Cantigny on May 28, 1918, the fact remains that the Second Division, 
including the Marine Brigade, was the first American division to get a chance to 
play an important part on the western front, and how well it repelled this 
dangerous thrust of the Germans along the Paris-Metz highway is too well known 
to be dwelt upon at any length in this brief history.18   
Building on the precedence of such a theory, numerous authors and historians, many of 
whom were participants in the battle, assessed the significance in much the same way.  General 
Robert Lee Bullard, a West Point graduate and commander of the Second American Army in 
France, wrote: 
But through a tidal wave of retreating humanity, our Second Division (Regulars and 
Marines) moved forward, stiffened by the knowledge that only they stood between Germany and 
Paris from which one million persons fled in hopeless consternation.  A tactical distrction had 
become a great strategic victory.  A wedge, fifty miles across the base and thirty-five miles in 
depth, had a point driving toward the very heart of France, the capital which was also the 
dominant rail center and the home of the war industries.  How gloriously our men stood, halting 
that wedge, blunting the tempered, cutting edge which was made up of Germany’s best shock 
troops, the world shortly knew.  So well, indeed, that when some weeks later leave became
possible for our hard-boiled Marines, they were literally kissed off the streets of the capital they 
had saved, and by men and women alike.19   
Bullard’s 1936 book largely addressed the overall credit by the French and British
Governments he felt was denied to the American Expeditionary Forces.  The battle of Belleau 
Wood very much anchors this argument by Bullard’s emphasis on the war-altering significance 
of the engagement. 
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick M. Wise led a battalion of Marines at Belleau Wood and 
became one of the more colorful characters to emerge from the campaign.  Wise recalled his 
interpretation of the situation in the face of the German drive, one that changed very little eleven 
years later when he wrote his memoirs of the chaotic engagement.  Wise wrote, “Later we 
learned that in stopping the German attack at Les Mares Farm, our battalion had thrown back the 
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last attack of the great Chateau Thierry drive and had stopped the Germans at the closest point 
they ever got to Paris after America entered the war.”20 
Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, a tough impetuous Marine veteran who survived 
the 1898 explosion of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, led a regiment of Marines during the 
battle.  In his 1918 book entitled With the Help of God and a Few Marines, Catlin wrote, 
At the point nearest Paris the danger was acute.  It seemed as though nothing 
human could prevent the German from attaining his objective.  A cry for help 
arose.  An American division was rushed to the front and thrown into the fray.  
Half of this division was composed of Marines, who were given the post of honor 
and danger at the center.  Could they stem the tide that threatened to engulf the 
capital of France?  They were virtually untried, and they were called upon to whip 
the flower of the Kaiser’s army, flushed with victory and enjoying all the 
advantage of momentum.21   
 
Brigadier General Catlin’s emblematic inquisition reflects the perceived peril of the 
situation and if the theatrical title of the book does not propagate enough grandeur, Catlin 
expelled any misunderstandings when he wrote: 
This was, as a matter of fact, one of the tensest and most critical moments 
of the war, for if the Germans had broken through at Chateau Thierry and had 
thrown their vanguard across the Marne, it is difficult to see how anything could 
have stopped them before they reached the defenses of Paris.  The delay 
occasioned by the stubborn resistance of the French and Americans at Chateau 
Thierry gave us a chance to organize the defensive strategy which culminated n 
the battle of Belleau Wood and the thrusting back of the German hordes.22   
Clearly Brigadier General Catlin emerged from the school of thought that believed the 
American presence was the only lifeline that kept German troops from marching through the 
streets of Paris, a considerable exaggeration of the situation. 
Most of these early works echo the incomplete argument that the German drive on Paris 
was unwavering in momentum.  These accounts embody the legacy of misinterpretation set forth 
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by the propaganda value of the battle.  None of these authors bring into question the methods 
used to conduct offensive operations against the enemy holding Belleau Wood and the 
surrounding area. 
Among the earliest personal narratives of the battle was the 1925 book, Fix Bayonets, by 
Captain John W. Thomason Jr.  In this body of work, Thomason uses his experience as a Marine
replacement officer combined with information told to him by comrades to portray the ba tl  of 
Belleau Wood as seen from his company’s perspective.23  This account eluded, for the first time, 
the true terror that characterized the American experience at Belleau Wood.  However theatrical 
this portrayal may appear, for the first time it introduced a very human element to America’s 
most renowned battle of the Great War.   
Thomason’s later work about the battle is one of quite a bit of mystery.  In 1927 the 
commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General John A. Lejeune, appointed then Captain John 
W. Thomason Jr. to join a group of U.S. Army officers for the purpose of documenting and 
writing an official history of the Second Division during its time in France.  Thomason traveled 
to Europe to research the records of German units as well as French units involved in the battle.  
Thomason’s work on the campaign was from a broad perspective, offering little to no personal 
accounts.  Upon close investigation, Thomason found numerous shortcomings in the conduct of 
the operation by several officers at all levels.  This seemingly righteous American battle was not 
what it appeared to be in all the mainstream periodicals and literary works, and Thomason’s 
project began to expose these deficiencies.  Many officers who were the cnter of these 
battlefield blunders were still, by 1927, in service and among the ranks of the Army’s senior 
officers.  Any negative portrayal of the most famous single-engagement of the war for the 
Americans was met with the sharpest of criticism, especially when officers, whose careers were 
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made by their participation in the battle, became the subject of questionable battlefield 
decisions.24   
By 1929 the project had been abandoned by Thomason after submission of a transcript of 
his work.  In a letter, Thomason stated that he “had no intention of submitting a whitewas ed 
account of what had transpired.”  He also stated “an unbiased investigation of source materials 
had revealed that in certain instances some of the Division officers had not exercised p oper 
judgment; moreover, the evidence had shown that on occasion others were professionally 
incapable of coping with the situation.”25  This work, unreleased until 2006, is extremely unique 
as it provides historians a very detailed summarization of the greater picture from both the 
American and German perspectives by using archival records for the first time.  Since a few 
works on the battle have utilized the archival copy housed at the Marine Corps Library in 
Quantico, VA before it was published, Thomason’s project, in many ways, set the precedence for 
future historians to examine this battle in a manner devoid of the propagandist inclinat ons.  Had 
his study been completed and released to the general public within a decade after the battle, 
perhaps the United States would have a much different perspective on the battle for Belleau
Wood.    
Later works analyzing the greater significance of the battle reiterated the same 
commonly-held interpretations of the overall importance of the battle, portraying some of the 
deficiencies initially exposed by Thomason’s body of work.  The first of these bodi s of work, At 
Belleau Wood, was published in 1965 when Robert Aspery, a former Marine Captain.  Asprey, 
utilized access to numerous veterans who held senior command positions, detailed the battle 
while contextualizing its significance in the overall opposition to the German drive towards 
Paris.  Asprey described the battle for Belleau Wood as the first true test of he American ability 
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to hold what was believed as the most crucial plot of ground against the German drive, while 
opposed against a very capable and determined German army.  Although he makes several 
inferences to the true weakened state of the German army at Belleau Wood he never seems to 
consider it as a significant development in the course of the battle.26  Asprey also neglects to 
make a link to the precedence established by the fighting as the unconventional means used by 
the Americans.  Despite the weakened state of the German army, they still inflicted heavy 
casualties on the American military, perhaps a testament to the inefficiency of American tactics 
and an implication as the deadly capabilities of modern twentieth century warfare.   
Though the battle has taken a backseat to the monumental engagements of other wars, it 
is an engagement that has not wavered in yielding subject material for milita y historians and 
authors in recent years.  Nearly every major body of work covering the battle has come within 
the last forty years.  Contemporary studies have done little to dispel the myths emerging from the 
propaganda value that originated from the reporting of the battle.  The most recent study about 
the battle was published in 2006; a book entitled Miracle at Belleau Wood.  Author Alan 
Axelrod discusses how the battle perpetuated the emergence of the modern Marine Corps and its 
reputation as the United States’ premier fighting force.  While his study is a legitimate 
examination of the propaganda value of the battle, he fails to address that the nostalgic 
interpretation is caters to the misconceptions that have continually emerged from a collective 
failure to examine all of the available sources including German and American.  Axelrod’s work 
cites only one primary source and an assortment of secondary works.  This mirror  the same 
misconceptions that emerged out of some of the earliest works.  Miracle at Belleau Wood based 
its argument on the fact that the odds were in every way against the Americans at Belleau Wood 
and that the stance against repeated assaults of Germans were the supremfactor in stopping 
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their drive to Paris. In reality the Germans in that sector lacked resource needed to sustain a 
drive to Paris and the Americans already stood in that path.   
George Clark examined the battle of Belleau Wood in his 1999 book, Devil Dogs, 
Fighting Marines of World War One.  Clark built his work largely from the same sources and 
argument used by Asprey.  Clark also credits the Americans with the salvation of Paris without 
alluding to numerous other important factors that contributed to the weakness of German fo ces 
and the inevitable failure of their drive towards the French capital.   Clark exmined all the major 
campaigns the Marines participated in during World War One, but also contributes good source 
material to relaying the personal side of the battle through a plethora of primary accounts, though 
few of his personal accounts of the battle, stray outside of those used by Asprey.   
The widely accepted portrayal of the battle of Belleau Wood is echoed even in most 
general histories of America’s involvement in the war.  In a 1980 book entitled, No Man’s Land, 
author John Toland discussed how small-scale the battle was by World War One standards, yet it 
also provided such morale boost to the American Expeditionary Force because, while the battle 
raged, French and American commanders believed it to be the most significant engagement 
involving the vanguard of the German assault on Paris.  Toland highlights one very important 
fact: even before the Americans could launch their initial counterattack on Belleau Wood, 
General Erich Von Ludendorff, who planned, commanded and carried out the German drives 
that spring, had called off all offensive operations along the Marne.27  This meant that the bitterly 
contested month-long engagement for control over Belleau Wood was simply an effort to 
dislodge a German defensive position and no longer was Paris in such grave danger.  
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Belleau Wood has not been limited to literary interpretation.  The popular interpretation 
of the battle can be seen in numerous images that have emerged from the nostalgia of the b ttle.  
Frank Schoonover, a noted American illustrator, painted a series of war images for the Ladies 
Home Journal that appeared throughout 1919.  Among these graphics is one that appeared in the 
April 1919 edition that has become one of the many symbolic images of the battle.  The initial 
caption of the painting states, “Belleau Wood: Where the Marines stopped the Kaiser on his way 
to Paris.”  Today the image dons the walls of numerous lecture halls and military bases 
worldwide.  It is one of the most identifiable images of the battle and will be a large mural in the 
background of the planned Belleau Wood exhibit at the National Museum of the Marine Corps.  
The increasing recognition that this painting receives perpetuates the my  of saving Paris.28 
In terms of historiography, Belleau Wood is unique in that the published firsthand 
accounts of the battle are numerous.  Many of the contemporary works are eye-witness accounts 
and published diaries of the battle.  While these sources provide a microcosm of the American 
experience at Belleau Wood, the accounts detract from the context of the battle.  Most portrayals 
of the greater picture by those who experienced the battle first-hand are reverbe ations of 
inaccurate context during the fight and often devoid of retrospective analysis.  While armed 
conflict is described as an unprecedented purgatory confined to a few dozen meters within the 
immediate front and flank by the men who experience it, primary perspectives portray a battle 
that must be epic in scale regardless of the context in which it occurred.   While these work  
attest to the horrific nature of combat, their existence, jointed with the clear perspective of the 
battle’s overall significance, contributes a unique understanding of the costlynature of twentieth-
century warfare; even for the most nominal acquisitions.  In this sense, Belleau Wood is a unique 
American story for never before had American troops experienced the terror of such killing 
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efficiency for what comparatively was an objective relatively and retrospectively minimal in 
significance and assaulted using such reckless methods. 
The most crucial source, relied heavily on throughout this study, completely absent in 
every other major body of work about the battle of Belleau Wood, are the endless boxes of 
archival material spread over libraries and archives across the United Stas.  These documents 
tell the story of the true nature of chaos, violence, confusion and terror that describe the battle in 
unbridled brutality and accuracy.  First, The Official Records of the Second Division Regulars are 
a series of nine books published in 1920 by the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army.29  Each 
volume contains thousands of pages of the actual correspondence, after action reports, and field 
orders issued at every command level.  These documents paint a true picture of the perception of 
the fighting as it occurred as well as the confusion and miscommunication throughout the battle.  
These works are located in only a dozen libraries around the country.   
The individual personnel records located at the National Personnel Records Center of the 
National Archives in St. Louis, Missouri hold documents describing in lurid detail individual 
acts for which personnel were decorated as well as the nature of wounds sustained by casualties.  
This source also includes sworn affidavits by battle participants regardin  the actions of 
individual troops in question.  Located in College Park, Maryland are the records of the Adjutant 
General of the Army that include the alphabetical files of the Graves Registration.  These 
documents reveal details regarding each individual serviceman killed overseas.  These reports 
document the initial burial of those killed, the condition of the body and most importantly 
numerous eye-witness accounts surrounding the circumstances of individual deaths.  
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 Located at National Archives One in Washington D.C. are the personal correspondences 
between officers at all levels and the American Battle Monuments Commission n what was used 
to develop the series of Summary of Operations, published for every American division that saw 
action in France.30  These records describe the comprehended analysis of the engagement from 
the perspective of junior officers at the time of the battle and retrospective summaries that those 
men came to understand in the intervening years after the battle. Collectively these records 
depict the raw human side of this event never previously included in any study.  Piecing together 
accounts and secondary studies yields a detailed viewpoint as to the human cost resulting from 
this carelessly managed indoctrination into twentieth-century warfare and a more accurate 





Background, Germany’s desperate hours 
John Keegan described the Great War as a European tragedy.1  Perhaps the greatest 
catastrophe resulting from the war emerged from the precedence of carnage established by the 
tactics used in twentieth-century warfare.  This fact is crucial in understanding the context in 
which the battle of Belleau Wood occurred.  Comprehension of the events of the Great War 
before 1918 reveals that the military experience was a unique one even by World War One 
standards.  American troops did not experience the true nature of horror that the war off red 
before 1918. The conflict eroded from its theatrical pre-war inception in the late summer of 1914 
into a stagnant stalemate of trench warfare where death became assiduou  and impersonal.  
Americans did not largely experience the typical stalemate and attrition that described trench 
warfare on the western front as the nature of combat rapidly changed with the large-scale arrival 
of U.S. troops.  The nature of war, by 1918, had become a mobile race to capture objectives, yet 
death still presented itself in industrious ways never before experiencd by uninitiated American 
troops.2  
By 1918, the war on the western front had put several exhausted armies in the thralls of 
desperation.  The British, who spent 1917 carrying out several highly costly and virtually 
ineffective offensives, were holding their sector in conjunction with very rudimentary 
coordination with their French counterparts, who remained stagnant and centered on their own 
sector.  The highly-welcomed declaration of war by the United States boosted the morale of the 
Entente powers.  Their hopes were soon countered when assessments as to the arrival of 
American troops in effective numbers were projected to take much longer than expected.  Added 
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to this disenchantment was that General John Pershing, commander in chief of all American 
forces in France, refused to budge to pressure by the French and British to place American units 
under their command.  Acting on strict orders and his own personal vision for America’s role in 
the war, Pershing would carry the United States into the fight as a unified army, not as piecemeal 
cannon fodder for their weary and decimated allies.3   
While the entrance of the United States into the war brought welcomed enhancement to 
the morale of the French and British, it placed the German high command in a bit of a strategic 
vice.  Field Marshall Paul Von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, his first deputy, oversaw all 
military operations for the German army.  Together they believed the scales must be tipped in 
favor of the Germans by 1918 or the weight of American industrial and personnel potential 
would break their backs.  Catering to this desire was the mass exodus of the Russian army from 
the eastern front, freeing millions of German troops for a decisive blow on the west rn front.4   
In the first few weeks of 1918, Ludendorff and Hindenburg hashed out a vague yet 
decisive plan of action to determine the outcome of the war.  This preparation relied on sheer 
manpower, seeking to disenfranchise the weak coordination between the French and British.  
Because the British spent much of the previous year taking the fight to the Germans and posed 
the greatest threat, Ludendorff made British forces the initial target of his plan.  He planned a 
massive offensive in the west in the area of the Fifth British Army south of thetown of Arras, 
France.  This plan would strike British forces along the single longest-stretched section of the 
English front held by fewer troops than any other in the British Expeditionary Force.  This area 
would also dissect any tactical liaison between the French and British.  This would enable the 
Germans to swarm the British forcing them to the coast.5  As the offensive materialized, another 
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assault was set to be carried out in the North against the British First and Second Armies in the 
vicinity of the old Ypres battlefield.6   
Code-named Operation Michael and Operation St. George, Ludendorff and Hindenburg 
enlisted the utmost secrecy in preparation for the assaults.  These attacks would utilize an 
overwhelming and sudden volume of pre-registered artillery as well as a new tactic recently 
introduced by the Germans; infiltration.  This method was carried out by special troops known as 
strumtruppen.  These soldiers were organized into small units able to penetrate deep into enemy 
lines while bypassing certain objectives for the main force that followed close behind.  Once the 
enemy’s lines were compromised, these troops, using weapons such as flame throwers, light 
machine guns and light trench mortars, could immediately disrupt rear area echelons while the 
main enemy force, already bypassed, met the brunt of the main assault force.7    
At 4:40 a.m. March 21, 1918, nearly 6,000 German artillery pieces commenced the 
largest bombardment of the war.8  Shells of every kind from gas to high explosive pounded the 
trenches of the British Fifth and Third armies over a thirty-mile stretch.  Up and down the sector 
phone lines rang constantly, alerting the same warning of an overwhelming level of incoming 
fire and gas shells.  “It sounded as if the world were coming to an end,” recalled Lieutenant 
Herbert Sulzbach, a German artillery officer.”9  “Machine gun posts were blown sky-high along 
with human limbs,” recalled one British soldier of the Fifth army.10  “Men were coughing and 
vomiting from the effects of gas, and men were blinded.  The whole earth around us turned into 
an inferno-akin to the Three Divisions described in Dante’s description of hell.”11  By 9:35 a.m. 
three entire German armies were lined north to south waiting for the attack order. Sturmtruppen 
units had moved out and taken the British lines under mortar fire.  By the early afternoon the 
forward British lines had been penetrated and overrun.12 
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As three German armies continued to press through deep into British lines, Ludendorff 
made what would be the first of several strategic errors.  While the initial goal of the offensive 
was to separate the liaison of the British and French sectors, Ludendorff decided the front of the 
attack should be expanded to exploit weaknesses in the British lines.  The extension of the battle 
front placed increasing strain on German supply and artillery support necessary to ustain the 
initial momentum.  The strategic cities of Amiens, a crucial railway junctio , and Arras were not 
taken nor were liaison between the French and British broken.  While the initial overwhelming 
success of Ludendorff’s operation appeared to be a tremendously one-sided victory, it failed to 
achieve its objectives and cost the Germans over 230,000 casualties.  Nearly seventy G rman 
divisions had been exhausted.  Particularly hard hit were the Sturmtruppen formations.13   
Operation Michael also alerted French, British, and American forces that better 
coordination and liaison between command structures was desperately needed.  General
Ferdinand Foch, whose official title had been chief of general staff was appointed Generalissimo, 
an official position overseeing the operations and coordination of the Entente powers.  From that 
moment on “General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments to coordinate the 
action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.  He will work to this end with the Generals-in-
Chief who are asked to furnish him with all necessary information.”14  While each nation 
maintained command of their armies, no longer were they operating independently of ach other.  
Foch was quoted as saying “I would fight without a break.  I would fight in front Amiens.  I 
would fight in Amiens.  I would fight behind Amiens.  I would fight all the time." The previous 
statement reflects how strong-willed the French were over even minor objectives.15  The quote is 
also perhaps reflective of the significance of major cities such as Paris; an objective weeks away 
from falling into the crosshairs of another of Ludendorff’s master-minded plans.   
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Following the devastating Operation Michael offensive, the Germans launched their 
second large-scale offensive code-named Operation Georgette.  The target was the very northern 
portion of the British sector held by the British First Army with the goal of placing vital channel 
ports at risk.  On the morning of April 9, 1918 following a massive artillery barrage, the German 
Sixth army tore through a sector of the line held by a corps of Portuguese troops.  6,000 became 
prisoners and the remaining 13,000 fled from the front lines into the rear sector.16  Terrified that 
the ports were under threat, Commander-in-Chief of British forces, Field Marshall Sir Douglas 
Haig, pleaded with General Foch, the newly appointed Generalissimo of the Entente powers, t  
release French reserves to the area.  Foch refused; believing that to limit the defenses of Paris 
would have been too risky.  Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. 
Pershing, also refused to commit the minimal and untested troops he had in country.  Pershing, 
adhering to strict orders not to relinquish command and control of U.S. troops unless under 
American dominion, did not share the panic that overcame British high command.  On April 11, 
1918, Field Marshall Haig issued a message of desperation to his engaged armies: “With our 
backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end
. . . Every position must be held to the last man.  There must be no retirement.”17  While the 
German drive continued against stiff British resistance, Ludendorff’s assault never reached the 
enemy ports and faltered at another tremendous cost to German ranks.   
The British suffered nearly 236,000 casualties and committed fifty-three of th  available 
fifty-nine divisions, but as heavy as these numbers appeared, England could replenish th  losses 
and add the gradual increase of arriving American troops.   The Germans suffered nea ly 
300,000 casualties and lost the majority of their best-trained troops.18   Casualties were 
particularly heavy among the elite shock troops.  For as much psychological advantage as 
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Ludendorff’s offensives claimed, they came at a fearful toll of men and material, most of which 
could not readily be replaced in a timely manner, if at all.  Ludendorff was slowly feeding his 
armies into a grinder with little or no decisive results.  German morale began to slump according 
to Colonel Albrecht Von Thaer, a member of Ludendorff’s staff who visited the front many 
times, pointed out that dwindling spirits from such tumultuous losses trickled down the ranks: 
“The morale influence on the troops has passed to company commanders and junior officers and 
NCO’s.”19  Need for relief came from every unit.  Losses that were replaced were done so with 
lesser quality soldiers, often young conscripts or older men who lacked experience.   
While Operation Georgette failed to break through to the ports, Ludendorff had not 
abandoned the target as a likely objective for another offensive.  Ludendorff’s problem was that 
the area controlled by the British had been bolstered with nearby French reserve units.  In order 
for Ludendorff to launch and sustain another offensive in this region, French reserves had to be 
lured away from the sector.  Perhaps vigilant to the value and imperativeness that Paris held-the 
only strategic objective that could prompt General Foch to take away from the defense of the 
ports-the chosen region for the attack was a twenty-two mile stretch of line along the formidable 
Chemin des Dames ridge line roughly between the towns of Soissons and Rheims, north of the 
Aisne River Valley, about eighty miles northeast of Paris.  The name given to this attack was 
Operation Blucher, in honor of the Prussian Field Marshall Von Blucher who, ironically enough, 
in 1814 crossed this ridge line from the south and met Napoleon’s army at Craonne.20  
Operation Blucher was intended as a limited offensive to draw French reserves away 
from the British sector, while appearing as an assault on Paris.  The region of Chemin des 
Dames, a quiet sector, held only four battle-torn British divisions.  The ridges wer very rugged 
and nearly impassable, a factor taken into consideration by the French, who drastically 
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underestimated potential enemy threats in the region.  While French and British units converged 
on this quiet sector to rest and replenish, Germans forces had spent nearly a month preparing an 
attack under utmost secrecy.  German units mobilized and moved only at night as not to catch the 
eye of aerial observation.  Routine night raids in enemy lines revealed little-to-no indication that 
the Germans were contriving a major assault, due to extra precautions the Germans took to avoid 
capture during periodic night raids.  Whenever French and British forces fired routine artillery 
barrages on likely enemy crossroads and supply routes, German guns remained silent as not to 
give away their presence.  Lessons of the previous two offensives had been addressed.  More 
machine guns were issued to assault, supply and transport units to thwart an air threat posed by 
British and French fliers.  Drills in open warfare maneuvering were car ied out in rear sectors.21   
  The German Seventh Army, under the command of General Max Von Boehn, consisted 
of six German corps amassed along the region north of the Chemin des Dames ridge.  Few of the 
twenty-nine German divisions in line, however, were of first-rate attack order.  The ranks of 
these units were second-rate and sector-holding troops or comprised of divisions virtually
exhausted in the two previous offensives.22  The condition of the German soldiers had been 
significantly weakened compared to the days leading up to the previous offensives.  Captain
Fritz Wiedemann, a German officer, was tasked with analyzing troop morale among the line 
units.  Captain Wiedemann found a large number of his regiment desperately needed time to 
recover before heading back into action; when this fact was brought to the attention of his 
division commander, it was announced that the attack would commence as scheduled.  Captain 
Wiedemann responded in his memoirs and summed up that the decisions being made by the 




Despite the concealed preparations for the offensive, plenty of signs emerged that should 
have created enough warning to ready a deep defensive line by the French and British.  The first 
bit of evidence came in an alarmingly accurate report issued by a member of G neral Pershing’s 
own intelligence section.  Captain Samuel T. Hubbard Jr., a 1907 Harvard graduate, pieced 
together the daily flow of information arriving from front line units and envisaged a major 
enemy assault in the vicinity of Laon, France, which sat nearly centered on the sec or the 
Germans planned to attack.  Captain Hubbard’s report, approved by General Pershing, was sent 
immediately to the French high command.24   
Captain Hubbard believed the Germans saw the area along the Chemin des Dames as 
extremely difficult for the French and British to reinforce in response to an assault, the same 
reason his theory was dismissed by the French and British, who believed the enemy could never 
traverse such terrain.  This qualm materialized in a reply that, according to Hubbard, stated, “. . . 
they [the French] had expressed considerable doubt that the American intelligenc servi e could 
be correct in their summary of what the Germans might do. . .”25  the second, albeit late, piece of 
evidence came on the eve of the attack.  As the sun set on the evening of May 25th, two days
before the attack, soldiers of the French 22nd Division set out on a routine raid of the German 
trench line.  The raiding party penetrated deeper into the enemy lines held by the German 197th 
Division of the VIII Corps where an officer and a sergeant of the third battalion, seventh Saxon 
regiment were captured.  These two enemy soldiers revealed everything they knew about the 
pending assault.  This pivotal evidence did not reach higher headquarters until the afternoon of 
May 26th, only hours before the attack was to commence.26  By that time the Germans had 
abandoned the art of concealment and as French observation balloons surmounted the horizon, 
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enemy formations made their way to the jump-off point.  The sector deemed “quiet” weeks 
before would, in the next few hours, be transformed into a shell-torn inferno.   
Across the ridges of the Chemin des Dames stood 1,321 batteries of German artillery.  As 
the pocket watches all across German lines struck 1:00 a.m. on May 27, 1918, firing commenced 
with unprecedented ferocity.  Across the rolling valley southwest of the ridges, a young British 
staff officer named Sidney Rogerson recalled the terrifying moments when the shells began to 
fall in the lines occupied by the British Eighth Division.  “The earth shuddered underthe 
avalanche of missiles . . . Ever above the din screamed the fierce crescendo of approaching 
shells, ear-splitting crashes as they burst . . . The dug-outs rocked, filled with the acrid fumes of 
cordite, the sickly-sweet tang of gas. . . It was a descent into hell.”27  
After hours of heavy artillery fire, German infantry began their advance.  By 5:30 a.m. 
German forces had driven French resistance off the ridges.  Four hours later, Germans crossed 
onto the banks of the Aisne River where pontoon bridges provided crossing.  Hours into the great 
offensive, alarming details began to reach French headquarters and the figures were appalling. 
Civilians inside Paris caught word of the impending threat posed towards their beloved city.  The 
situation eerily resembled the situation of the summer of 1914.28  German acquisitions that day 
exceeded expectations.  In the west, the crucial town of Soissons was under threat; in th  east, 
the town of Rheims fell into German crosshairs.  In the center of Ludendorff’s lines, the German 
IV corps made the biggest gains and closed in on a crucial piece of high ground near the River 
Vesle where the French sixth army began a fighting retreat.29  The momentum of the offensive 
continued on into the pre-dawn hours of May 28 and made Ludendorff wonder if such a limited 
and diversionary offensive might be enough to materialize into a sustained push onto the Marne 
River and into the French capital.   
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The French government was in a panic.  French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
believed the capital was in peril and pleaded with General Foch to act quickly.30  Foch, the 
brilliant military mind, did not show alarm.  He believed that Ludendorff’s latest assault was an 
effort to divert French forces from the region of Flanders in the west.  He also re lized that if the 
main thrust of Ludendorff’s drive were to converge on Paris, the Germans would dangerously 
expose their flank to the French Tenth Army.  Nonetheless, members of the French government 
needed consoling with a proactive move.  The decision to stiffen the resistance on the fla ks of 
the enemy’s advance was made by Foch.  As units arrived they were fed into battle in the east 
near Rheims and in the west along the heavily wooded valley north of Soissons.31   As May 28th 
eroded into dusk, the advance of the Germans along the flanks had slowed significantly.  
Ludendorff, displeased with progress that day, attempted to resume the pace his troops had 
displayed the day before and fed precious reserves into the fray.32  
As French units arrived, they were flung into the fight almost as sacrificial objects to jam 
the German war machine.  Thirty-seven French divisions participated in the fighting and five 
days into the offensive seventeen were exhausted.   Two French divisions were so decimate  
they had to be absorbed into other outfits.33  French reserve units took positions along the flanks 
of the German push, stemming the progress made in these regions at a high cost.  In the center, 
the French Sixth Army continued a steady retreat against the German Seventh Army. This 
development created a deep salient along the German axis of advance.  The southward depth of 
the bulge, spearheaded by General Richard Von Conta’s IV Corps, had greatlyexceeded its 
width and made resupply and logistics a dire problem for the advance units of Ludendorff’s 
offensive.  This salient also exposed the flanks of Ludendorff’s forward units ultimately c using 
the failure of the offensive (See Appendix A).  Despite this precarious situation, Ludendorff 
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insisted that the Marne River be reached by May 30, 1918 and he continued to feed valuable 
reserve units into the salient to ensure this would occur.34     
 
Appendix A. Map of situation on June 1, 1918  
 
The region around Rheims, the eastern portion of the German push, remained resolute 
after the French bolstered the line with the newly arrived French Fifth Army, adding to German 
difficulties in penetrating to the Marne River.  This allowed General Foch to concentrate solely 
on the center and western portion of the threatened area.   The French drafted up plans for an 
immediate counter-offensive in the west near Soissons that could succeed only if the German 
drive in the center became stymied.  While French units continued to plug the elongating salient, 
General Philippe Petain, commander-in-chief of the French Army, pleaded with General 
Pershing to release any available American divisions to assist in stopping the German drive in 
the center of the front.  General Pershing realized the desperation of the current state of affairs 
and agreed to release the Second and Third Divisions, the two most readily available in the 
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American Expeditionary Forces.35  His decision bred into the annals of American military history 
an engagement that became the legacy of the American experience in the First World War, one 
shrouded in lore and inculcated by pageantry at the cost of the true significance of the c ming 
engagement.  At the time, the efforts were to save Paris.  Retrospectively, the pending battle 
revealed to an unsuspecting American army the true cost and harsh realities of modern twentieth-
century warfare.   
The events that occurred from June 1-6, 1918 provided the inexperienced American 
military with their first extensive campaign, but lessons learned came at a bru al cost.  The 
United States Army would learn that the employment of artillery had to be done with specific 
methods in order to be effective against a fortified defensive position.  Specifically the use of 
saturating and rolling artillery bombardment that preceded an infantry advance was needed 
against well fortified enemy troops.  Since units became more mobile and front lines constantly 
changed position methods of communication needed to be immediate since battle situ ion  
change rapidly.  The use of electronic field telephones provided troops with a much faster means 
of correspondence, but they were difficult to operationally maintain in mobile warfare and their 
use often gave way to foot messengers.  During the American assault on Belleau Wood, this 
proved a fateful dynamic.   The use of assault formations required specific tactcal employment 
in the face of terrifying and deadly weaponry such as quick firing artillery and machine guns.  
These armaments rendered previous infantry assault methods obsolete.    
American troops learned all of these lessons under extremely difficult circumstances at 
Belleau Wood.  The experience was unprecedented for the United States military; never before 
had American troops faced these combined lethal components of twentieth-century warfa e and 
the techniques they used leaves behind a story of unique and unprecedented terror, carnage and 
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tragedy in the chronicles of American military history.  While America rejoiced in the perceived 
glorious performance of the American Marines at Belleau Wood, the shattered souls and broken 
hearts of the battle’s participants emerged from the ruins with the horrific experi nce forever 
etched into their minds.  Devastated families received little word of the exploits of sons, brothers 
and husband’s whose death often came in the most violent and undignified method.  Never 
before have most of these experiences been juxtaposed to the often celebratory atmosphere 
pervading historical analysis of the battle.  These examinations often cloud the human story of 




Movement to the Front and the Pending Battle 
As the sun sank low on the evening of May 30, 1918, orders to move out to the 
threatened region south of Chemin de Dames reached the American Third Division.  
Immediately a motorized machine gun battalion mobilized from their training area and headed 
for the perilous sector.  In the vicinity of Chaumont-en-Vexin, nearly fifty-six miles from the 
threatened sector, the American Second Division enjoyed a rare day off.  The 27,000 men of the 
division were the most unique out of the entire American Expeditionary Force since the 
organization consisted of Marines, Navy corpsman and regular Army soldiers.1 One the two 
infantry brigades were made up entirely of nearly 14,000 Marines.2  The calm of the afternoon 
came to a sudden halt when a French staff car churned up the dust in front of the division 
headquarters.  Orders were delivered to Major General Omar Bundy, the division commander, 
for his unit to immediately depart for the endangered region.3   
As the Second Division assembled for action, the German drive neared the Marne River 
along the outskirts of Chateau Thierry.  In the center of the city, the 7th Motorized Machine Gun 
Battalion of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division took up positions south of the Marne River 
overlooking the town’s only remaining bridge; all other crossings had been destroyed by French 
forces in order to prevent the Germans from gaining access to regions south of the river.  On the 
afternoon of May 31, 1918, German troops attempted to cross the bridge but met heavy 
resistance.  The French and American stance in this area caused the Germans funneled the 
spearhead of the assault, and the focus of the drive shifted west of Chateau Thierry into the 
rolling countryside dotted with small chateaus and scattered woods. The French, however, gave 
38 
 
stiff yet futile resistance in this area, but bought precious time and wore down the Germans who 
had been on the advance for nearly five days with little rest.   
In the predawn hours of May 31, 1918, men of the Second Division stood in formation 
with equipment staged awaiting the convoy of vehicles.  Sergeant Gus Gulberg recalled the 
grumbling voice of the company first sergeant demanding, “Pack up and be ready to shove ff in 
ten minutes,” but after twenty and then forty minutes, Sergeant Gulberg and his men plopped 
down on the side of the road and went to sleep.4 “We stood by, as usual, all night,” recalled 
Captain John West.5  Lieutenant Elliot D. Cooke, an army officer attached to the 18th Company 
of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, grew tired of the endless waiting and went to sleep 
along with the other men of the company.6  A few of the convoys disembarked on schedule but 
only a portion of the allotted transports were actually made available.  The logistics of moving 
the entire division so abruptly became increasingly complicated.  The division’s artillery units 
would be transported by train, however the horse-drawn machine gun units would be forced to 
move on foot.7   
By early morning small, tarp-covered flat-bed trucks called “camions” arrived to 
transport the infantry.  The journey to the volatile front pervaded in the memories of the men 
who experienced it.  Nobody knew the division’s destination, but the ranks were never short of
rumors.  Private James R. Scarbrough of the 83rd Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment 
recalled, “I remember the talk on the way there was that the Second Division was moving into 
place for some kind of big offensive, but they said something like that before every one of our 
moves.”8  Bitterness gripped Private Scarbrough and his comrades Private Eugene O. Clark and 
Private Walter Clark.  The crowded group of men managed to find a moment of humor in the 
ensuing chaos.  Scarbrough remembered the mood when he recalled: 
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I remember E.O. saying he wished the generals would let us just train in one spot 
if all they were going to do was let us train. . . It was like they wanted the Marines 
to keep away from the fighting and keep all the glory for France!  E.O. was 
talking in this funny French accent and pretending to be a French general.  He 
said that he was Generale’ Pierre Coon-Ass from Pair-ee!9   
Laughter erupted from the back of the crowded truck.  Humor was a luxury the men still 
possessed since they had no idea what was in store. 
The vehicles rode through the night.  “Sleep was out of the question,” recalled Sgt. 
Havelock D. Nelson.10  The closer the vehicles got to the front, the slower the pace.  An endless 
stream of stunned refugees fleeing the front slowed the transports to a crawl.  The roads became 
increasingly impassible due to “not only military traffic of every description, but crowds of old 
men and women, middle-aged women, girls and children carrying bundles, pushing wheel-
barrows, baby buggies or pulling small wagons heaped high with clothing and small household 
articles.”11  The scene was the first real look at the desperation of the situation and the war
became real for many of the young Americans.  “It was not just an adventure; it was serious.  
This sight, more than bullets, proved that.  No one spoke but everyone had many thoughts,” 
wrote Captain West.12   
While the Second Division gradually converged on the front, the Germans continued 
their steady push towards the banks of the Marne River west of the town of Chateau Thierry.  
Elements of the German 231st Division seized control of a crucial hill just east of Chateau 
Thierry.  Denoted by its height in meters, occupation of Hill 204 gave the Germans the tactical 
advantage of observation over the surrounding area.  Elements of Von Conta’s IV Corps als  
occupied several of the surrounding villages including Vaux and Belleau.13  The apex of 
Ludendorff’s drive towards the Marne channeled into a ten-mile front, anchored by Chateau 




Appendix B. Area around Belleau Wood 
 
 The small villages of Belleau, Bouresches, Torcy, Champillon and Lucy-le-Bocage were 
centered on this sector.  These particular chateaus would, in the following weeks, be the center 
stage of the Second Battle of the Marne.  Situated between these villages was a nearly square-
mile stretch of thick woodland known as Bois de Belleau (Belleau Wood).  The forest, very 
much identical in the present day as it was just before the battle, is dominated by sloping ravines, 
rising high ground in the north and south.  Rolling slopes are dotted with massive boulders and 
heavy undergrowth, a natural defense barrier for anyone who occupies it.  On the evening of 
June 1, 1918 the Germans realized this value and ordered the objectives for the next day, June 2, 
1918 to be the towns of Bouresches, Lucy-le-Bocage, and Champillon to include Belleau 
Wood.14   
After a twenty-hour of ride to the front in crowded vehicles, the first elements of the 
nearly 25,000 troops of the Second Division arrived.  Orders were sent to the Brigade of Marines 
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to operate south of the Paris-Metz road, the main vessel through the sector.  The Second 
Division’s brigade of Army regulars were to operate north of the highway where t  main action 
had developed.15  Despite these orders, the situation was changing hourly as developments came 
into the headquarters of the French 21st Corps in command of the sector. Control of the Second 
Division passed over to the French, who sought to feed the American units into the line as they 
arrived, a strategy the Americans adamantly opposed.   A long and restless trek to the front, the 
fact most men had not eaten in twenty-four hours, and that none of the Second Division’s 
artillery or machine guns had arrived made the scenario futile.  American and French 
commanders reluctantly agreed that U.S. troops would create a reserve line behind th  fledgling 
French fighting north of the Paris-Metz.  The Americans would be thrust into the line as th y 
arrived.16 
As thousands of vehicles of a seemingly endless convoy came to a brief halt, men of th  
Second Division disembarked in a town several miles southwest of the front.  They began 
scavenging the deserted village for anything to eat.  Chickens, pigs, and form of livestock 
became a meal.  Men got desperately needed sleep.  “. . . but the sleep was short, for, at twelve 
o’clock noon, a bugler blew assembly.  Back in the trucks we went for a short ride,” recalled 
Captain West.17  One man, Private Alfred Schiani, a tough nineteen-year-old from Brooklyn and 
member of the 18th Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, recalled a desperate 
situation while the trucks stopped along the road briefly.  “I developed nature’s urge for relief.  I 
told the sergeant my situation and he advised me to leave all the equipment on the truck and if I 
was lucky I could catch the last truck.  But the last truck unfortunately went by.  I had no idea 
where my outfit was going, nor the means to get there.”  As the trucks continued in convoy, 
Schiani discovered where a rear headquarters was located and ran over to it.   
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“I walked in unannounced, and was suddenly in front of the headquarters staff.  They were bent 
over maps, evidently going over the next day’s operations, when suddenly one of the officers
noticed me, and asked me what I wanted.  I had told him what occurred, he blasted out, ‘Get the 
hell out of here, and get back to your outfit immediately.”18   
After hours, the seemingly endless convoy stopped and delivered the men of the Second 
Division to a point a few miles southwest of the front lines where they would march towards the 
front.  Marines moved in column towards the distant rumble of battle.  The 96th Company, 2nd 
Battalion, 6th Marines adjusted equipment while standing in a hasty formation along the side of 
the dust-choked road.  The order to fix bayonets echoed through the ranks as the company 
moved into the knee-high wheat fields towards their position.19  The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines 
began their movement to the eastern sector of the front near a patch of woods identified as Bois 
de Clerembauts.  
 Once in position, the battalion immediately dug in.  Sprinkled along the battalion line 
were heavy model 1914 French Hotchkiss machine guns of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion.  Due 
to anticipated onslaught of the German drive in this particular area, two machine guns of the 77th 
Company of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were situated north and south of the Paris Metz road 
in the vicinity of Le Thiolet.20  The 9th Infantry Regiment of the Division’s other brigade already 
occupied a sector of the line east of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment.  At 4:00 p.m., a 
French plane spotted isolated German units moving west from the area south of Hill 204.21  The 
French perceived this sector of the front to pose the greatest threat the earliest units to arrive 
were immediately sent to this location.22       
43 
 
East of the threatened section, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment moved into 
position just to the west in the vicinity of Lucy-le-Bocage, including the woods to the west of the 
village. Corporal Warren R. Jackson of the battalion’s 95th Company recalled, “We left the road 
to our right to turn into some fields. Toward evening we were deployed and resumed the marc  
through the field of ripening grain.  Coming upon rising ground, we saw a village ahead.  As we 
advanced, two of the men, who had brought along bottles from the cellar, had to be separated in 
a drunken fight.”23  
 The town Jackson referred to was Lucy-le-Bocage and it was, recalled Jackson, a place 
of serenity with sunlit walls and green gardens virtually abandoned on that bright June day.  
“The sole occupants were a few French hospital corpsmen.  These men cheered us by reiterating 
the predictions we had heard along the road that Paris would be taken in eight days.”24
According to Jackson the 95th Company was issued more ammunition before moving out of town 
into position.25   
The main enemy pressure shifted from the east to the northeast.  The 6th Marine 
Regiment was positioned along the eastern side of the salient, and the newly arrived 5th Marine 
Regiment and the 23rd Regiment of the Second Division took up positions in back of the line 
ready to move to any threatened portion of the line.  A massive gap was discovered in the 
western sector of the front and Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion received ord rs to move out 
towards this gap first thing in the morning.  Prompting his four company commanders, 
Lieutenant Colonel Wise recalled, “I explained to them that there was no doubt the line was 
broken and the French were on the run.  Soon we would be up there trying to stiffen them and 
that there was no doubt they would start filtering back through us.”26 
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As the sun surmounted the horizon on June 2, 1918 the Second Division’s position began 
to materialize under frantic and perilous pandemonium.  The division’s logistics and support 
elements trickled to the front.  Members of the division’s engineer battalion joined the front-line 
units.  The division surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Derby, summoned to division 
headquarters, received orders to begin medical evacuations of the front line.  Forward field 
hospitals were put in operation even though they lacked ambulances for evacuating the wounded.  
Lieutenant Colonel Derby sped away from the headquarters building in a motorcycle, headed 
southwest for the small village of Bezu.  Made up of fewer than fifty buildings, the town had a 
small church and adjoining two story schoolhouse on the north end of the village’s winding 
street.  Derby recalled his arrival in the small town and the signs that an immed ate evacuation 
had taken place.   
The schoolroom and church were used as Field Hospital One.  The floor of the 
church, with the pews removed, became a room for the litters of wounded that 
would surely flood in.  In the schoolroom, blankets quartered a section of the area 
as a resuscitation ward, undoubtedly a place where many Marines’ soldiers and 
corpsman would later take their final breath.  In the courtyard, a tent served as 
decontamination area for victims of gas attacks.27 
 
The situation remained chaotic, accurate maps were scarce, and few officersat every 
level possessed any credible information as to the layout of the division.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Feland, a member of the 5th Marine Regiment headquarters company, scouted the center portion 
of the line north of the towns of Marigny and Champillon to develop an understanding of the 
front.  To his surprise, the gap discovered earlier spanned for nearly two miles on the left flank of 
the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment.  Working his way along the line, Lieutenant Colonel 
Feland came upon a French unit so decimated that a regimental commander was manning a 
machine gun.  All around the area, French troops looted nearby farmhouses and when Lieutenant 
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Colonel Feland tried to round them up, the French commander told him, “Looting is very bad at 
times like these.  Everything goes.  As soon as we can reorganize, we shoot a few f them and it 
stops.”28 
In response to this discovery, Colonel Wendell C. Neville commander of the 5th Marine 
Regiment, jumped into a staff car and rushed to area where Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion 
had staged.  That morning Lieutenant Cooke saw a disheveled column of French troops making 
their way past the company.  “Retreating before the Boche for six days had left them utterly 
spent.  I offered a cigarette to one of lieutenants and asked him how things went.  He regard d 
me from a pair of eyes sunk to an unbelievable depth far into his head.  ‘My frien’ lose the gun 
and the bullet, yes, but save the shovel.  Neyer lose the shovel -never.’”29   
Shortly afterward, Colonel Neville’s staff car pulled up to the 2nd battalion’s bivouac 
sight.  The colonel approached Lieutenant Colonel Wise and pulled from his pocket a map and a 
written order.  “You’ve got to get out of here right way,” Neville told Lieutenant Colonel Wise.  
“If you don’t hurry up, the Germans will get there before you do.  When you get there sick.  
Never mind how many French come through you.”30 Immediately bugles sounded assembly and 
the men of Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion assembled into formation.  The battalion shuffled 
down the dirt road.  The long file of Marines marched into the outskirts of the town of Marigny.  
Sporadic German shells greeted Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s men as they moved thrugh t e 
village; no injuries or casualties were reported.  North of the town the battalion stopped and 
prepared to move into position when another barrage of German artillery exploded with a violent 
shatter in the treetops, raining shrapnel down among the ranks.  As men stood in shock, Captain 
Lester Wass, commander of the 18th Company screamed, “Get going! What do you think this is, 
a kid’s game? Move out!”31   
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Lieutenant Colonel Wise established his command post a few hundred meters behind his 
battalion, in the chateau of Marigny, in the seclusion and shelter of a wall in the villag  
cemetery.  The battalion expanded along the front to fill the two-mile gap in the li e.  A small 
cluster of buildings known as Les Mares Farm stood in the center of the battalion sector. 
Surrounding the farm on either side was open pasture for several hundred meters.  The western 
flank of the line dug in along the tree line of thick woods.  The eastern flank took cover in a 
forest as well.   Throughout the line a few French Chasseurs remained in position. 
Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s Marines dug in along their dangerously thin line.  “There 
wasn’t a sign of a trench anywhere, nor any time to dig one.  There wasn’t a bit of dequate 
shelter.  I gave orders they were to dig individual fox holes-little scooped-u hollows similar to a 
grave but about a foot deep, with earth piled in front for a parapet.”32  Cooke remembered these 
shelters were “made according to the owner’s individual taste, or idea of safety.”33  Many 
Marines had long abandoned their entrenching shovels, a decision that would come to haunt 
many men in the days to come.  Men used any and all improvised resources to get below arth.  
Private John C. Geiger of the 43rd company recalled, “We got the order to dig in.  We used the 
lids of our mess gear and bayonet for tools.  Say, you’d be surprised to know how much digging 
you can do under those circumstances.”34  
Even with the gap filled, Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s flanks failed to make conta t with 
either unit in the east or west, causing tension for days to come.  Stretched out in a thin line, men 
dug in six to seven feet apart from one another, the battalion lacked any machine guns to bolster 
their position since much of the division’s machine gun companies were still marching overland 
on foot.  Only three companies of the Marines 6th Machine Gun Battalion were present, but they 
were sent into line east of the division sector.  Behind Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s troop , a 
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battery of French seventy-five millimeter cannons fired salvo after salvo at the unseen Germans 
to the north, down the sloping valley.  Due to the instability of this sector, Brigadier General 
James Harbord, commanding the Marine Brigade, requested that any available machine guns 
from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion move with all haste to bolster Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s 
line.35    
In the eastern portion of the division sector, Captain John A. West and his third platoon 
of the 79th Company had dug in.  Next to Captain West’s platoon, Corporal Pike and the second 
platoon of the 79th Company sat entrenched along the forward slope of a hill.  By mid afternoon, 
German observation balloons had surmounted the horizon and distant German guns began to fire 
on that portion of the line.  In the distance, the earth rumbled dully, then again and again.  Soon 
the sudden and violent screech of incoming shells rippled across the valley.  West’s men 
continued to dig deeper into the ground.  Shells seemed to land almost on top of each other as 
they crept closer to the lines.  A shell hit along the parapet of a fox hole, blowing Private 
William Dingle of Chicago, Illinois backward killing him instantly and breaking his Springfield 
rifle in half.36  Another round exploded and killed Private William H. Brown.37 The barrage 
increased and quickly encompassed a large area. Along the Paris-Metz near Le Thiolet, Private 
Charles Francis Brown made a sudden dash for a dugout about 100 feet from the north edge of 
the Paris-Metz road at the sound of the first incoming round.  According to Captain William B. 
Croka, commanding officer of the company, “Brown was struck by the shell just shy of the 
dugout and killed instantly.”38 
The sudden German barrage was not isolated along the eastern sector of the lines.  
Around the small village of Le Voi du Chatel, members of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine 
Regiment commanded by Major Berton Sibley concealed in the surrounding woods.  Private
48 
 
Scarbrough’s 3rd platoon of the 83rd Company fell under the onslaught of German shells and he 
vividly recalled the horror when he wrote: 
We were concealed in the woods and not making much commotion so I don’t 
know if somebody saw us or they were just shelling everywhere.  That’s what it 
looked like to me, not a deliberate attack by artillery but just pot, shots, 
harassment with German 77’s, three-inch guns.  Still, it found its mark and three 
of our men died.  One of the men was John W. Collins of Clarksburg, West 
Virginia who’d left his studies hoping one day to be a lawyer . . . The second was 
Frank Snow of Anniston, Alabama, a friend of mine who could have joined the 
Army and stayed right in his hometown at Camp McClellan.  He wanted to be a 
Marine and was so proud just to be a part of the unit.  Frank wasn’t twenty yards 
away from me when the shell hit.  He just came apart.  There wasn’t enough left 
of Frank Snow to fill a grease can.  There’s a little white cross at Belleau Wood 
with his name on it, but I don’t know who or what they buried there. 39 
 
Sergeant Darel J. McKinney recalled Snow‘s platoon was commanded by a Gunnery 
Sergeant.  Once the shells started falling, the Gunnery Sergeant ordered the men to separate into 
squads and to take shelter. He separated the squads about fifty yards apart in attempt to limit 
damage.  The squad which Private Snow belonged became isolated in the open by the heavy 
bombardment and about ten Marines were wounded.40   Among the wounded was Joseph M.  
Flanagan of Bellwood, Illinois, one of Scarborough’s friends.  Flanagan was a company runner,
and according to Private Scarborough, he was “slight of build, a wiry kid, but he could run like a 
bird could fly.” A piece of shrapnel had virtually disemboweled the seventeen-year old.  “The 
shrapnel had torn him straight through in the abdomen.  Part of his intestines was outside, and 
the smell was terrible.”41  Flanagan was carried away to a field hospital where he succumbed to 
his wounds two days later.  The third Marine Scarborough saw die in the barrage was Gunnery 
Sergeant James Clair Wertz of Lewiston, Pennsylvania, a sea-going veteran of the fleet Marine 
Corps and rigid disciplinarian whose incessant demands of a uniformed and clean appearance 
won the admiration of his men. “Seeing his dead, broken body shook our confidence.”42 
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Corporal Frederick W. Hill and Sergeant Major Herbert H. Akers from the 6th 
Regimental headquarters company were also caught by another barrage in La Vo  du Chatel that 
morning. Corporal Hill recalled: 
 We came in for a great ‘panning’ from Boche artillery fire for several hours and 
some were too close for comfort.  Akers and I had several come so close over us 
that we could feel the ground ‘bounce’ when they hit.  A few very close ones 
were ‘duds’ and did not explode.  One ripped up the road about twenty feet from 
us and about six feet from Major Sibley, and then failed to burst.  If there ever 
was a miracle this was it. 43
 
The heavy artillery complicated every task needed to stabilize the lines and greatly 
hampered contact between units and headquarter elements from battalion-level all the w y up to 
division.  Since communications were non-existent at that point, runners had to be used until the
phone lines could be installed.  Sergeant Thomas J. Kelly, a five-year veteran of the Marin  
Corps, was in charge of guiding the Sixth regiment’s wireman to various strategic points where 
phone lines would be established.  The exposed detail of men was in particular danger due to the 
active German guns targeting the newly arrived division.  As German shells fell throughout the 
line, one round landed near the twenty-eight-year old throwing him to the ground.  Shrapnel had 
torn a massive gash through the bicep of his right arm and another piece had torn a small 
superficial hole through the tricep.  Another shard of metal had lacerated the lower portion of his 
left leg.  As he struggled to his feet, Kelly, with his tunic bloodied and torn, shrugged off the 
assistance of his comrades who attempted to carry his pack for him.  The small detachment of 
Marines pressed on towards the positions that needed phone lines.  Kelly finally returned back to 




Compounding the increasing menace of German artillery was the fact that the eavy 
French 155-millimeter gun batteries had exhausted all available ammunition preventing any 
retaliation on the German guns.  This problem would not be remedied for thirteen hours; only 
sixty 75-millimeter guns were available to provide artillery support.  In the fringes of the woods, 
occupied by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, the enemy artillery also cl imed victims.  
The majority of German shells struck the line occupied by the 76th Company.  Two Marines 
were killed and several wounded including Private Harold Alfred Brooks, who died when the 
concussion of an exploding shell crushed his left leg and led to severe internal bleeding.45   
Despite the lack of available heavy artillery support, some of the light French field guns 
responded to the German shelling.  Private Jackson of the 95th Company recalled the retaliation 
focused to the northeast on either the village of Belleau or Torcy:  
We could see across the valley a mile or so away.  In an open field where a house, 
set about with large spreading trees, and a small, thick wood a stone’s throw 
distant.  The house seemed to be the object of our artillery fire.  Every few 
seconds a shell was dropped in the vicinity of the house, throwing clods and dust 
into the air, leaving where the shell struck an irregular mass of black smoke.  
Such was the distance between us and the falling shells that we did not hear the 
explosion until some seconds after the black puff appeared over the place where 
the shell had dropped.  The shells had been dropping but a short time when, 
following the fall of a shell close to the house, half-crouching, hatless figures 
began to scamper in abandoned haste across the open space to the plot of wood-
running for their lives.  The sight was novel; strange to say, even amusing!  Why I
was affected by this tragic scene in the way I was I do not understand . . . Yet it
was sport now to see these fellows, much like we were and with similar hopes and 
ambitions, running a race with death.46    
 
During the remainder of the day, Jackson and his comrades made numerous movements 
to stabilize the line and in doing so often came under a random barrage of stray machine gun 
rounds that, according to Private Jackson, “zipped through the twigged roof of our dugout.”47 
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The shelling slowly dwindled and the Germans began to branch their assault on the 
division’s eastern flank occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment.  Corporal Pike, a 
member of the 79th company’s 2nd Platoon, watched as the Germans came into view from the 
east: “The attack began with widely spaced skirmishers making short, individual rushes toward 
us, then dropping quickly into the ground cover, making them practically invisible.  The rushes 
were of such short duration that a defending rifleman had not enough time to get an enemy in his 
sights before he disappeared.”48  Corporal Pike watched the spectacle before him helplessly; days 
before, a decree stated that all Marines not carrying an automatic weapon would carry a rifle and 
bayonet.  Corporal Pike had previously carried just a pistol. This new order meant he was 
hurriedly issued whatever rifle was available.  He received a rifle w th a broken front sight that 
swiveled from side to side and was of no use except to hold a bayonet and according to Corporal
Pike, “as far as bayonets were concerned, at no time have I ever looked with favor on them as a 
method of adjusting differences between people.”49As the encroaching Germans came within 
range of the guns of the 79th company’s 2nd platoon, they fired furiously.  “I noticed a young 
Marine on my left,” recalled Corporal Pike,  
lying in the clover and firing his rifle madly, obviously too rapidly to be aiming 
carefully at anything.  I crawled over to him and exercising my, up until then, 
dormant office of corporal, cautioned him about wild firing and urged him to pick 
a target and continue to follow it until he dropped it.  Keep a bead on where the 
enemy dropped out of sight and when he comes up again be ready for him.  After 
several attempts, he knocked over one of the attackers.  I remember we both 
shouted, and I am sure we both felt as if we had just won the war.50
 
 To the west of the 79th Company, the 78th Company under the command of Captain 
Robert E. Messersmith watched the same line of German troops moving through the waving 
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waist-high wheat.  Private Thadeus B. Allen, a member of the company remembered the disarray 
as the German shelling ended, miraculously with no casualties:  
The German barrage lifted . . . The men about me were cursing and swearing in 
that choice collection of profanity that belongs to the Marines . . .The German 
troops were clear of the woods.  On they came with closed ranks in four lines.  
One looked at them with almost a friendly interest.  No particular hate or fear . . . 
The fingers bit into the rifle.51  
‘Hold your fire,’ was the command sent up and down the line according to Allen. 
  The next I recall is firing. Firing. Firing. My fingers were tearing greedily at 
more ammunition . . . I began to fire slower, looking for my mark, making sure of 
a hit.  The Huns now appeared to be on top of us and then all of the sudden, there 
was nothing more to aim at.  A few scattered groups with hands up, racing for out 
lines were shouting ‘Kamerad!  Kamerad’52 
 
According to Allen, those Germans racing towards the 78th Company lines in surreder came 
under the onslaught of German machine gun fire by their own men far to their rear which killed 
several enemy troops.53 Adding to the firepower of Major Holcomb’s battalion were several 
Hotchkiss machine guns of the 77th company dispersed along the battalion’s lines.  These guns 
laid down lethally accurate fire into approaching Germans as they advanced into the open wheat 
fields southeast of the town of Bouresches. 
The fighting of the day gave way to disarray.  All along the lines false reports surfaced.  
No one had a complete grasp as to what the larger picture looked like.  At 3:00pm that afternoon, 
Brigadier General James Harbord received a telephone report from the French high command 
that the right flank of the American line had begun to give way.  Harbord, the ever-impetuous 
leader, prompted Colonel Albertus Catlin, commander of the 6th Marine Regiment, to reiterate to 
his men that the line must be held at all costs.  Harbord also explained that lack of operational 
telephone communication with his regiments was creating serious problems.54  Such quandaries 
53 
 
delayed movements, clouded the accuracy of reports and limited the steady flow and utilization 
of information, and in this case allowed the accuracy of such messages to remain uncler for 
prolonged periods of time.  For forty minutes Harbord fretted over the reports about his right 
flank until shortly afterwards, the phone lines at the 6th Regimental Headquarters became 
operational.  Major Thomas Holcomb, commanding the battalion which occupied the flank in 
question, personally telephoned Harbord to inform him that the reports of his battalions withdra  
was erroneous.  Major Holcomb colorfully added, “When this outfit runs it will be in the other 
direction, nothing doing in the fall back business.”55 
In an effort to stabilize the line and establish liaison, men of the Second Division, largely 
deprived of sleep, denied food and exposed to harassing yet deadly artillery, constantly shifted 
their position in line and began to dig in only to receive orders to move out again as the fighting
went on throughout the late afternoon.  The valley beyond the 2nd Division line echoed with the 
intertwined crescendo of rifle, machine gun, and shellfire.  Billows of white smoke lifted in 
isolated spots beyond the tree lines and along the heights north of the division’s lines.  At 8:00 
p.m. a pilot named Lieutenant Harmon reported that a German regiment was massed in the 
woods two miles to the north and had taken the high ground.  At 8:45 the same pilot reported 
German troops moving south and stood just a mile north of the position occupied Major Maurice 
Shearer‘s 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment.  Soon after this, men of the 95th Company oved 
towards the northern fringes of the woods they occupied where they paused to fix bayonets nd 
awaited further orders.  While this was going on, Private Jackson recalled the pand monium of 
the assault occurring to the north.  From this area, several surviving French soldiers fled south 
through the lines occupied by Jackson’s battalion.56  
54 
 
A raging machine gun battle was going in the valley below us; however, a cloud 
of white smoke overhung it, so we could only hear.  A part of us were sent along a 
fence to our right.  We met excited groups of French soldiers.  These men were 
evidently bent on getting out of the fray.  Further down the fence was a dead 
French soldier and then another.  Both of them wore their sky-blue overcoats and 
their packs.  One lay on his face.  I couldn’t tell where either had been hit, but 
here on the ground were two French whom in the past months we had regarded as 
invulnerable-dead.   The sight of those two dead soldiers was a thousand times 
more impressive.  Appalling!57 
 
By dusk German elements had penetrated into the northern fringes of Belleau Wood, and 
by 7:00 p.m., the Germans had seized the village of Bouresches.  German occupation of the town
meant the French in Belleau Wood had a dangerously exposed flank and the decision was made 
to abandon the woods, which the Germans immediately occupied.  By 1:35 a.m. German forces 
established forward observation posts along the southern edge of the woods, a few hundred 
meters from American lines.58  For the previous two days, the Americans held a reserve stratum 
to augment the decimated French.59  At 9:30 a.m. the next day, command of the sector was to 
pass to the American Second Division under Major General Omar Bundy.  Due to the German 
success that day, June 2, 1918, a vanquished French Corps commander planned a counterattack 
for the following day to vindicate the situation and attempt to retake the positions that were lost 
postponing the passing of command.60 The French line withered with every stand and counter 
they attempted.  Many French units were fragments of already depleted and xhausted groups.  
Throughout the sector, French troops used the darkness of night to effectively pull back and filter 
through the line of the Americans behind them. For days the French fought valiantly, often to the 
last man, allowing the American line the necessary time to stabilize. 
In the depths of night on June 2-3, 1918, elements of the Second Division attempted to 
make physical contact with other outfits on both flanks.  This meant more movement; more sleep 
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deprivation, and more hardship.  The constant movement, not conducive to even brief moments 
of rest, as well as the lack of food and general ignorance of the situation at hand beg  to take a 
toll on the morale of men of the 95th Company.  According the Private Jackson, “The mud-
begrimed exterior and the emptiness within, along with the continued sleepless nights, coupled 
with the belief that we were not getting a square deal, resulted in grumbling.”61 One Marine of 
the 95th Company, Corporal William C. Ferris had, up until the company moved to the present 
front, remained under guard pending charges for a mutinous statement made weeks arlier.  
Jackson described Ferris as “affable and inoffensive, one of the best soldiers in th  company, 
though one of the youngest.”  Due to the young corporal’s charges, he was forced to enter the 
front unarmed.  Despite an effort to acquire a weapon from a casualty, Ferris rema ned without a 
rifle for the next several days.62   
The night and predawn hours of June 2-3, 1918 also allowed for movement of German 
raiding parties actively seeking the lines.  French survivors of the days’ shattered stance against 
the Germans also used the concealment of night to sporadically stroll through American lines.  
French troops passed through the 95th Company’s lines in the darkness.  German raiding parties 
operating nearby and trigger-happy Marines posed a real threat to French stragglers.  One 
German raiding party advanced upon the portion of the 95th company’s line occupied by 
Gunnery Sergeant Peter Morgan’s platoon.  This was near a section where several Fr nch troops 
were filtering back through the line.  An alert Marine observation post spotted the shadowy 
figures in the dim moonlit sky.  With the French soldiers approaching in the vicinity, a potential 
fratricidal disaster loomed.  Gunnery Sergeant Morgan, realizing the danger posed to th  
approaching French, maneuvered along his men and pointed out the exact direction for his men 
to direct their gunfire.  When the German patrol approached to within 200 yards, Morgan’s 
56 
 
platoon fired precisely on the avenue of approach of the enemy.  Muzzle flashes illuminated the 
tree line and shattered the night’s silence for several terrifying seconds.  The German patrol 
immediately wilted and broke into a panicked retreat.63 
German guns remained active well into the darkness shelling pre-registered targ ts, 
including woods and villages.  During the night, Lieutenant Colonel Wise, situated at his 
battalion command post behind the cemetery wall in the city, watched the slow and steady 
glowing haze in the darkened sky as fires erupted in the village of Marigny as result of exploding 
shells.  Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion had yet to make any contact with units east and west 
of him.  His unit was already stretched dangerously thin and could not extend the flanks any 
further.  To reinforce this line, Major Berton Sibley, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine 
Regiment, received orders to dispatch the 82nd Company north toward the troubled area.64   
Major Sibley’s battalion had moved out from the woods during the night as Germans 
were sure to bombard the wood during the night.  Corporal Harry Collins of the 82nd Company 
recorded in his diary, “Had two or three narrow escapes from German shells.  We spent the night 
out in an oat field.”65 Private Scarbrough recalled, “That evening they moved us out of the woods 
and we slept in the open field to avoid being shelled.  They woke us up in the middle of the night 
to move again.  It wasn’t that hard because we were just sleeping under the stars, and with all the 
artillery fire around, you couldn’t sleep anyway.”66 
Reports describing the location of German lines were sketchy during the day since the 
line appeared to be so fluid.  In the midst of the confusion throughout the ranks, some efforts 
were made to scope out not only the American lines but the German lines as well.  A small patrol 
led by Lt. C.C. Gulliver, a U.S. Army officer of the 2nd Division general staff, set out on a 
57 
 
reconnaissance mission just before dawn on June 3, 1918.  Moving north from the direction of 
Lucy-le-Bocage, the detachment tried to avoid silhouetting themselves in the moonlight along 
the inclined slope to the southwest of Belleau Wood.  The patrol succeeded in pinpointing 
German activity less than a mile north of Lucy-le-Bocage.67  As the dawn grew near, fewer 
French troops remained in line, but the coming counterattack and subsequent delay in the passing 
of command of the sector proved vital to the Americans who still lacked divisional artillery 
support and a large number of their machine gun companies.   
The roadways leading to the sector remained choked with traffic from both civilian and 
military personnel.68 The 73rd Machine Gun Company of the 6th Marines was one of those units 
caught in the mayhem.  Private Einar A. Wahl, a twenty-four year old machine gun squad leader 
in the company, recalled the grueling trek to the front.   
Motor trucks were to have transported us, but they didn’t seem to have 
enough to carry us all even though there were hundreds continually passing.  So it 
was a case of hike again for the seventy-third and several other Marine 
companies.  That hike is pretty much a blur.  I hope I will never have to do one 
like it again.  We had one rest from twelve noon until nine in the evening of the 
first day.69  
Eventually trucks became available later in the day.  Wahl recalled,  
Did those trucks look good to us!  Tired out beyond description, we didn’t care 
where we were or where we were going, just so we could ride.  We learned from 
the weary, dust-covered drivers (many of whom hadn’t slept for several days) th t 
the situation was serious and that we were badly needed.  We bumped along all 
night at a tremendous speed, passing the long lines of dim-shaped wagon trains, 
truck trains, cannon, troops, and the poor refugees, who, of course, were bound in 
the opposite direction.70 
 
Similar problems slowed most of the division’s artillery.  As late as 2:45a.m. June 3, 
1918, elements of the 12th Field artillery regiments had passed through the town of Montreuil 
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and were still several miles away from their designated position between La Voi du Chatel and 
Le Ferme Paris.71 Sergeant Joseph J. Gleeson of ‘D’ Battery, 12th Field artillery recorded in his 
diary of June 3, 1918, “Men and horses about exhausted, but we have to get up there quick.  Hit 
the hay at about 6 bells; slept until 11:30; up and now ready to meet the Boche although very 
tired.  No real sleep for four days.  Went into position.”72 
At dawn on June 3, 1918, the French initiated their anticipated counterattack with the few 
broken ranks that remained, but as quickly as it started, it fell apart as German guns shredded the 
columns as the French advanced in the open fields just beyond American lines.  At 7:11a.m. a 
French reconnaissance pilot dropped a message over friendly lines stating, “The French infantry 
could not pass the road one kilometer north of Lucy-le-Bocage because the Germans had thi  
road spotted.”73 German units on the eastern portion fronting the second division continued to 
show signs of increased activity, noted by Lt. Lautier who flew a reconnaissace mission at 
10:00 a.m. over Belleau Wood. The Lieutenant reported, “Some organizations have been notic d 
in the Bois de Belleau, just a few isolated vehicles in the rear lines of enemy.” 74 
 The French assault centered on German forces north of the positions occupied by 
Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion.  Behind them French batteries of 75-millimeter field guns 
began sending rounds at a low trajectory towards the enemy lines.  Down the slopes along the 
horizon, small flashes and subsequent blossoming billows of smoke dotted the valley, were 
shortly followed by the thud of the explosion in a bizarre display placing Lieutenant Colonel 
Wise’s men in the middle of the firing line.  Along the slopes, exhausted and depleted French
troops pressed forward with the promised yet wasteful counterattack.  German fire incessantly 
tore into the French.  A few men managed to get in close to the German lines, but were either cut 
down by the withering fire or retreated back to the lines.  German artillery responded to French 
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batteries firing south of Wise’s battalion, on the outskirts of Marigny and soon its position 
became inundated with exploding shells.   
Lieutenant Colonel Wise had just come from his command post on the outer edge of 
town to inspect the situation along his battalion front when German shells began to fall 
intermittently throughout the village.  Early into the advance, some of the French Chasseurs, a 
name given to the light infantry, began a steady retreat near Champillon.75  Wise entered the 
woods where his 43rd and 18th companies had taken up position the day before.  On the extreme 
left of the line, Captain Lester Wass’s 18th company had dug in along the woods’ norther  face 
and reported German movement down in the valley to the north and throughout the clumps of 
woods 800 meters beyond the front.  Several Marines of the 18th Company noticed to the distant 
enemy movement and open fired with steadily aimed shots.  In front of the lines, Captain Wass 
cautiously led Wise to the edge of the exposed tree line and, through a pair of binoculars, pointed 
out a cut in the distant woods where the Germans could easily move their heavy Maxim machine 
guns as well as any small field pieces.  Forward command posts also reported enemy movement 
in front of the battalion’s line.76     
To the east of the 18th company, Captain Murray of the 43rd also spotted the Germans 
carelessly moving along the tree line down the slope.  Private Walter Cook moved out of the 
cover of the woods to an advanced position in the tall wheat beyond the company’s location.  
Once in place, Cook patiently watched through the waving stalks of wheat.  Steadily h  made out 
occasional shadows lurking in the tree line several hundred meters down slope. Placing the 
telescopic sights of his rifle on the distinguishable human form, he slowly squeezed th  trigger 
until the weapon recoiled into his shoulder followed by the crack of the rifle’s report, muffled in 
the open valley and faded with the distant sound of shots elsewhere along the line.  As the 
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shadowy adversary crumbled to the forest floor, Private Cook quickly reworked the bol  of his 
rifle and scanned the tree line for another roaming German soldier.  During the cours of the 
afternoon, Cook remained out front and took down anywhere from twelve to eighteen Germans 
menacing the woods in the valley below.77 
  Along the battalion lines, numerous Marines, some with scoped rifles, took careful shots 
at visible enemy troops in the valley below.  The sniping accomplished by Marines of the 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment attracted the attention of other members of the battalion as well 
as a few French troops.  Second Lieutenants Chester H. Fraser and Fred H. Becker, United States 
Army officers assigned to the 18th Company moved to the east side of the battalion’s line to 
witness the exhibition of marksmanship.78    
As the sniping occurred along the battalion lines, several German shells sail d by with an 
abrupt and uncanny scream and detonated in succession.  Lieutenant Colonel Wise noticed 
German observation balloons surmounting the horizon.  Shortly after he entered the lines, several 
more shells dropped in the woods and adjacent fields.  Exploding just behind where he stood, 
shrapnel and concussions wounded several Marines.    The woods shuttered under the violent 
barrage.  Marines rushed for cover, huddling under the feeble protection of hastilydug holes.  
Lieutenant Colonel Wise later recalled shells indiscriminately soaring what seemed only a few 
feet over head into the woods.  “Right over my head a shell burst.  I saw a Marine a few feet 
away crumple up.  A shell fragment had torn away his thigh.”79 
Beyond the tree line occupied by the 43rd Company, a detachment of the battalion’s 
intelligence section maintained a forward observation post.  All day this position remained 
exposed to the stray rounds of German machine guns and now fell under the same artillery 
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pounding as the rest of the company.  Private James Hodges, a former house painter from 
Detroit, ran from the open space between the company’s line and the forward outpost.  He 
suddenly tumbled to the ground in the wake of a detonation as shrapnel tore through the twenty-
six year old who immediately fell dead in the tall grass.80 
While the rate of fire increased and rounds seemed to land almost on top of each other, 
Lieutenant Colonel Wise ran east to the neighboring company, also under the same heavy fire 
and suffering casualties.   One of the wounded, Gunner James Gallivan, had a large portion of his 
upper thigh and knee torn away.  Lieutenant Colonel Wise, witnessing litter bears h stily 
evacuating Gallivan, noticed a pale whitish demeanor in the face of the stunned old veteran who 
burst out with a monologue of profanity to mask his agony as he was hurriedly taken out of the 
woods amidst exploding shells.81  Fragments of hot steel twirled through the air with a hideous 
sounding whine.  Those that missed their mark succeeded in piercing the nerve of helpless 
Marines desperately trying to tear at the earth and get below it.  Dirt, twigs and soil soared 
through the air in a melee of dust clouds and debris coupled with the deafening concussions that 
accompanied each incoming round.  The experience penetrated beyond the auditory senses and 
into the very core of one’s psyche, even for those too distant to experience the shriek of lethal 
steel chunks coursing through the air. The long desired and likely unanticipated distant 
confrontation with the enemy had abruptly materialized for the men of the 2nd Battalion, 5th 
Marine Regiment.  
For many it was more than they had bargained for.  It was a baptism of modern-age 
warfare more terrifying than they had anticipated.  Two other Marines of the43rd company were 
wounded and one killed during the barrage.  One man, Private John M. Russell, convulsed so 
uncontrollably following the incessant storm of artillery fire that he was taken to the rear as a 
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victim of shell shock.82  The increasingly intense volume of artillery directed on the battalion’s 
position suggested German balloons had spotted the commotion occurring in Lieutenant Colonel 
Wise’s line.       
 As the onslaught ensued and gradually dwindled, Lieutenant Colonel Wise continued his 
reckless journey further east over to the position occupied by Captain Blanchfield’s 55th 
Company.  Blanchfield tentatively held their section of the line, which spread into the concealed 
confines of the farm grounds where men also hunkered down in their rapidly dug holes.  This 
area offered no fortified protection and German shells had long sent men scrambling for their 
lives.  In front of the company’s position was a forward observation post that offered a favor ble 
field of fire as well as advantageous vantage point.  This position, established by First Lieutenant 
Lemuel Shepherd, was several hundred yards in front of Les Mares Farm, upslope from Hill 165.  
Earlier that morning, Lieutenant Shepherd sought permission from Captain Blanchfield to take 
several men forward to claim this advantageous position.  Once in place, Lieutenant Shepherd 
left a sergeant in charge of the command post and moved back to Les Mares Farm, where he 
remained into the late afternoon.  Lieutenant Shepherd’s role was to rove from the main line to 
this outpost with the latest observations.  French Chasseurs still held a position at the farm.  A 
French Major in charge of the remnants of the two French battalions gave Wise a relatively bleak 
outlook.  According to Lieutenant Colonel Wise, the French Major declared, “It looks blue. The 
whole German army has broken through.  I don’t think we will be able to stop them.  What are 
you going to do?”   Lieutenant Colonel Wise sternly replied, “Our orders are to stick.”83 
 During the bombardment of Colonel Wise’s lines the French counterattack, nearly a 
kilometer to the north, had come under extreme fire further down the valley.  The withering 
German barrage cutting into the French ranks also soared into the lines at Les Mares, and the 
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rounds sailed overhead on the crest of the ridge where Les Mares was located.  The farm, 
situated on the high ground, resembled a hornet’s nest as German rounds zipped and cracked 
from distant machine gun barrels far down the ridge.  Gunfire and artillery rounds landed along 
the defilade south of the buildings sailing over Wise as he moved from the shelter of th  farm.  
He recalled sprinting back to his command post at Marigny to avoid becoming a victim of stray 
German shells and stray machine gun rounds soaring all around him.84 
 German shells also targeted the town of Marigny.  Buildings that had stood for centu ies 
shattered under the German bombardment, a spectacle Wise watched helplessly from the 
huddled seclusion provided by the cemetery wall at the northeast edge of the village.  Just north 
of the village, the battalion aid station operated under the command of Navy commander Lester 
Pratt, also under heavy shellfire.  The facilities proximity to the line occupied by Wise’s 
battalion was crucial to getting the wounded treated and evacuated to a hospital.  Despite th  
dangers, the steady flow of wounded could be treated almost immediately.85  
  Once at his command post, with regimental phone lines operational Wise called 
Lieutenant Colonel Feland’s headquarters located near a rock quarry 300 meters northwest of 
Wise.  During his visit to the front earlier in the afternoon, Wise learned that no contact had been 
made with the 6th Marine Regiment to the east or the 23rd Army Infantry regiment in the west.  
According to Lieutenant Colonel Wise this detail caused quite a bit of concern among the 5th 
Marine Regiment since every available soldier and Marine was already hol ing an extremely 
tenuous position on the front and no other troops were readily available to secure this weak 
point.  Wise was asked if his Marines would be able to hold the line in place with the men he had 
available and he promised the regimental command staff his battalion would hold their current 
position at all costs.86 During the conversation, Neville advised Wise to find the extreme left of 
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the regiment east of his position.  If a gap still existed, Neville advised Wise to extend his 
already thin line toward it.87  In addition to his exposed flanks, Wise still lacked significant 
machine gun support along his sector of the front.  Several machine guns were in routto bolster 
the very few guns operating up and down the line, but they too came under heavy artilleryfi e as 
they converged on the lively front. 
 Private Einar A. Wahl of the 73rd Machine Gun Company had arrived in the village of 
La Voi du Chatel earlier that morning and, following an exhaustive trek to the front.  The 
company was allotted a few hours sleep before continuing north to take up a position in line. 
German shells interrupted their already restless nap.  Private Wahl recalled: 
 Managed to sleep for a couple hours, but the roar from artillery and machine guns 
in front became increasingly heavy as the day advanced that rest was imposible.  
Stretchers with wounded French Marines began coming up from the lines.  
Ambulance after ambulance dashed and dashed back again.  We realized that we 
were at last in the thick of things.  About noon a couple of high-explosive shells 
dropped near us.  Then another and another.  We were caught in an enemy 
artillery barrage that lasted about two hours.  Our first casualty occurred then; 
Corporal Johnson was hit by a piece of shell through the back, and died a few 
minutes afterwards.  We sought shelter everywhere, falling flat on our faces as we 
heard shells come screeching down.  We just had to lie flat wondering if the next 
was going to get us.  One shell landed about fifteen feet from me and exploded.  I 
heard a scream at the same time and looked up.  It had landed in a hole where two 
chaps from another company were lying.  Several of us rushed over to the spot 
and pulled them out.  They were horribly cut up, but not dead.  A horse tied to a 
tree about five feet away was killed instantly.  I can’t begin to describe my state 
of mind-you will have to imagine it.  We were getting our first real taste of he 
horrors of war.88 
 
 Four Hotchkiss machine guns of the 81st Machine Gun Company quickly arrived to 
strengthen the battalion’s line.  They moved west, the left side of the line whereCaptain Lloyd 
William’s 51st Company took up a position.   This part of the line also fell under the barrage.  
On arrival, the gun crews carried the heavy tripods of the machine guns out beyond the cover of 
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the tree line and set up a forward position.  When the German barrage targeted the 51st 
Company’s sector, these machine guns were caught in the open.  Believing the barrag 
foreshadowed an infantry assault, several men stayed with the guns as the intensity of the 
incoming artillery fire increased.  Detonating overhead, shell fragments of all sizes rained down 
on the Marines out in the open.  Suddenly a shell detonated near one of the guns instantly killing 
Private Floyd H. Deckro.  Three more men were wounded by the heavy volume of incoming fire 
and lay helpless as the ferocity of exploding shells forced the remaining machine gun crews to 
lay flat on the ground.89 
 As shells fell on the 51st Company, the French withdrawal through the American lines 
drew a withering barrage of enfilading machine gun fire.  A stray round caught Priva e William 
Theodore Hayden in the open, tearing through the twenty-one year olds left groin, luck ly 
missing the femoral artery.  Hayden was immediately bandaged amid the snap of bullets 
overhead.  Artillery exploded with increasing frequency.  Shells continued to drop, one on top of 
the next while Marines continued to maintain their positions.  Moments into the volley, twenty-
two year old Corporal Karl W. Locke fell, severely wounded out in the open.  Immediately, thr e 
Marines rushed out into the open amidst the deafening pound of incoming rounds and deadly 
shrapnel to rescue the gravely wounded man.  Twenty-two year old Sergeant James Henry 
Parsons and two other men grabbed Corporal Locke and made a cumbersome dash to the shelter 
of a hastily dug hole.  Another shell exploded nearby, killing the already wounded Corporal 
Locke.  The concussion threw the other three Marines to the ground.  Miraculously, Sergeant 
Parsons was untouched; the other two men were severely wounded.  Private Hayden, his pai ful 
wound hastily bandaged, hobbled out to help drag the wounded to safety.90   
66 
 
The French counterattack had long since ended as the German guns increased their range 
to catch the fleeing French.  A heightened intensity of the barrage allud d to the Marines that an 
enemy ground assault might follow.  When the salvo momentarily died out along his company’s 
position, Captain Williams sent an urgent message to Lieutenant Colonel Wise stating, “All 
French troops on our right have fallen back, leaving a gap on our right.  Two platoons of the 95th 
Company have reported to fill the gap.  Request that additional men be ordered to fill the gap at 
once.”91 
The mass French withdrawal put the 2nd division into increasingly direct contact with the 
Germans, especially near Captain William’s company.  This location als he d the 5th section of 
the 15th Machine Gun Company manning a Hotchkiss machine gun.  Shrub and vegetation in 
this area was thick enough to keep the crew well concealed, and Gunnery Sergeant Carl H. 
Horton found an opening in the undergrowth that offered good observation and an optimum field 
of fire.  The detachment, which included Privates Maurice Jackman, Hood L. Haynie and Jason 
W. Thurston, had been in position since the day before.  Heavy enemy activity that afternoon put 
the men on an anxious alert.  Occasionally, rounds snapped overhead as German gunners tried to 
feel out their position.  Private Haynie recalled, “Sgt. Horton kept peering over the shrubbery 
every little while to see if he could spot the enemy that was firing.”  After gazing through the 
opening at one point, he straightened up a bit from his crouched position to roll a cigarette. As 
soon as he stood, a muffled snapping sound rippled through the air. The robust gunnery sergeant 
indolently wilted to the ground.  A sniper’s bullet had entered Horton’s left side near the 
shoulder, severing his spinal cord, deflecting through the lung and exiting the right side of his 
torso.  Horton lay on the ground wide-eyed, bleeding profusely, and gasping for air.  His men 
rushed to his side as he lay there paralyzed from the waist down.  Litter bearers arrived 
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immediately and rolled his flaccid body onto a stretcher, rushing him to a field dressing station 
nearby.92  
During the retreat of French troops through the line later the evening of June 3, 1918, a
French Major approached the company’s second in command, Captain William O. Corbin, and 
told the young officer the Germans were not far behind and to pull his line back.  Corbin 
incredulously ignored the order.  Thinking the young American did not understand his broken 
English, the French officer wrote on a piece of paper a direct order to retreat.  Corbin to k the 
message to Captain Williams.  As his eyes followed the hastily scribbled text wi h bewilderment 
and disbelief, Captain Williams, according to Lieutenant Colonel Feland and First Lieutenant 
Joseph A. Hagen, reacted with astonishment, and exclaimed, “Retreat, hell wejust got here.”93 
Amid exploding shells and the haunting drone of stray and concentrated small arms fire, 
William’s briefly discussed the situation with one of his platoon leaders, First Lieutenant Joseph 
A. Hagen.  Captain William’s then summoned twenty-nine-year old Private John Francis Russell 
to use his back as a desk top to write the following message to Lieutenant Colonel Wise, “The 
French major gave Captain Corbin written orders to fall back - I have countermaded the order- 
kindly see that the French do not shorten their artillery range- 82nd and 84th companies are on 
their way to fill the gap on the right of this company- Lloyd W. Williams, Captain U.S.M.C.”94 
West of Captain Williams’ 51st Company, the increased concentration of artillery 
inflicting shock upon the 51st Company continued at varying levels of intensity at Les Mares 
Farm and Blanchfield’s 55th Company.  During the bombardment, a volley of shells crept 
toward the small cluster of farm buildings.  Lieutenant Shepherd’s detachment of men holding a 
forward post, in place since the morning, was enacted under the idea that they would fall back 
once the artillery fire increased in frequency, a sign that an attack would follow. Lieutenant 
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Shepherd, under the permission of Captain Blanchfield, took his orderly and inched back out 
towards this forward position just as enemy artillery rained down.  The barrage fell dangerously 
close to Lieutenant Shepherd and one of his orderlies. The concussion of incoming rounds swept 
the ground like a violent windstorm of unprecedented intensity.  Ducking and dropping to the 
ground along the way, Lieutenant Shepherd recalled one shell slamming into the gr und about 
six feet in front of them tossing dirt forward; it did not explode, a miraculous stroke of luck.  
Once the barrage passed them, the two men finally reached the beleaguered outpost of men 
cowering amidst the incessant pounding of enemy artillery that gradually slacked in intensity.  In 
the distance, figures obscured by the drifting haze of smoke sifting across the slope came into 
view.95 Lieutenant Shepherd’s outpost, fourteen strong, watched as evenly spaced rows of 
German helmets bobbed in and out of view a kilometer away along the irregularly-sloped 
ground.   
The French assault earlier in the day had virtually broken and most of the surviving 
Chasseurs had made their way back through the lines held by Wise’s battalion.  The enemy 
artillery had long slackened in intensity which meant that the enemy infantry would more than 
likely be on the assault. Several hundred meters back at Les Mares Farm and in the eastern 
portion of Bois de Veuilly the men of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment watched the 
columns of enemy troops close on high ground centered on the farm (See Appendix C).    Some 
men moved out of the shelter of the farm buildings across a narrow farm trail into the fronting 
field where they laid prone.   Other men hunkered down in their fighting holes as shouting men 
relayed the order to hold fire until commanded.  Private Paul Bonner, a twenty-year old clerk 
from New York City recalled,  
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We ran up a road toward a hill and as we reached the top, I saw my commanding 
officer, Captain John Blanchfield, standing at the side of the road. ‘The devils are 
coming on,’ he shouted.  ‘You have been waiting for them for a year; now go get 
them.’  He was shouting in his Irish brogue and his blood was up.  He thrilled 
every one of us.  We ran across a wheat field and dropped in it.96
 
Appendix C. Les Mares Farm 
 Lieutenant Colonel Wise had just left the shelter of his command post along the 
cemetery wall at Marginy and moved up the road towards the farm after the latest barrage had 
thinned out.  “I reached the crest and stood still.  A long way off over those grain fields I could 
see thin lines of infantry advancing.  I realized that I couldn’t give an order that would be of any 
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help.  Everything to be done had been done.  I stood there and watched them come . . . I was 
frozen, but fascinated.”97 
Further southeast of Les Mares Farm in the village of La Voi-du-Chatel, Colonel Catlin 
and his regimental adjutant; Major Frank E. Evans watched the German advance towards Les 
Mares farm from a second-story window. According to Colonel Catlin the Germans moved down 
a gradual slope and advanced by platoons from the north and northeast.  The German 
counterattack had already driven right through whatever isolated French soldier  remained near 
Hill 165.  The Chasseurs who survived their vanquished assault made a hasty withdrawal, 
stopping only for moments to get off a few shots, all in hopes of hindering the slow and ste dy 
pace of the enemy.98 
 Once the enemy came into view of the 55th Company in front of the few farm buildings 
at Les Mares, they allowed the Germans to approach within relatively close rang .  Private 
Bonner recalled, “We all looked to see that our rifles were loaded.  From somewhere along the 
road we got the command to fire.  Sharpshooters only, I thought I heard them say, but everybody 
fired.” 99 
 According to Evans, once the firing began, it was incessant.100  The sound of pulsating 
American machine guns pierced the open fields with a haunting undulation echoing acrss the 
valley.  Shells burst along the slope searching for advancing columns of German troops.  A 
sudden flash of white smoke appeared; a second or two later a dull crushing thud as the crash of 
detonation became audible to the distant spectators.  Occasionally, a blossom of white smoke 
would engulf part of the German column as a shell found its mark.  Rifle fire from the line of 
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Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s men as well as heavy machine gun fire from the Hotchkiss guns tore 
into unsuspecting German soldiers in a chaotic spectacle.101   
According to Private Bonner, “Those Germans just melted away.  Whole columns went 
down and the others scattered to the right and left.  They were utterly stunned and surprised, and 
there was not an answering shot.”102 While the 55th Company’s main line received little return-
fire, the advance observation post of Lieutenant Shepherd’s detachment had quite a differ nt
experience. From the confines of the little knoll where he established a forward operating post, 
Lieutenant Shepherd and his small detachment watched as the enemy closed the gap. “We held 
our fire until they got within 300 or 400 yards.  We had no machine guns, nor any artillery.”103 
To gain a better view without exposure, Lieutenant Shepherd leaned against a tree at the top of 
the knoll.  Shepherd vividly recalled the incident.   
By now the Germans had worked their way around the hill.  We opened up with 
everything we had.  They opened up with a machine gun they had worked into 
position.  The first blast hit me in the neck.  It spun me around.  My first reaction 
was to see if I could spit.  I wanted to see if the bullet had punctured my throat 
and figured if I could spit I was alright.  I could spit.104   
The encroaching German formations withered, and eventually the few survivors made a 
hasty retreat by dusk.   
As darkness set in on the evening of June 3, 1918 men of Private Jackson’s 95th Company 
slogged through the thick woods to the east of Lieutenant Colonel Wise’s battalion to cl se the 
gap between the two units.  Private Jackson remembered stumbling upon the bodies of dead 
Frenchmen sprawled along the forest floor in the darkness as his company spread out to form a 
line.  One Marine, Sergeant Wilbur Summerlin, was “ransacking their packs, nd I don’t know 
what else, to get whatever suited his fancy.”105  Private Jackson described his initial shock at 
watching this.  “I was amazed at his coolness and unconcern in doing what it took me weeks to 
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learn to do, and then with a great sense of relief when I had finished the job.”106 As Private 
Jackson trudged away from this sight, he came upon yet another ghastly scene.  He wrote in his 
memoirs:   
Before I knew it I was at the edge of an opening in the bushes and trees, and at my feet was a 
large hole six or eight feet across.  In the hole were the mangled bodies of three Frenchmen.  
Against the back of the hole on the side nearest me leaned one of the bodies, nearly bolt upright, 
with the head and neck almost gone.  The body of one of the other men presented a sight scarcely 
less ghastly.  The combined odor of the high explosive gas, which still lingered ther, and the 
decaying bodies, sent me hurriedly away.107  
By dawn the American artillery was operational in the rear of the line greatly 
strengthening their presence by providing firepower to a thinly-held sector.  According to the 
diary of Sergeant Joseph J. Gleeson of ‘D’ battery 2nd Battalion 12th Field Artillery, the French 
75-millimeter guns began to fire a barrage at 3:00 a.m. on the morning of June 4, 1918.  They 
maintained their steady fire until 9:00 a.m.  According to Private Warren Jackson, German guns 
were also very active.  Once the guns of the 2nd Division commenced fire, their shells fell short.   
Few of the shells went more than a hundred yards beyond our lines, and some hit 
in our positions.  Knowing the experienced Germans outnumbered us, continually 
harassed by their artillery fire, and then to have our own guns threatening us with 
annihilation every moment-the anguish we suffered could not be described.  What 
in the world could be the cause of this bombardment by our own guns?  Why was 
the range not raised?  We asked one another the questions in vain.108
 
The German probe along the line waned under the fire by the Americans.  The French, all 
but annihilated, managed to buy the 2nd Division precious time. Unbeknownst to the French and 
Americans, the seemingly successful offensive of the German Army was very much a blunder.  
Ludendorff’s ability to launch additional offensives elsewhere, which had been his initial plan, 
failed because the Germans committed too many resources to the present drive west of Chateau 
Thierry.  The drive was initiated under the pretense that it was to serve as a diversion to and 
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when the first vestiges of success were felt, Ludendorff decided to press on with the offensive.  
“A tactical distraction had become a great strategic victory,” said General Robert L. Bullard in 
describing the initial phase of the German offensive.109  
The decision to continue to exploit the initial success of the drive diverted supplies meant 
for other planned offensives.  When the pace of the attack slowed down, they continued to feed 
precious provisions on continuously congested thoroughfares, creating immense supply problems 
and slowing the pace.  The corps commander, General Von Conta, realized his units were worn 
down.  Evidence of this appears in official German documents when he sent out a memorandum 
to his officers stating:  
We are compelled to temporarily assume the defensive, after positions most 
suitable for this purpose are captured.  I insist that all commanders inform their 
troops, leaving no doubt in their minds, that our attack up to this time had passed 
far beyond the objectives that were first assigned, and had achieved far greate
success than had been anticipated.  The offensive spirit must be maintained even 
though a temporary lull in the attack seems to exist.110 
Casualties had mounted from the beginning of the offensive on May 27, 1918.  Adding 
additional mere burden was the hardened resistance by the French and American line.  The 
flanks of the German 7th Army’s drive had slowed significantly at Rheims and Soissons, 
allowing the center of General Von Boehn’s 7th Army, consisting of General Von Conta’s corps 
facing the American 2nd Division, to advance into an increasingly narrow front now thirty miles 
deep and lacking any protection on the flanks.  Supplying this region was arduous.   According 
to Crown Prince Kaiser Wilhelm, “the difficulties of supply, which could only be brought up to 




Since resources used to sustain the Chemin des Dames front were intended to aid the 
offensive of the German 18th Army on the British front led Kaiser Wilhelm to declare: 
 In view of this situation my Army Group staff as early as June 3 opposed the 
continuation of the offensive [Chemin des Dames] in the form of open warfare.  
The attack must not be resumed except after systematic preparation and then only 
at a particularly favorable point, or in parts of the line where local straightening 
out was necessary.  The resumption of the offensive in a southwesterly direction 
was to await the result of the attack on the southern front of the Eighteenth 
Army.112 
 
Ludendorff’s offensive resorted to a leap frog advance, applying pressure from one front 
to the next.  At that moment General Von Boehn’s 7th Army was to stand at ease, while the 18th 
Army in the west made its leap forward on a different front. Major General A.D. Von Unruh, 
Chief of the General Staff, 4th Reserve Corps, stated 
Though we told ourselves and our men, ‘on to Paris,’ we knew this was not to be . 
. . Our casualties were increasingly alarming; ammunition was running short and 
the problem of supply, in view of the large demands, became more and more 
difficult.  It became all too clear that actions so stubbornly contested and 
involving us in such formidable losses would never enable us to capture Paris.  In 
truth the brilliant offensive had petered out.113 
 
 In reality, this was a very limited engagement; something noted the author Robert Asprey 
who stated: 
 In terms of comparative casualties the two-day action appeared relatively 
insignificant-it cost the Germans of Corps Conta just over 200 casualties, the 
Americans of the Second Division slightly more than 250.  Such small actions, 
however, can sometimes lend a war a new direction: a German breakthrough 
would have greatly altered the subsequent fighting, undoubtedly to the enemy’s 
benefit.  Contrarily, his failure marked the turning point of the southern 
offensive.114 
Contemporary examination of this phase of the battle portrays the American stance in the 
region around Les Mares Farm as a desperate linchpin that plugged the German pathw y to 
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Paris.  Author Edward Lengel, wrote of the engagement, “Together they held a six-mile front, 
stopping  a heavy German assault on June 4 that brought the enemy to within fifty miles of Pari , 
legend has it that when a French officer told a Marine captain to retreat, the American snarled: 
‘Retreat, hell.  We just got here.’”115  This largely ignores the weakened condition of 
Ludendorff’s forces. 
From this moment, subsequent actions by American forces were against a defensive 
German flank, not the apex of the German thrust: a major and crucial factor for placing the battle 
that followed into context.  This development is noteworthy as the American advance would 
disrupt miniscule expansions of the newly postured German defense flank.  This information was 
unknown to the Americans or French, yet their stance in this region went down in history as he 
primary factor stopping the German drive on Paris.  The assault that occurred two days later, one 
donned in lore and legend, more than anything revealed to the American military the true cost of 
offensive operations in twentieth-century warfare providing United States troops with a 





Learning the Ways of 20th Century Warfare 
The suspension of German offensive operations in the region west of Chateau Thierry 
does not appear in any of the available records to be known by either the French or Americans.  
Nonetheless, two developments had greatly improved the situation for the Americans and 
French.  First, a fresh division of French troops arrived to relieve the extrem w st flank, 
reducing the front of the 2nd Division and resulting in better liaison and communications.  
Second, American artillery and machine gun support had arrived in significant numbers, 
strengthening its defensive capability of the region.  Despite the large American presence in this 
region, the Second Division still remained under the command of French General Jean 
Degoutte’s XXI Corps and all major command decisions over this sector fell under his sc utiny. 
On June 5, 1918, General Degoutte decided his forces would launch a counterattack 
against enemy positions the following day.  The high ground the Germans attained on June 4, 
1918 provided a commanding view of the territory below.  Additional German assaults were 
possible from this region, a dangerous factor that needed consideration.  Despite improvement in 
the situation, much of the 2nd Division was still shifting in an effort to solidify the weak points 
of its positions.  Reinforcement of the sector continued well into the night.  Phone lines remained 
largely inoperable for almost every unit from the regimental level down to the company and 
communication came by runner, greatly prolonging movement of troops.  General Degoutte’s 
orders for counterattack came amidst the chaotic rearrangement of the line. 
At 3:00p.m. June 5, 1918, French headquarters issued the order for the French 167th 
Division to advance north in conjunction with the west wing of the Second Division.  The 
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Americans’ objective was to move with the French and seize the elongated ridg enoted Hill 
142 north of the town of Champillon.1  Orders filtered down to the Marine Brigade and Brigadier 
General James Harbord was tasked with designating the unit to undertake the assault. As 
message runners scrambled along the lines locating necessary officers, ord r  f r the attack were 
greatly delayed.  Finally at 10:25 p.m. June 5, 1918 the headquarters staff of the Marine Brigade 
sent word of the attack to the designated unit.  The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 
commanded by Major Julius Turrill, would carry out the assault scheduled to begin at 3:45 .m. 
June 6, 1918.2 
Due to the earlier panic that gripped Lieutenant Colonel Wise over the sector held by his 
battalion days earlier, Major Turrill’s men had been dispatched to help strengthen the line.  On 
the afternoon of June 5, Major Turrill had only two of his four companies in line and was 
awaiting relief by elements of the freshly arrived French division.  Situated in the town of 
Marigny, nearly two kilometers from where the attack was to take place, Major Turrill recalled, 
“Then about one or two o’clock on the morning of the 6th we got orders to go up and make an 
attack on hill 142.”3 Major Turrill had only a few hours in the darkness of night to assemble 975 
men of his battalion and move them to the jump-off point from which the assault would begin. 
The objective had not been reconnoitered.  Two of his companies were in line several hundred
meters north scattered in a thick patch of woods making only half of his battalion ready to 
assemble for the pending attack.4 
Major Turrill’s two available companies in of the town of Marigny formed and moved 
out in the predawn hours of June 6, 1918.  Marching through fields they came toward the 
outskirts of the village of Champillon.  Here the companies came to a halt.  None of the 
designated machine gunners sent to support the battalion’s assault had yet reported to Major 
78 
 
Turrill.  Only the 15th Machine Gun Company was available to assist.  The other had not arrived 
in position.5    Only two of the battalion’s four companies stood poised for orders; the other two 
had not been relieved from their position nearly two kilometers away. 
Captain Jonas Platt, a replacement who arrived only hours before, stood among his men 
and awaited the next set of instructions and awaiting for food to be brought up to the line.  Platt’s 
introduction to front line duty granted him no spare moments to acclimate to his new unit.  He 
recalled the pandemonium that morning. 
Just then the captain stumbled toward me with orders to put the company into combat formation.  
We formed into a bulbous group in the darkness.  No one was depending on supplies, for they 
were not coming up.  Everything was too frenzied, too new, too hurriedly organized to hope for 
them.  We formed to go through fields, a ruined village and then into woods, where we 
deployed6 
According to Captain John Thomason, “The platoons came out of the woods as dawn was 
getting gray.  The light was strong when they advanced into the open wheat, now allstarred with 
dewy poppies, red as blood.”7 Gunnery Sergeant Gerald Finnegan, a member of the 49th 
Company, used the tip of his bayonet to force open a salvaged can of salmon and skewered th  
meat with his blade to hastily devour the morning meal.  “When you are quite through with your 
refreshments, you can damn well fix that bayonet and get on with the war!,” belted out an 
enraged lieutenant, who caught the Finnegan consuming what turned out to be his final meal.8   
The two available companies fanned out, and according to Major Turrill, “I had the 49th 
Company, Captain George Hamilton, on the right and First Lieutenant Orlando Crowther 
commanding the 67th Company on the left.”9  Before Major Turrill could signal attack, his men 
were twenty-five meters past the jump-off point and beyond the concealment of the woods.  
Faced with the crucial decision of letting the attack commence or waiting until his full force 
arrived, Turrill gave the order to proceed since the battalion’s supporting machine guns were set 
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to fire a preliminary volley timed exactly at the moment of attack.10  As whistles signaled the 
advance, Private Walter H. Smith of the 49th Company recalled: 
At four a.m. we went over or rather charged forward since there were no trenches 
to speak of and the fighting was all in the open or in the woods.  There wasn’t a 
bit of hesitation from any man.  All went forward in an even line.  You had no 
heart for fear at all.  Fight-fight and get the Germans was your only thought.  
Personal danger didn’t concern you in the least and you didn’t care.11 
 
As the men advanced beyond the tree line into the open field, Major Turrill came up to 
watch his men amble down slope into the wheat.  Another dark looming wood stood a couple 
hundred meters across the open field (Appendix D).  Behind the advancing Marines, minimal 
machine gun support chattered away in search of the German positions.  Major Turrill ecalled, 
“There was a barrage from some machine guns; I remained in the jump-off trench until the fourth 
wave of the two companies disappeared into the woods.”12       
The apex of the Marine attack on the hill was a rather weakened position for the Germans 
who established a liaison on the hill between two German regiments.  The attack by he Marines 
centered on a position held by one German platoon.  Across the field, in the western edge of the 
facing woods, Second Lieutenant Bezon, commanding that platoon in the 9th Company of the 
460th German Infantry Regiment, heard the distant whistle across the field, signaling the 
American advance.  According to Bezon, “. . . we were ready.”13 He witnessed the formations of 
Americans emerging out of the distant tree line and immediately signaled for artillery support by 




Appendix D. Map of attack on Hill 142 
  As the two companies of Marines crept further across the open field, the fronting tree 
line came alive with a blaze of Maxim machine gun fire. Immediately men in thefirst wave of 
the 67th Company dropped in the wheat as rounds snapped violently all around them.  The initial 
burst caught the Marines off guard and according to Second Lieutenant Bezon, caused the 
Americans to fade into “disordered masses.”15 Private Andrew Champion of the 67th Company 
was an assistant gunner on an automatic rifle team.  As the German machine guns swept the 
field, Private Champion saw his gunner, Private Harry Y. Flynn slump into the tall wheat as 
bullets tore through his abdomen.  Before he could react, the same burst wounded Private 
Champion, sending him to the ground.  His friend, Private Flynn, painfully wounded, lay nearb
and died about fifteen minutes later.16  Private John L. Carver recalled the horror when he saw 
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his friend, Private Russell J. Wakefield, killed as machine gun bullets shattered his skull.  “He 
was one of my pals and I was right along side of him,” said Carver.17   
Men in the 67th Company fell wounded and dead by the dozens.  Private George E. Fesler 
advanced toward the distant tree line with his platoon.  When he peered from under the brim of 
his helmet he saw his comrade, Private Walter L. Haynes, fall dead as a bullet passed through his 
forehead.18  Private Fesler then saw Corporal William J. Flaherty’s dead body lying nearby.19  
Casualties in Private Joseph M. Baker’s platoon were inflicted by one of the three Ge man guns 
in the nearby tree line.  Members of the platoon scattered for cover.  Private Baker made a dash 
through the meadow at an angle towards the muzzle flashes emanating from the facing woods.  
Dropping in the wheat, Baker took careful aim and fired his rifle at the machine gun crew 
nearby.  One of his rounds killed the enemy gunner.  Several men in Baker’s platoon continued 
to advance on the tree line.  Private Baker repeatedly worked the bolt of his weapon until he had 
exhausted all five rounds.  He sprang up and began to close the distance on the machine gun 
from the side.  Distracted by the chaos out in front, the remaining German crewmen evidently 
did not see Private Baker approaching until he stood nearly on top of them thrusting his bayonet 
into the remaining enemy, killing all of them.20 
Simultaneously, Captain George Hamilton’s 49th Company in the east did not fare much 
better.  “Hadn’t moved fifty yards when they cut loose at us from the woods ahead- more 
machine guns than I’d ever heard before,” recalled Hamilton in a letter home weeks after the 
incident.21  Captain Hamilton maneuvered among his men urging them to get on their feet and 
press forward toward the tree line.  As the pulsating whip of machine gun fire sailed 
indiscriminately over the fields, the wounded lay writhing in the wheat.  Slowly and collectively 
small groups made small advances for the tree line.  Sergeant William Van Train charged 
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through the field that morning with Hamilton and witnessed the ghastly efficiency of the 
machine guns as he saw Privates Edmund J. LaBonte, Henry Penney and David Tartikoff all cut 
down by the murderous fire.  Private LaBonte was shot through the head and died instantly.  
Private Joe G. Oliver recalled his good friend Private James McQuiddy slumping into the wheat 
after a bullet had passed through his abdomen.22  Suddenly, a piercing shriek added to the 
crescendo of gunfire as German shells began to drop in the field.   
Before the Marines could infiltrate the woods in great numbers, German troops decided 
to relinquish their position, fleeing the woods on Second Lieutenant Bezon’s orders.  As they 
filtered back toward their main line, they were mistaken for Americans and came under fire from 
their own guns.23  Several of Lieutenant Bezon’s men did not hear the order to pull back and 
remained in the first tree line where most were either killed or captured.  One German sergeant 
held off the onrushing Americans with grenades as another man took the last functioning 
German machine gun and withdrew out of the woods.  Even though they inflicted heavy 
casualties, German soldiers in the first patch of woods were a mere picket line sent out as 
observers.  The primary German defenses stood at the other end of a second wheat field in  
fronting tree line.24 
The 49th Company battled their way deeper into the woods.  Captain Platt remembered,  
Machine guns rattled and dropped.  There we started to form again, while I tried 
to count my men.  Suddenly a machine gun far ahead opened up spitefully, but 
there came no whine of bullets.  Inasmuch as I had the only two hand grenades in 
my unit, I crawled ahead a bit to see what was happening.  There, grouped about a 
captured German machine gun, were ten of my missing men having the time of 
their lives, banging away with this captured gun at anything that looked boche.25   
The front elements of Captain Hamilton’s group in the west edge of the assault pressed 
through to the north side of the initial patch of woods where, according to Hamilton, “we came 
to an open field-a wheat field full of red poppies-and here we caught hell.  Again it was a case of 
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rushing across the open and getting into the woods.”26  Captain John Thomason recalled one 
unidentified officer, pinned down in the first wheat field, and stuck his head just above the stalks 
of wheat for better observation.  The officer sent a corporal and his squad to maneuver ro nd 
one machine gun.   
‘Get far enough past that flank gun, now, close as you can and rush- we’ll keep it busy.’  The 
corporal judged that he was far enough and raised with a yell, his squad leaping up with him.  He 
was not past the flank; two guns swung that way, and cut the squad down like a grass-hook 
levels a clump of weeds. . . They lay there for days, eight Marines in a dozen yards, face down 
on their rifles.27   
 One squad of Marines from the 49th Company made it inside the woods and immediately 
drew the attention of a German machine gun, which killed and wounded several men of the 
group. Private John Kukoski unflinchingly charged toward the enemy gun alone with his 
bayonet-tipped rifle.  The enemy, completely taken by surprise, threw their hands up in the air 
and surrendered to the twenty-nine year old private.28 
The Marines of the 49th Company encountered the 10th Company of the 462nd German 
Infantry.  Shattered by the sudden assault, the company of Germans broke but an adjacent
company situated in the woods across the ravine to the east of the hill opened fire with s veral 
machine guns and quickly took a toll on the 49th Company.29  Captain Jonas Platt made a dash 
for the tree line, lost his footing and stumbled to the ground.  He eventually caught up with the 
rest of his company who advanced quickly through the fire-swept field.  “When I reached the 
woods I was the whole command!  The rest were gone, planted and hidden so effectively that 
even I couldn’t locate them.  Gradually I rounded them up and tied them to one spot with 
emphatic remarks.”30 
Captain Hamilton advanced with his company through the second forest.  He later 
admitted, “After going through this second wood we were really at our objective, but I was 
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looking for an unimproved road which showed up on the map.  We now had the Germans pretty 
well on the run except a few machine gun nests.  I was anxious to get to that road, so pushed 
forward with the men I had with me-one platoon.”31 The objective, the second patch of woods, 
bordered an unpaved road, but the maps used did not show this road.32  H milton led his 
remaining men down the slope of the hill into the open pasture beyond the objective and on all 
sides machine guns opened up with devastating results.  “I lost heavily here I cam  out 
unscratched.  I was pushing ahead with an automatic rifle team and didn’t notice tha  most of the 
platoon had swerved off to the left to root out the machine guns.”33  
Second Lieutenant James M. Garvey, leading the remnants of a platoon of the 49th
Company, advanced into an open field beyond the second patch of woods.  Dotted with wood 
piles, the area was infested with German machine gun nests.  Private Robert D. Morgan, ca rying 
a Chauchat automatic rifle, pushed forward with Second Lieutenant Garvey along the wood 
piles.  “Here, Morgan,” he said, “I’ll poke my tin hat around this side, and you watch and see if 
you can get the Chauchat on them.”34  As Garvey stuck the helmet out something violently 
struck it from the tip of his rifle, causing the weapon to vibrate sending a fierce t ngle through his 
fingers.  Corporal Morgan let loose with the automatic rifle.  Seconds later, an odd noise from 
just above the crouching Second Lieutenant caused him to look up.  He watched Corporal 
Morgan slump toward the ground with his hand still grasping the pistol grip of the rifle, which
descended butt-stock first.  Corporal Morgan’s helmet slid from his face to reveal that a volley of 
enemy bullets blew his head off from the eyes up.35   
Captain Hamilton’s men had gone beyond their objective and now found themselves 
mixed with the Germans.  Fighting quickly developed into hand-to-hand combat.  Running dow  
the slope, Private Jessie Tompkins came face to face with an enemy combatant.  He immediately 
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shot the German soldier as another appeared.  Private Tomkins immediately sho  him.  Almost 
simultaneously he felt a blow from behind when a third enemy soldier delivered a vicious strike 
with his rifle.  Corporal Joseph C. Toulson immediately came to Private Tompkin’s aid and 
thrust his bayonet into the opposing German and, without hesitation, continued to sprint down 
the slope.36  Corporal Ambrose Hughes found himself engaged with an enemy soldier and 
suffered a ghastly wound through the groin that severed his femoral artery.  He lay wounded 
bleeding profusely as the company vigorously pressed the attack on the enemy.37   
Fighting developed beyond the second patch of woods but several Americans remained 
engaged inside these woods and German infantry and machine guns concealed in nearly every 
tree and entrenched in covered pits continued inflicting heavy casualties on the 49th Company. 
Men seemed to wilt to the ground with every bit of ground obtained.  Sergeant William Van 
Train witnessed Sergeant Arthur Russell’s violent death when a bullet smashed through is 
head.38   Private William H. Smith wrote,  
We reached the edge of a small wooded area and there encountered some of the 
Hun infantry.  Then it became a matter of shooting at mere human targets.  But 
the Germans soon detected us and we became the objects of their heavy fire.  We 
received emphatic orders at this time to come back.  German machine guns were 
everywhere; in trees and in small ground holes and camouflaged at other places so 
they couldn’t be spotted.39  
Some Marines of the 49th Company, who were now desperately trying to consolidate 
their position on the northern slope of the hill, began to dig shallow foxholes upon the verbal 
orders of thirty-nine year-old Gunnery Sergeant Charles Hoffman.  As bullets snapped over head 
amidst the chaos, Gunnery Sergeant Hoffman looked to the east and to his disbelief saw twelve 
German soldiers crawling on their stomachs towards his men.  The enemy combatants dragged 
behind them five light Spandau Machine guns.  Gunnery Sergeant Hoffman screamed a warning 
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to his troops as he raced toward the approaching enemy troops.  Before the two leaders of the 
enemy detachment could react, Hoffman jammed his bayonet into the first combatant.  Without 
hesitation, he pulled the blade out and skewered the second enemy soldier, causing the remaining 
German troops to abandon their guns and retreat back down the east slope of Hill 142.  If the 
detachment had been able to emplace their guns, it would have certainly obliterated the 
remaining Marines of the 49th Company.40 
Private William H. Smith noticed a German soldier a short distance away.  Sprawled 
across him were two of his dead comrades, and according to Smith:  
He was in a sitting posture and was shouting ‘Kamerad, Kamerad.’  We soon 
learned the reason.  He was serving as a lure and wanted a group of Marines to 
come to his rescue so that the kind-hearted Americans would be in direct line of 
fire from machine guns that were in readiness.  Before I knew what I was doing 
and before I realized that everyone was shouting at me to stay back I bobbed up 
out of my hole and with bayonet ready beat it out and got that Kamerad bird. It 
seemed but a minute or so before I was back.  But, believe me, there were some 
bullets whizzing around.  They came so close at times I could almost feel their 
touch.  My pack was shot up pretty much but they didn’t get me.41 
 
Several men of the 49th Company established a defensive position on the north side of the 
hill.  Other members of the company continued the assault; oblivious to the objectives.  Beyond 
the northeastern side of the hill, some survivors of the 49th Company continued the attack and 
ran head on into part of the 12th Company of the 460th German infantry.  This group of enemy 
soldiers were situated near Torcy as reserve and raced towards the hill when they discovered the 
Americans had broken through the main line.  The German 12th Company split into two groups 
to assault up both sides of the hill.  The eastern group attacked Captain Hamilton’s men causing
him to order the survivors to pull back.  Captain Hamilton had been just south of  a road north of 
the hill and as he advanced towards it, believing it to be the objective, most of his men had 
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shifted to the left to deal with machine guns that were delivering enfilading fire.  “It happened, 
however, that there was a town just a few hundred yards to the left and while most of the 
Germans had left, one company was forming for a small counter-attack.”42 
Captain Hamilton, realizing that his company stood beyond their objective, continued to 
the order his men to pull back. “It was a case of every man for himself.  I crawled back through a 
drainage ditch filled with cold water and shiny reeds.  Machine gun bullets were just grazing my 
back and our own artillery was dropping close.”43  Captain Platt bounded down the side of the 
slope looking for Captain Hamilton.  When he approached the exhausted company commander, 
Captain Platt inquired as to his platoon strength to which Captain Hamilton told him to takehis 
survivors and establish a defensive position.  Captain Platt had only a few from his platoon but 
had located twenty stray men from another depleted platoon.  Racing back towards his shattered 
and patched command, a distant sniper fired on him, Bullets kicked up dirt and encouraging 
Captain Platt to accelerate his pace.44  Panting heavily from his close encounter, the Captain 
rounded up his men, most of whom were ransacking the enemy corpses for souvenirs.  “Working 
my way along as best I could, I found my men-practically every one of them-squatted down 
beside a dead German, relieving him of a belt buckle or iron crosses.”45     
Not every member of the 49th Company heard Captain Hamilton’s order to pull back to 
the original objective.  Small and unorganized groups of Marines blindly advanced down into the 
valley where they drew unrelenting machine gun fire from all sides.  Corporals Joseph C. 
Toulson and Anthony S. Kowalak continued to brave the fire and positioned their automatic 
rifles on the outskirts of the town of Torcy, nearly a kilometer beyond the battalion’s objective, 
far behind enemy lines (See Appendix D).  Accompanying the two Corporals was Priv te 
Charles C. Steinkamp.  According to Corporal Abbie D. Atkinson and Privates Frederick 
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Bodwell and Jessie Tompkins, the three men ran all the way towards the small village of Torcy.46  
A French aviator even spotted what he believed were Americans advancing on the town.47 
Moments after seeing Corporals Toulson and Kowalak and Private Steinkamp continue through
the valley out of sight, Corporal Atkinson saw a signal flare go up in the air, a sign requesting 
reinforcements.  Due to the chaos and the withdrawal toward the 49th Company’s initial 
objective, reinforcements would not be sent.  No news of Corporals Toulson and Kowalak and 
Private Steinkamp materialized until their remains were discovered months later.48  
Private William Smith and a group of men from the 49th Company continued the blind 
advance, oblivious to the orders to pull back.  “I saw one Dutchman stick his head out of a hole 
and then duck.  I ran to the hole.  The next time his head came up it was good night Fritz.”49  As 
Smith and an unidentified sergeant ran along the hill, a German soldier fired at the two men.  “A 
bullet got the sergeant in the right wrist.  I got the German before he dropped back into the 
weeds.  Every blamed tree must have had a machine gunner.”50 
First Lieutenant Orlando Crowther and survivors of his 67th Company on the western 
flank of the assault emerged from the second patch of trees into the open amidst a hornet’s nest 
of machine gun fire.  Almost immediately a slug tore through the thirty-four year old lieutenant’s 
arm.  In the mayhem of the moment, Crowther refused to let anyone tend to his wounds until the 
enemy gun emplacement was silenced.  He maneuvered his men toward the German machine 
gun position.  As the men ran at intervals toward the enemy position, the German crew had 
exhausted its ammunition and abandoned the weapon.  Immediately the men rushed the gun and 
picked it up off the sled mount and brought it back to the company’s position.51  Lieutenant 




The western half of the 12th Company, 460th German Infantry met the survivors of 
Crowther’s 67th Company.  Some Marines continued to advance while others pulled back to the 
crest of the hill as German fire tore through the ranks.  Small groups of Marines engaged in close 
combat with German troops on the western slope.  With the recently captured enemy machine 
guns and abandoned boxes of ammunition in tow, Crowther shouted for men to push the 
captured weapons forward and lay down a base of fire on the advancing enemy.  He moved 
along the line giving instructions until a burst of enemy gun fire tore through his body killing 
him instantly.52   
Private Eric Kitchens, a member of Crowther’s contingent, recalled that everyone had 
dropped to their stomach as machine gun fire screamed over head.53 Private Eric A. Goldbeck 
stood up amidst the snap of bullets and began firing at the German gun crew and killed the 
gunner, just as a burst of fire killed him. As the men lay pinned to the ground, more German 
guns continuously poured a large volume of fire in their direction. Private John Harris moved 
forward to lay down a base of fire from his Chauchat automatic rifle when suddenly a stray 
round passed through the twenty-year-old in the upper and lower jaw, shattering his teeth and 
mandible.54  The overwhelming enemy gunfire created pandemonium among the exposed 
survivors of the 67th Company.  Crowther’s death left the survivors leaderless.  Captain Francis 
S. Kieren appeared on the scene with a few stragglers and assembled a team to outflank the 
enemy gun emplacements.  One of Kieren’s men, Corporal Frederick H. Fox, suffered a gunshot 
through the shoulder and he was immediately ordered to the rear for treatment. As Corporal Fox 
stood up to make his way to the rear, another stray round struck him in the temple, killing him.55  
 Kieren’s primary goal was to silence the enemy guns that hindered the 67th Company’s 
assault.  According to Kieren, Sergeant John V. Fitzgerald offered to go out as a decoy to draw 
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fire so the guns could be taken from the front.  Earlier, Fitzgerald had suffered a dep gash in his 
face from a combatant’s bayonet; now he set out across the open field running through e waist-
high pasture.  Instantly, the enemy gunners spotted him and swung the barrel of a Maxim gun his 
way.  With bullets kicking up clods of dirt and dust, the remainder of the company charged 
straight at the machine gun.  As Fitzgerald attempted to outrun the traversing field of enemy gun 
fire, a burst struck the twenty-seven-year-old in the upper right thigh just under the pelvis.  
Another round blew open his left thigh.  As he fell one more slug passed through his right wrist 
shattering several bones.  Fitzgerald, bleeding profusely, managed to lay flat on the ground out of 
enemy sight.56 
The remnants of the 67th Company desperately tried to stem the large volume of enemy 
fire.  Private Harris, despite the severe amount of blood loss from his facial wound, regained his 
senses and managed to bring his automatic rifle to his shoulder and squeezed off a burst of fire at 
the Germans.  He continued to fire his weapon until he lost consciousness.57  Other members of 
the company desperately tried to silence the enemy guns.  Captain Kieren and Gunnery Serg ant 
Charles J. Smith noticed Private Pleas Parker out in the open maneuvering into a very exposed 
position.  The twenty-one-year old had dragged his Chauchat automatic rifle with him and 
proceeded to fire the awkward weapon at the enemy gun emplacement during the duration of the 
counterattack.58     
As Private Parker and other members of the company tried to break up the enemy assault,
one group of Marines, caught in the open when the enemy initially opened fire during the 
counterattack, remained isolated and in very bad position.  Pinned to the ground as Maxim 
machine gun grounds cracked overhead, Corporal Prentice Geer assumed control of the isolated 
detachment and peered over his shoulder as he lay prone in the wheat. Ordering his men to 
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follow close behind, Corporal Geer sprang up out of the tall wheat and charged the enemy gu .  
Before the enemy could traverse the weapon on the advancing Marines, Corporal Geer nd his 
men overran the position and the crew immediately surrendered.  Following the captur of this 
gun, the enemy counterattack faltered.59   
Just over one hour into the attack, Captain Platt moved his men back to the spot of the 
originally designated objective.  “I started out to see what was ahead, suddenly to stop short as I 
came on a First Sergeant and twenty men from another company-all that was left of a platoon.  
‘Chuck,’ I said to my newly found First Sergeant, ‘who’s your commanding officer?’  ‘Me,’ said 
Chuck simply.  ‘All the rest are deados.’”60  First Sergeant Daniel “Pop” Hunter was the man 
speaking to Captain Platt.  First Sergeant Hunter planned to take his men across the road ahead 
with emphatic zeal, the same road that Captain Platt’s platoon had just pulled back from.  
Captain Platt discouraged the overzealous First Sergeant from his actions.  “I can’t give you a 
command, because the worst punishment for disobedience is death.  And you’ll get that if you go 
after that road.”61 
Back at the battalion’s initial jump-off point, Major Julius Turrill encountered First 
Lieutenant Walter Galliford who commanded a platoon in the 66th Company.  The French finally 
relieved the other two companies in Turrill’s battalion and they were on the way from the 
battalion’s position of the previous day.  Major Turrill immediately moved forward with First 
Lieutenant Galliford’s platoon.  They advanced through the woods where the Marines began th  
attack over an hour earlier.  As they entered the first open field, Turrill noticed that the dead and 
wounded lay intermixed with each other, scattered throughout the open pasture.62 
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The remainder of the 66th Company eventually arrived from the battalion’s previous 
position and Major Turrill directed them to the western edge of the hill.  Shortly after, Germans 
troops began to ascend the western slopes in an attempt to counterattack again.  Private Albert 
Powis of the 66th Company recalled: 
Ahead of us was a field of almost ripe wheat.  About 500 yards away was a big 
gully holding the Germans.  We would aim and fire slowly and large gaps would 
appear in the lines.  Some of our men would run out to use the bayonet on them 
and the Krauts would shoot them down.  Our officers kept yelling that our men 
should stay in their hole.63 
 
The 17th Company also arrived from the battalion’s previous position.  The delayed relief 
of the battalion meant that the assault on Hill 142 utilized half the intended manpower.  Majo  
Turrill immediately put the 17th Company in line on the east side of the hill, next to the remnants 
of Captain Hamilton’s men.  Private Onnie Cordes remembered arriving on Hill 142 that 
morning and seeing his friend Private Edward M. Butler of the 67th Company make his way to 
the rear.  “He was shot in the wrist.  Although this Butler lad had a bad wound in his hand, he did 
not go to the rear, but instead he assisted in caring for the more severely wounded that were lying 
all about.”64  As the company moved forward to bolster the weakly-held line, the enemy machine 
guns delivered a storm of bullets.  Powis recalled the melee when he wrote: 
We were now in a terrible machine gun barrage and I at once threw my pack away 
containing a couple boxes of hardtack.  With rifle, belt, helmet and gas mask I 
stooped as low as possible and started through an open field which was being 
continually swept with machine gun bullets.  Bang, a bullet hit my helmet but 
glanced off.  Another hit my cartridge belt, but fortunately did not go through.65 
 
The arrival of the remaining companies in Major Turrill’s battalion as well as needed 
machine gun support meant that Major Turrill’s Marines held this little patch of rolling hill top 
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and forest, but the price was staggering.  The 67th Company suffered 119 casualties out of a total 
strength of 244 men.  The 49th Company lost 101 men out of a total strength of 240 men.  The 
remainder of the battalion lost ninety-six men.  A total of 349 men fell in the capture and defense 
of Hill 142.66  More Americans died on the hill in the days that followed, but the events on the 
morning of June 6, 1918 revealed to the Americans that the price, even for miniscule objectives, 
would be high when contesting machine guns using obsolete methods of assault, no preparatory 
artillery barrage, and a hastily-planned attack.  Objectives were not clearly defined and the 
assaulting formations were heavily undermanned.  These factors cost additional lives, but these 
aspects plagued the American attacks which occurred later that day and reinforced the same 
harsh realities.  
 Most works covering the skirmish on Hill 142 address the lack of artillery, 
delayed movements and poor communications.  Most authors, however, do not link these flaws 
as the cause for the exponential casualties suffered by the Americans who were realistically 
assaulting a weakened German position.  The success on this position also perpetuated th  
commencement of offensive operations later that day, which relied solely on theattainment of 
the assault on the hill.  The rapidity which the subsequent actions would be carried out prohibited 
any assessment as to adjustments needed to avoid such bloodshed.  The slaughter of the 
morning’s assault on Hill 142 would play out repeatedly on other places on the battlefield.  Th  
anatomy of the methods used in this and later attacks centered upon the acceptance of mss tr op 
expendability.  This is fundamental in understanding the uniqueness of the human experience of 





The Failed Assault on Belleau Wood 
In accordance with General Degoutte’s counterattack order issued the day b fore, the 
second phase of the assault on June 6, 1918 involved the eastern flank of the 2nd Division 
advancing forward in order to consolidate the new line established from the gains made by the 
western flank on Hill 142.  Vague verbal instructions regarding this second phase were 
communicated to Colonel Wendell C. Neville, commanding the 5th Marine Regiment and 
Colonel Catlin commanding the 6th Marine Regiment earlier, but it was not until 2:00 p.m. on 
June 6, 1918 that the details of the attack reached Colonel Catlin.  He recalled, “The orders to 
attack at 5 o’clock were written at brigade headquarters, about three kilometers in the rear, at 
2:00p.m.  At 3:45 p.m. a copy was handed to me by Lieutenant Williams, General Harbord’s 
aide, who came up by motorcycle.”1   
Colonel Catlin had also been tasked with commanding the entire second phase of the plan 
that afternoon, which called for the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, commanded by Major 
Benjamin S. Berry, to advance east from the woods northwest of the village of Lucy-le-Bocage 
and assault Belleau Wood.2  Simultaneously, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, commanded 
by Major Berton Sibley, was ordered to advance its left in conjunction with the rigt of the 
Berry’s Marines and sweep through the southern half of Belleau Wood and assault the village of 
Bouresches.  The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines would consolidate to the progress of Sibley’s right 
flank and support the advance.  Once the three battalions captured their objectives, they were to 
advance further east beyond Belleau Wood and Bouresches and seize the narrow-gauge railroad 
in the east. 
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Success relied heavily on one factor: the Division believed Belleau Wood would have to 
be taken by surprise.  No artillery preparation was outlined, but according to Brigadier General 
James Harbord, the French intelligence section informed him that Belleau Wood was not 
occupied except for a few Germans in its northern end, and that he considered a surprise attack, 
without extensive artillery preparation, practical.3  The records do not indicate that any extensive 
reconnaissance was made to verify the enemy strength in the woods.  According to Colonel
Catlin, “It had been impossible to get patrols into the woods, but we knew they were full of 
machine guns and that the enemy had trench mortars there.  So far as we knew, there might have 
been any number of men in there, but we had to attack just the same, and with but a handful.”4  
The conflicting evidence should have served as a precursor to disaster.  
The French information regarding the woods could not have been more inaccurate.  Two 
battalions of German soldiers from the 461st Infantry Regiment spent the previous two days to 
developing a defensive stronghold of the woods while remaining completely out of view.  The 
thick tangle of trees and undergrowth created a near- impenetrable bastion for he defenders.5  
The village of Bouresches, located southeast of Belleau Wood, remained in control of the 2nd 
Battalion of the 398th German Infantry Regiment, but served only as an outpost manned by only 
a single company of troops.  The majority of the battalion dug in on the high ground east of the 
town.6  
While the Marines of Major Turrill’s battalion desperately clung to control of Hill 142, 
the moment of assault on Belleau Wood and Bouresches grew near.  All but one of Major 
Berry’s companies was situated in the woods several hundred meters west of Blleau Wood.  At 
7:00 a.m., the 45th Company of Major Berry’s battalion had been ordered to advance north 
immediately from their location to help relieve the tremendous enfilading enemy fire bearing 
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down on Major Turrill’s battalion on Hill 142.  Captain Peter Conachy, commanding the 45th 
Company, immediately dispatched the 1st and 2nd Platoons to advance north in efforts to help 
Major Turrill’s men.  According to Captain Conachy, “1st Platoon reached the road and was held 
up, dug in and consolidated, 2nd Platoon never started, they were held up by fire superiority of 
machine guns from woods, although this platoon ably supported the 1st Platoon by covering fire 
thereby enabling Lieutenant Hope to advance to the road, which was an ideal jump-off point.”7   
Lieutenant Edward S. Hope, a young Army officer leading the 1st Platoon of the 45th 
Company, recalled the commotion off to the west as Major Turrill’s battalion in tiated the pre-
dawn assault on Hill 142.  “They had already started on our left, so I organized four waves at 
once and just as I sent the first ones across, the Boche machine guns opened up.  I feltmy legs 
suddenly knocked from under me.  One of the men near me took my puttee off and stopped the 
blood with a bandage.”8  Eventually Lieutenant Hope’s platoon made it to the road and dug in.  
They signaled for rifle ammunition and grenades, neither of which could be brought f rward.  
“On account of the exposed position I would not order a man to take ammunition out, as a live 
Marine is better than a dead or wounded one any day,” recalled Captain Conachy.9 
One Marine, Private Robert F. Higley, saw the predicament of the exposed men.  He 
grabbed bandoliers of rifle ammunition from other Marines.  Slinging six of them across his 
body, he dashed several hundred meters across the field as machine gun rounds searched for him.  
Sprinting among the men laying prone along the roadside, he dropped one bandolier among a 
few of the men and repeated this as he continued down the line.  He collapsed in exhaustion from 
the terrifying ordeal.  Private Higley noticed Sergeant Robert D. Foote Jr. had been severely 
wounded and needed to get medical attention fast.  Perilously gazing back hundreds of meters 
across the gunfire-swept field where the rest of the company remained, Private Higley, still 
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exhausted from the terrifying trip, picked up his weapon and crawled over to Sergeant Foote.  He 
slung both his and Sergeant Foote’s rifle on his back and dragged the wounded Sergeant several 
hundred meters back to the company’s line.  Miraculously, both men made it back unscathed.10   
Before Captain Conachy could regain command of the two engaged platoons, a battalion 
runner found him in the woods and delivered a message directing him “to report to the C.O., 1st 
Battalion, upon reporting I was ordered to prepare and stand by for a general attack, in 
conjunction with the 1st Battalion, objective-Torcy, the attack to take place at 5:00 a.m., June 7, 
1918.”11  When Captain Conachy returned to his company’s position in the woods, they had 
already moved out to assemble for the assault on Belleau Wood.   
Communications, poor as they were, caught the battalion off guard when the order to 
attack finally arrived.  Colonel Catlin vividly recalled the dilemma.   
I was supposed to direct Berry’s movements, though he had also received the 
orders from his own regimental headquarters.  I telephoned at once to Berry’s 
P.C. [Post of Command] at Lucy, but his battalion was beyond reach and he 
himself in the woods in the rear, a mile away.  It had been impossible on account 
of the heavy shelling, to run a telephone out to him.  I sent runners, but I was sure 
they couldn’t reach him before the attack would have to be made.12   
 
Second Lieutenant George V. Gordon, who commanded a platoon in the 16thth Company, 
remembered standing with another officer in the woods, noting a small bit of artillery fire on the 
eastern horizon.  According to Second Lieutenant Gordon, “We were watching the shells a  they 
dropped along the edge of the woods across the wheat field.  ‘I wonder what this is about,’ his 
friend said, as several more landed.  ‘They must have spotted something over there.’”13 Just as 
Second Lieutenant Gordon and his comrade witnessed the spectacle several hundred meters to
the east, Captain Henry Larsen, the battalion adjutant, came running over to Second Li utenant 
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Gordon and shouted, “Get your platoons ready immediately, you should have started across with 
the barrage.”14 Before Second Lieutenant Gordon could mass the platoons of the company, 
Captain Larsen sent him orders to remain in place, as the 16th Company would hold a reserve 
position.   
Similar orders reached three of the four platoons in the 45th Company.  Men had 
assembled, in Captain Conachy’s absence, under the command of Second Lieutenant Thoms H. 
Miles and moved the platoons towards the jump-off point where the attack would commence.  
“Imagine my predicament,” recalled Captain Conachy when he returned to find his entire 
company advancing through the field ahead.  “I had been ordered to prepare for an attack, and 
when I returned I found only one platoon left.”15   
Phone lines did not connect most of the front line units with headquarters detachments in 
the rear.  Orders arrived much too slow to be effectively carried out.  The pace and fluidity of the 
lines created even greater demand for immediate communication.  The situation suggested 
tragedy even before the planned assault commenced.  The small volume of artillery was meant to 
harass whatever enemy held the woods and did not resemble the pulverizing level of 
bombardment necessary to suppress and destroy enemy positions while the assault waves closed 
in on their position. Further, the artillery fire preceded the infantry assault by too much time.  
None of the assault waves were in position, much less aware that an attack was to occur, and 
when they did carry out the assault, the enemy would likely be prepared to resist them.  Delayed 
communications and the feeble artillery support only amalgamated the looming catastrophe for 
the Americans.  Based on the little intelligence available it was believed that the woods were 
very lightly held.16  
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The general advance called for Major Berry’s battalion to assault from the east into the 
western face of Belleau Wood.  Since several of the 45th Company’s platoons remained in 
support of Major Turrill’s battalion on Hill 142 only three of the four platoons comprised the left 
flank of the attack, the 47th Company, commanded by Captain Philip T. Case on the battalion’s 
right flank, and would advance eastward towards the southern portion of Belleau Wood.  In the 
center of the battalion was Captain Richard N. Platt’s 20th Company; they were ordered to hit the 
center of the western tree line of Belleau Wood.  The 16th Company under, Captain Robert 
Yowell would remain in reserve (See Appendix E).  The 45th Company was not the only outfit 
caught off guard by the order to attack that afternoon.  Most men in the battalion remai ed 
oblivious to the pending assault.  They had spent the day in the cover of the woods several 
hundred yards west of Belleau Wood.  Some rested and others enjoyed the gracious ift of 
cigarettes delivered to them earlier in the day by Chaplain John J. Brady, who personally toured 
the front lines.17 




Appendix E. Map 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines attack on Belleau Wood 
Chicago Tribune reporter Floyd Gibbons and Lieutenant Arthur E. Hartzell, an Army 
officer from the Intelligence and Censorship Bureau arrived in the sector tha  day and they 
traveled toward the 3rd Battalion’s position to cover the first major assault by American troops.  
Earlier that day, Gibbons had jockeyed for a good position to cover the developing action along 
this particular front.  When the two men sought permission from Colonel Wendell C. Neville, the 
5th Marine Regiment commander, to move closer to the front lines, he exclaimed, “Go wherever 
you like.  Go as far as you like, but I want to tell you it’s damn hot up there.”18   
Many men, including officers, remained oblivious to news of the impending attack.  First 
Lieutenant Raymond Knapp of the 47th Company recalled,  
All through the day the battalion remained concealed in their positions 
overlooking the Bois de Belleau.  With the exception of a few planes flying over 
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the lines during the day there was no activity.  Late in the afternoon, Captain Case 
called the platoon commanders of his company together and told them that the 
battalion was to attack at 5 o’clock that afternoon.19  
 
 After Captain Case pulled out a map of the area, he fingered the objective and looked up 
from the sprawled chart to the east, pointing across the sloping wheat field to the distant tree line 
of Belleau Wood.  “Get your men out into position as fast as you can we attack at 5 o’clock.”  
According to First Lieutenant Knapp, the Captain pulled out his watch and remarked, “It is now 
5:15.”20   
The 20th Company remained concealed in St. Martin Woods, the battalion’s jump off 
point.  Sergeant Merwin Silverthorn, while scavenging through the forest for ouvenirs, recalled, 
“A quarter after five, the lieutenant said, ‘we were supposed to attack at five o’clock, so we have 
to assemble and ease across this road into a narrow band of woods.’  The objective was a road on 
the other side of Belleau Wood.”21  Excited by the fact they were finally getting in the fight, 
Silverthorn walked over to his college friend from the University of Minnesota, Sergeant 
Stephen Sherman, and shook hands “happy and exultant in the fact that at last we were ‘going 
over.’”22   
Situated in a fox hole deep in the confines of St. Martin Woods, Private Sigurd Swenson 
and his friend Private Ole Counts had just awoken from a brief nap and decided to eat the first 
little bit of food either of them had enjoyed in days.  “We just got through eating and word 
passed that we were to go over,” recalled Swenson.  The company had already begun to form up 
while Privates Counts and Swenson, struggling to put on their gear, dashed nearly 200 meters to 
the edge of the forest.  “Ole was right next to me in the first wave,” recalled Private Swenson.23 
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Immediately, the endless lines of Marines stepped out from the covering tree line into the 
field poised for the attack.  The platoons, according to First Lieutenant Knapp, “took up the
assault formation as though they had been on the parade ground.  The 1st and 2nd Platoons were 
in the first line and the 3rd and 4th in support.”24  The other companies in the battalion took up a 
similar configuration.  Private Carl B. Mills, of the 20th Company recalled, “Well the zero hour is 
getting close and I see the officers watching their watches.  We were on our way in open 
formation.  Everyone seemed to be in his place.”25  When reporter Floyd Gibbons appeared 
among the ranks of the men awaiting the assault, one Marine officer looked curiously at the 
brassard on Gibbon’s arm and asked him, “What are you doing here?”  Gibbons earnestly 
replied, “Looking for the big story.”  Stunned by his seeming ignorance, the officer turned his 
attention away from Gibbons back towards the distant woods and calmly proclaimed, “If I were 
you I’d be about forty miles south of this place, but if you want to see the fun stick around.  We 
are going forward in five minutes.”26 
As the first wave marched forward toward the edge of St. Martin Woods, the battalion’s 
jump-off point, Corporal Robert M. Fischer and his college friend Sergeant Frank J. Tupa, both 
of whom enlisted together as students at the University of Minnesota, joked with each other at 
the prospect of getting killed as they adjusted their gear.  “What should I tell your father,” asked 
Fischer as he looked over at Tupa.  “Tell him I did my part,” exclaimed Tupa.  “What shall I tell 
yours, Bobbie?”  Fischer, with a smile on his face, glanced over at his friend and said, “Tell him 
I was a good boy.”27  Platoon commanders glanced to the left and right of the formation.  
Satisfied every man was in place, they blew their whistles, signaling the advance. 
The brief preliminary American artillery had long ceased and now the ominous western 
face of Belleau Wood appeared across the open field.  Stretching from north to south, the tree
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line spanned more than a mile.  “Now then we started off in trench warfare formation, the only 
formation we knew, which consisted of four waves with the first wave and all waves holding 
their rifles at what is called the high port, not even aiming or firing or hip firing or anything like 
that.”28  The first two waves, separated by about seventy-five meters were followed by the next 
two waves 150 meters behind.   The last two waves were replacements, an arrangement designed 
for the expendability of men according to Sergeant Silverthorn, “When they got all killed, there’s 
the third and fourth wave.”29 
As the battalion moved forward, the guns of the 77th Machine Gun Company supported 
the advance with a barrage that swept the western face of the woods, and the assault slowly 
progressed.  Sergeant Silverthorn stated, “Bayonets fixed, moving at a slow steady cadence that 
we had been taught to move, because theoretically a barrage is shooting in front of you, and you 
don’t want to go too fast or you’ll walk into your own barrage.”  The bombardment of machine 
gun fire stopped as the 20th Company moved down the slope into the ravine running north-south 
through the wheat field.  Before they could cross the road that traversed the countryside, the 
Germans defending Belleau Wood opened fire.  “There are really no heroics about it,” recalled 
Floyd Gibbons.  “There is no bugle call, no sword waving, no dramatic enunciation of catchy
commands, no theatricalism- it’s just plain get up and go over.”30 
“Hell broke loose as we marched in skirmish,” recalled Private Mills.  “There was too 
much to see of the battle field to say one saw anything for sure.”31  To the left and in front of the 
company, the tree line exploded with the pulsating-whip of machine guns.   
It was teeming with machine guns; I mean it seemed that way.  And nobody, 
literally nobody was firing a shot at these Germans.  They had us enfiladed.  Th y 
were to our left front; and as we got out far enough, we were perfectly enfiladed 
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from them.  So it was obviously like a shooting gallery and not a single Marine of 
ours firing a shot.  We weren’t trained that way.  We went on. 32  
Men of the 20th Company’s first wave fell immediately.  Private Joseph Bridge of the 20th 
Company recalled how the initial burst of fire struck Private Lee L. Fry in the stomach.33  
Moments later, Private Bridge also suffered a wound.  Private Willis Rummel heard a loud 
pinging sound as a bullet tore through the helmet of Private Thurman Worstall and came out the 
other side of his head, killing the “old man of the company.”34  Private James N. Allen also 
collapsed dead when a bullet hit him in the head.35 Numerous machine gun bullets hissing and 
cracking over head, but the company continued to push forward.  
The Marines realized the terrifying capability of the enemy guns when in one sweep of 
the fronting fields German machine guns cut down a number of 20th Company men.  Corporal 
Fischer, leading an automatic rifle team, was ten yards away from his dear friend Sergeant Frank 
J. Tupa.  “Good god he fell, something told me,” recalled Tupa as he saw, from the corner of his 
eye, Corporal Fischer stumble and disappear into the wheat.36 He had been struck by a bullet that 
pierced his aorta and died almost instantly.  Tupa fell wounded a short time later. Another 
Minnesota student, Private George B. Sellars, suffered mortal wounds when bullets shattered his 
right leg above and below the knee.37  Several yards back, Sergeant Stephen Sherman’s mangled 
body lay in the fields along the path of trampled wheat with his commander’s whistle dangling 
from the pocket of his tunic.  He was instantly killed by an exploding artillery shell.38 
Private Mills was also wounded after the enemy guns opened fire.   
I was struck on the right calf, a flesh wound that felt just like a mule kick.  I found 
myself on the ground and everyone was down.  The signal was given to move on.  
I made one lunge and found myself on the ground again.  Then Wham! I took a 
machine gun bullet in my left knee and I began to see that this was no dream or 
kids stuff.39   
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Private Mills crawled through the tall stalks of vegetation to see if anyone else needed 
assistance, but “the machine gun had done a thorough job in putting the men out of 
commission.”40 
Sergeant Silverthorn recalled, “Well, of course, as soon as we came out of this first belt 
of woods in my platoon, there were only six people who got across the first seventy-five yards.  
All the rest were killed or wounded.  I mean we were down in a ravine which was perfectly 
enfiladed and just bloop, a few machine guns and that was it.”41  A lieutenant in Silverthorn’s 
platoon crawled over to him and hollered above the deafening noise, “Where the hell is my 
platoon?”  “Well his platoon was mostly killed and wounded,” recalled Silverthorn.  The 
lieutenant ordered Sergeant Silverthorn to stay together, but when the stunned officer said, “I’m 
going on back.” Sergeant Silverthorn thought to himself, “Here’s where you and I part company, 
because we just got across this place, and that’s the last thing I’m going to do- go back.”42 
Sergeant Silverthorn eventually spotted the remnants of another platoon that had crosse  the 
ravine near an area that offered improved protection.   
In the first wave, Private Sigurd Swenson’s platoon advanced only three-quarters of the 
way across the field when he was struck by a machine gun bullet.  “I couldn’t go any further,” 
recalled Private Swenson, who began to go in and out of consciousness.  “When I came to I was 
lying on my back.”  The remainder of the platoon, including Private Swenson’s friend Private 
Ole Counts, had advanced another twenty-five yards before they dropped behind the protection 
of an embankment to catch their breath.  “Ole was laying right there resting and looking back 
toward me.  He didn’t want to recognize me because he couldn’t help me,” remembered 
Swenson.  Moments later as the group began to rush forward, a burst of fire also struck Private 
Counts who fell back.  “I saw him fall,” remembered Private William Wagoner.  Private Thomas 
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Barwick went to the aid of Counts.  “I spoke to him but he never answered a word, he died an 
hour later from loss of blood.”43   
German machine gun fire emanating from the front and left of the 20th Company did not 
abate.  Two decimated platoons remained pinned in the wheat field (See Appendix E).  Enemy 
guns situated in front of one of the pinned platoons delivered devastating fire and both Second 
Lieutenants Percival Wilson and Ernest Toomey were wounded.  The leaderless detachment was 
in trouble.  With reserves desperately needed, First Sergeant John Grant sprang up fom the
cover of the wheat to make his way back to the rear and request that the remainder of the 
battalion press forward.  The thirty-three-year old scrambled back west over the ravine.  
Silhouetted above the tall stalks, another burst of fire searched the horizon on which he traveled
and killed the First Sergeant before he got across the field.44  Gunnery Sergeant William H. 
Mack immediately assumed command and attempted to take his men forward in order to assault 
the machine gun nest.   
Sergeant Silverthorn crawled over to a group led by Gunnery Sergeant Harry Gay.  The 
assembly slowly advanced over the brim of the ravine by small group rushes.  Simultaneously, 
“the Gunnery Sergeant got wounded, I attended to him and saw where the bullet had entered the 
back of his shoulder blade and hadn’t come out.”45  Sergeant Silverthorn bandaged the wound 
and reassured the wounded man that his injury was not bad.  “But I never expected to see him 
again,” he claimed.46  Another man, Corporal George O. Bissonette, writhed in pain and bled 
heavily after bullets had blown his left foot and thigh open.  Corporal Bissonette remained with 
the remnants of the group instead of attempting to go to the rear for treatment.47  Several 
wounded men lay exposed as the enemy guns continued to pour out a heavy volume of fire.  
Private Hollis E. Empey sprinted forward towards one of the wounded men and tried in vain to 
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get him out of the firing line.  The shattering bombardment was too much and Private Empey 
could not safely reach him.48  
The wounded could not be treated while the enemy machine gun fire remained too 
intense.  The field behind the remnants of the 20th Company was scattered with wounded and 
dead Marines.  In the open field, about 130 yards from the western face of Belleau Wood, 
Pharmacist Mate Second Class, Frank C. Welte, a hospital corpsman attached to the 20th 
Company, worked feverishly to treat the numerous wounded strewn throughout the field.  Welte 
was overwhelmed with the number of wounded and had just treated four Marines as machine 
gun bullets continued to pass overhead.  He calmly filled out their casualty tags and began to 
crawl through the wheat towards a fifth wounded man when a stray machine gun round tore i to 
his right heel.  Suddenly a shell detonated nearby and the concussion threw him to the ground. 
Welte recovered from the momentary distress of the explosion and noticed that he had sustained 
shrapnel wounds from the blast.  He continued to apply field dressing to the other wounded ma  
and pulled out a casualty tag from his pouch.  Welte began to fill out the tag when another stray 
machine gun round struck him in the head knocking him to the ground.  He remained conscious 
though the bullet had passed through his skull.  “Turn them over to the chief,” muttered the 
mortally wounded corpsman as he handed the five tags to the wounded Marine.49   
Commanding a shattered detachment of survivors from the 20th Company, Sergeant 
Silverthorn ordered men to move forward a little bit at a time.  “We’d run just as fast and as far 
as we could, and then we’d drop from exhaustion.  About the second rush that we got, is when I 
dropped to the ground, I felt that I’d hit my knee on a rock; and I looked down and found there 
wasn’t any rocks.  I found that a machine gun bullet had creased my knee.”50As he crouched 
down in the tall wheat, Silverthorn looked around and noticed his small detachment had been 
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reduced to himself and another Marine, Private Francis Green, who carried a Chauchat.  “So 
after observing the condition I was in, I told him to move into Belleau Wood where that 
automatic rifle was needed.  I decided, ‘I’m going to stay right here where I am until it is dark 
and get out under cover.”51  He crawled towards the shelter of a plowed strip of earth that had a 
slight raise.  Machine gun bullets nipped off the tops of the wheat stalks just above his head.  
Every second, the situation grew more precarious and he decided to make a sudden dash for the 
shelter of the tree line of Belleau Wood about 200 yards away.  While he made his way there, 
Sergeant Silverthorn encountered Sergeant Luther W. Pilcher who had been severely wounded in 
the stomach.  Silverthorn told Pilcher to remain where he was and that he would be back after 
dark.52  
On the left flank of Major Berry’s battalion, three platoons of the 45th Company pressed 
toward the northwestern face of Belleau Wood.  Second Lieutenant Thomas H. Miles, in the 
absence of Captain Conachy earlier the morning, assembled three out of the four platoons that 
made up the company, left one in reserve and moved into the open field.  The company advanced 
parallel to a small cluster of trees to the left, a finger jetting out towards Belleau Wood, but it 
would not conceal them from the ferocity of the enemy guns.  As soon as they stepped forwar , 
enemy artillery fire blanketed the wheat.  With a violent collision that shook the ground and 
echoed across the rolling pasture, dirt and debris littered the field, leaving massive charred divots 
in the waving fields of wheat.  The bombardment suddenly increased.  Second Lieutenant 
Thomas Miles, out in front of his advancing platoons came under the barrage.  After advancing a 
few hundred meters across the field, a shell, screaming through the air and slammed into the 
ground with little warning.  The projectile detonated nearly underneath the twenty-six year-old.  
The resulting explosion blew him apart.53  An increasing volume of artillery shells fell among the 
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company as they pushed forward. Private Frank P. Millage remembered standing close to 
Corporal Carl Stiekle, the company’s officer’s mess cook, when a shell landed nearby, killing 
him.54 
As the company pushed closer to the tree line of Belleau Wood, German machine guns 
erupted.  Gunnery Sergeant Benjamin Geary saw Private Charley Frehse knocked back as a 
bullet went through him.  As he staggered, another round struck him followed instantly by a third 
that hit him in the chest before he slumped to the ground.55  Machine gun fire cut down nearly 
anyone who dared expose himself.  First Sergeant William P. Higginson and Gunnery Sergeant 
Harold Todd also became victims of the enemy machine guns.56  Corporal Benjamin Strain, a 
hotheaded squad leader, looked over his shoulder and urged his men forward.  Corporal Strain, 
who only a few months before stood trial for telling a senior enlisted man to “kiss my a s” barely 
shifted his focus in front of him when a torrent of bullets struck the twenty-one-year old in the 
head and face, splitting his upper jaw in half and instantly killed him.57 Men immediately 
dropped to their stomachs into the wheat in order to escape the sweeping machine gun fire.  
While men lay prone under the relentless volley, shells continued to land seemingly everywhere. 
Eventually the survivors of the 45th Company, after crossing the road running between 
Torcy and Lucy-le-Bocage, worked their way toward a square patch of woods about a hundred 
meters from the western face of Belleau Wood.  Beyond this patch of forest lay the firs  line of 
German machine gun pits.  A few 45th Company men managed to get to this enemy position 
despite the murderous gunfire.  Private LeRoy Harned remembered, “We charg d and reached 
these pits but were subjected to a terrific fire.  Many of the boys were hit b fore gaining these 
pits.”  Private Clifford S. Cushman reached the first enemy entrenchment and was immediately 
struck by gunfire.  “He fell half in and half out of the pit in a sitting position.  I do not think he 
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was hit very hard this first time for he sat there, reloaded his pistol and alone clead out the pit 
on his right.”58  Private Harned then witnessed Private Cushman single-handedly kill six enemy
troops occupying the adjacent hole.  “I can personally testify to this as I was within feet of him at 
that time,”59 remarked Private Harned, three months after the engagement.  Private Cushman was 
hit again and rolled over on his side. Regaining his senses, the wounded private immediately 
cried out for water.  “About this time things got a great deal hotter, and that was the last time I 
saw Cliff alive,” claimed Private Harned.60  
Along the first line of enemy positions, the fighting became hand-to-hand.  One of th  
few men of the company who successfully made it to the first line of German redoubts was 
Private Grover C. Bowers.  He noticed one wounded Marine kill a German officer with a trench 
knife.  According to Private Bowers the enemy officer had just drawn his pistol in an attempt to 
finish off the injured American.  Private Bowers himself fell wounded moments later.61  
Numerous enemy troops fled their dugouts, leaving some of their light machine guns behi d.  
According to Harned, several of the German machine guns were turned against the fleeing 
enemy. Several enemy officers surrendered, seemingly happy to be out of the fight.62  The few 
men left of the 45th Company realized that the position could not likely be held.  Several started 
to filter back to the company’s original position (See Appendix E).  While Private H rned 
desperately tried to work his way back through the open field, his friend Private Frank McCarthy 
fell wounded in the side and back.63  Many of the wounded decided to wait until darkness to get 
back to the jump off point.  Several others lay in the field incapacitated, unable to move. 
 On the extreme right flank of the assault, Captain Philip Case’s 47th Company advanced 
with the rest of Major Berry’s battalion. The company took fire from the front left and suffered 
approximately thirty casualties while crossing the field.64 Floyd Gibbons watched the squads 
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advance with about four yards between each man.  They would rush forward for about fifty feet 
and drop flat on the ground as another squad sprinted forward.65 The German guns hammered the 
47th Company as they neared the tree line.  Suddenly, the lead elements encountered a wir  fence 
that stretching a great distance in front of the woods.  Sergeant Oliver D. Benier noticed the 
obstacle fronting the company.  The twenty four-year-old ran forward as dirt from the impact of 
machine gun fire flew in all directions.  Explosions from German trench mortars dropping in the 
field did not stop Sergeant Bernier.  When he finally reached the fence, he struggled with it until 
it broke and came down.  The company continued their advance on the woods.66 
Because the 47th Company advanced on the southern edge of Belleau Wood, they had a 
shorter distance to travel in the open field and were able to penetrate the strip of woods 
protruding west.  This sector of the woods was not held by a significant number of Germans, and 
47th Company was able to veer to the right in an effort to establish contact with the left wing of 
the 6th Marine Regiment nearby.  First Lieutenant Raymond Knapp remembered:  
The 47th reached the woods and turned to go north to go through and drive the 
enemy before them.  After advancing some 500 yards, a cleared spaced opened 
before them into which they dashed with all speed.  This dash proved costly, for 
hardly had they entered the trap, for a trap it was, than a veritable rain of machine 
gun fire fell upon them and pinned them to the ground.67   
 
Floyd Gibbons, situated at the battalion’s jump-off point, recalled seeing the men 
reaching the woods but all that could be heard above the pounding machine gun fire was 
shouting.  “Then we knew that work was being done with the bayonet.”68 
“The further we went, the thicker were the Dutch Machine guns,” rememberd Corporal 
Victor M. Landreth.  “Our left flank was open and we were getting flank fire.  Machine gun 
bullets were sure thick and lots of one-pounders and trench mortars.”69 Several men maneuvered 
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on the guns.  One of these men, Second Lieutenant Joseph A. Synnott, was instantly killed when 
the flanking machine gun cut him down.70  Unbeknownst to the men of the 47th Company, they 
had sauntered deep into an intricate enemy ambush.  “The trap was a cunningly devised one.  It 
was about a hundred yards square and was cleared of all trees, they having been felled a d th  
branches interlaced so as to form an abbattis. Paths, which were easily discernable, ran across it 
and down these paths, machine gun and rifle bullets literally rained.”71  Survivors of the 
company worked their way to the right edge of a clearing in the woods on their stomachs.  
Captain Case examined the situation, and sent four men to cross through the open area of the 
woods to deal with the gun on the left.72   First Sergeant Edmund Madsen and two other men, 
sent forward by Captain Case, tried desperately to attack the machine guns situated in the heavy 
underbrush; when First Sergeant Madsen was just feet away, a sudden volley of fire killed him 
instantly.73   
Captain Case sent six more men forward and they met a similar fate.  Knapp rec lled the 
horrific scene when he wrote: 
Finally an officer and ten men were sent out across to clear out the gun and then 
get the center guns on the flank and clear them out so that the company could 
advance.  The detail started across and arrived on the other side with the officer 
and three men to find the men of the other two details killed or wounded within a 
radius of some fifteen yards.  A hasty reconnaissance of the area revealed th  
troublesome gun cleverly concealed in a tree.74   
 
One man, Private Winn, lay in the underbrush awaiting the section to clean out the 
machine gun nest.  A platoon leader shouted for Private Verne Gardner to deliver a message.  As 
soon as Gardner stood up to make his way over to the platoon commander, a shot rippled through 
the forest.  Fifty feet away, Private Winn saw Private Gardner slouch lifelessly to the ground.  
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The surviving members of the detachment eventually succeeded in silencing the menacing 
machine gun.75   
Captain Knapp remembered the majority of the 47th Company being held up by the 
enemy resistance and “deployed along the line already formed, put scouts out in their front and 
dug in so as to prepare for the coming counterattack and hold the ground taken.”76  With the 
afternoon growing late, most of the men had consumed all of their water.  Private Joseph 
Sanderson saw the body of a dead German soldier sprawled out in the open just beyond his 
position.  Attached to the dead combatant was a canteen and Private Sanderson began to crawl 
out to retrieve it.  “We told him to keep down, but we needed the water,” recalled Private Harry 
G. Reckitt.   Before he could reach the corpse, a sniper’s bullet blew his head open, instantly 
killing the man many knew simply as “Scotch.” 77 
Several runners tracked back to the company’s jump-off point looking for Major Berry.  
One of these messengers came across reporter Floyd Gibbons and Lieutenant Hartz ll who were 
watching the main assault waves of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment advance toward 
Belleau Wood.  The courier decided to stay with Gibbons and Lieutenant Hartzell.  Th  three 
men spotted Major Berry with a few men from his battalion headquarters group preparing to 
advance toward Belleau Wood behind the main assault.  Major Berry gave the men per ission to 
advance forward with him and his headquarters detachment.78 The group advanced through the 
field and reached the road bisecting the field where several of the company’s wounded men 
sought cover.  The Major Berry and his group reached a patch of the field that formed an apex 
into the woods.79  Each side of tree line along this apex contained very active enemy machine 
gun positions.  Major Berry ordered the group to follow him at small intervals at a time to limit 
exposure to the torrent of gunfire as they rushed towards the forest.  Bullets kick d up dirt all 
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around Gibbons as he followed the Major into the increasingly ferocious gunfire.  “Get down 
everybody,” screamed Major Berry.80  Laying flat on his stomach and face, Gibbons heard an 
unusual commotion out in front.  Secluded in the cover of the waist-high wheat, Gibbons had lost 
sight of Lieutenant Hartzell.  When Gibbons lifted his head up he saw Major Berry struggling to 
get to his feet, clinching his left wrist and shouting, “My hand’s gone.”  A single bullet had hit 
him in the elbow traveling parallel to his forearm and sunk deep into his palm tearing away the 
flesh along his ulna bone.  Major Berry ran back towards Gibbons but dropped into the cover of 
the wheat just short of Gibbon’s position.  In a labored and agonized voice Major Berry 
muttered, “We’ve got to get out of here.  We’ve got to get forward.  They’ll start shelling this 
open field in a few minutes.”81 
Gibbons tried to guide Major Berry toward him without peering above the stalks.  
Gibbons crawled towards the Major.  He tried not to move the foliage as it would surely draw 
enemy fire.  Gibbons Suddenly felt a burn on the upper part of his left arm as he crawled on his 
belly, propped up on his elbows.  A bullet had pierced his left bicep muscle.  “I glanced down at 
the sleeve of my uniformed coat and could not even see the hole where the bullet had entered.  
Neither was there any sudden flow of blood.”  Gibbons continued to move forward.  Another 
round clipped the top of his shoulder and sent another stinging sensation down his arm.  Gibbons 
recalled the fear he felt when he reached the wounded officer and saw the agony splashed across 
Major Berry’s face.82   
Enemy fire increased with every little movement. Gibbons burrowed his left cheek to the 
ground in order to remain as flat as possible.  He moved his helmet to the right side of his face a  
he inched towards the Major.  A crash described as a “breaking glass bottle into a porcel in 
bathtub,” stunned Gibbons.  The initial shock caused him to raise his head up off the ground but 
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he instantly placed it flat to again as bullets snapped through the stalks of wheat overhead.  He 
felt the left side of his face with his right hand.  “My fingers rested on something soft and wet.  I 
withdrew the hand and looked at it.  It was covered with blood.”83  The pain in the left side of his 
head was excruciating.  A bullet had ricocheted off the ground and entered Gibbon’s left eye 
cutting it in half, splitting his eye lid open, and exited out of his forehead, fracturing his skull.   
Gibbons, in an effort to find Lieutenant Hartzell began shouting for him.  Lieutenant 
Hartzell discovered that Gibbons had been hit and asked to the severity.  Gibbons replied that h  
was not hit very badly.  “Where are you hit,” shouted Hartzell.  Gibbons replied that he had been 
shot in the head.  “In the head, you damn fool,” hollered an angered Hartzell.  “How the hell can 
you be alright if you are hit in the head?”84  Gibbons could not easily move as the pain began to 
intensify.  The injured side of his face lay in the dirt, and in order to rest more comfortably.  
Gibbons pulled his gas mask bag out from underneath his prone body.  He removed the bag’s 
harness from around his neck and managed to place the satchel underneath his face so he could 
rest his head upon it.  The enemy guns remained active while Gibbons lay there helplessly.   
Twenty feet away to Gibbon’s left, another wounded Marine lay unconscious.  The 
injured man still donned his pack and occasionally writhed around in order to roll over on his 
back but the pack obstructed his movement.  Every bit of commotion drew the wrath of a nearby 
enemy machine gun.  Eventually the unidentified Marine managed to get on his back with his 
satchel still strapped tightly to his back, hoisting his chest up into the air.  Suddenly en my guns 
spotted him and as bullets struck his exposed chest, the buttons from his coat flew off and one of 
the, straps from his pack split in half.  His now lifeless body flopped over to the side, shredded 
by the horrendous enemy gunfire. 85 
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 The 4th Marine Brigade headquarters knew very little regarding the progress of the assault 
and several reports coming in from the field contradicted each other.  Ten minutes into the 
attack, a message was dispatched from Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Lay stating, “That the men 
went over the top in fine shape, proper deployment around the edges of Bois de Belleau- and no 
casualties.”86  Another message sent later that afternoon by Captain Henry Larsen claimed, 
“Three platoons of the 45th Company only a few men returned.”87  Hours would pass before any 
definite information would paint even the faintest clarification regarding the status of the 





Assault on the Town of Bouresches 
In accordance to the second phase of the attack order on June 6, the east wing of the 
brigade prepared to assault the village of Bouresches.  The task fell to Major Berton S. Sibley’s 
3rd Battalion 6th Marine Regiment.  Instructions stated that the battalion would advance from the 
area around Lucy-le-Bocage and move east.  The left wing of Major Sibley’s attalion would 
sweep though the southern fringe of Belleau Wood in an effort to connect with Major Berry’s 3rd 
Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, while the right half moved parallel to the road that ran from 
Lucy-le-Bocage to the village of Bouresches.  Along this path, a steep ravine r n east between 
the southeastern corner of Belleau Wood and Bouresches.  The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine 
Regiment was tasked to tie in with the right flank of Major Sibley’s battalion nd while still 
maintaining contact with the 23rd Army Infantry Regiment in the east.   
The constant movement of the previous days, in addition to the terror of constant shell 
fire, made rest nearly impossible.  Men grabbed brief moments of sleep during momentary lulls 
in the constant movement of the ranks.  Private Scarbrough, whose company had moved into a 
position in the pre-dawn hours of June 6, 1918, managed to catch a few hours of sleep until word 
of a pending advance spread through the company rumor mill.   First Lieutenant Louis 
Timmerman commanded Private Scarbrough’s platoon in the 83rd Company and had just 
returned that morning from regimental headquarters located nearly a kilometer sou hwest of the 
3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment’s position.1 As Lieutenant Timmerman arrived he noticed 
Private Scarbrough sound asleep and woke him.  “I was going to let you sleep in,” joked 
Lieutenant Timmerman, “but I thought you’d be sore if you missed a chance to shoot some 
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Germans today.”2  Private Scarbrough, in a post-sleep daze, glanced up at the officer, “I told him 
he was confusing me with [Private Edward J.] Steinmetz, who over heard my remark and said, 
‘Hey Jim, I was killing Germans in my dreams too!’”3 
Colonel Catlin, who had been tasked with overall command of the attack by both Major 
Berry’s battalion and Major Sibley’s men, discussed the pending attack with Sibley and Major 
Thomas Holcomb, whose 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines were to keep in touch with Sibley’s right.  
“With a map in hand,” recalled Colonel Catlin, “I explained the situation to them without trying 
to gloss over any of its difficulties and gave them their orders.  I found them ready. As we stood 
there, Sibley’s battalion was filing into a ravine, getting into position.  The two maj rs passed on 
the oral orders to the company commanders.”4   
Major Holcomb’s orders called on him to dispatch one company of his battalion to move 
through the town of Bouresches, the initial objective of the assault, and connect with the 23rd
Infantry Regiment on the extreme eastern flank of the division.  “I detailed the 96th Company, 
Captain Duncan, to this duty.”5  Major Holcomb ordered the 79th Company, under the command 
of Captain Randolph T. Zane, to support the assault of the 96th Company.  The 80th Company 
received directions to support Major Sibley’s.  The 78th Company of the 2nd Battalion was to 
remain in reserve.6 
Major Sibley recalled the haste and obscurity characterizing the entiroperation.  His 
battalion had assembled on the area with vague details; he had to relay the few-known particulars 
of the pending assault to his company commanders.  “There was no other information 
concerning the enemy or the terrain and as there was no time for scouting, the company 
commanders were shown the above order, also their objectives on the map, and were conducted 
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to the line from which the battalion would start the attack.”7 Despite the sketchy information 
available, Major Sibley readied his four company commanders for the assault with no time to 
spare. 
First Lieutenant Louis Timmerman remembered that Captain Alfred Noble, leader of the 
83rd Company, pulled all platoon commanders together.   
When Noble spoke to us he gave us the following instructions which I jotted 
down in a little notebook: we were to go through the woods which lay ahead of 
us-this turned out to be the Bois de Belleau-having gone through the woods we 
were to take the town of Bouresches which we could see from where we were 
because it lay along a road which led from approximately near the field that we 
were forming in down through an open lowland that skirted the edge of the Bois 
de Belleau.8 
 
The men of the 2nd Division remained oblivious to the pending attack leading to 
speculation and rumors among the ranks.  Word of a definite attack quickly dispelled any gossip.  
“Our sergeants told us to get everything in order and that we would make an assault on the 
woods at 5 o’clock that evening,” recalled Private Scarbrough.  “Men checked and rechecked 
their weapons.  Some ran their bayonets and fighting knives down their arms to see if it was 
sharp enough to shave the hair off.”  Being always particular about being clea shaven, Private 
Scarbrough remembered packing his shaving kit and a leather strap and hoisted his strapped on 
his combat pack.9  Private Havelock D. Nelson’s platoon of the 97th Company had not yet joined 
the rest of the battalion.  Their platoon commander, First Lieutenant Kennedy, an Army reserve 
officer, frantically assembled the men of his platoon to join the rest of the company ne rly two 
kilometers away.10 
 Corporal Joseph Rendinell of the 97th Company recalled, “we were ordered to leave 
everything but our emergency rations.”11 He also witnessed seven enemy observation balloons 
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take to the sky on the eastern horizon.  First Lieutenant Ralph W. Marshall, commanding the 4th 
platoon, called for Corporal Rendinell as he adjusted his gear.  The corporal rushed to Lieutenant 
Marshall, who reached into his pocket and pulled out a large clumped-up piece of paper.  As the 
lieutenant unfolded the awkward diagram, he pointed to a particular spot as Corporal Rendinell 
gazed over the officer’s shoulder. “See this line,” remarked Marshall.  “It’s this little ravine, 
about four-feet deep.  Take any three men you want and go until you see Germans and find out 
where their machine gun nests are and keep ahead of our line about 500 feet and send runners 
back so we’ll know where they are.”12  Confounded by this seemingly suicidal task, Rendinell 
recalled, “I said a little prayer.  It didn’t look to me like there was any chan e of coming back at 
all.  My buddies from my old company said goodbye and wished me luck and I could tell they 
didn’t ever expect to see me again neither.”13 
 That afternoon Captain David Bellamy of the 6th Marine Regimental Headquarters 
Company, feeling similar fate might befall him, scribbled a brief diary entry stating:  
I feel as though I ought to write some possible finals, but am unable to work 
myself into that frame of mind.  Not that I can’t foresee the danger, but no matter 
what the exigency, I like to go on as if nothing were happening or about to happen 
to upset things.  But still I am full of feelings for those who love me and who are 
watching my every move with tender anxiousness.14 
 
 Before the attack that afternoon, Colonel Catlin and a Captain Thibot Laspierre, a French 
officer attached to the 6th Marines, moved through the town of Lucy-le-Bocage to a forward 
position where the colonel could watch the assault.  As he passed through the town he walked 
through the left side of Major Sibley’s men awaiting the assault in a ravine.  “The men seemed 
cool, in good spirits, and ready for the word to start.  They were talking quietly among 
themselves.  I spoke to several as I passed.”15  As the men shifted their attention to the almighty 
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Colonel Catlin, a man seemingly larger than life, he belted out, “Give ‘m hell boys!”  Colonel 
Catlin added, “The men knew in a general way what was expected of them and what they were 
up against, but I think only the officers realized the almost impossible task that lay before them.  
I knew, and the knowledge left me little comfort.  Perhaps I exposed myself unduly,” recalled 
Colonel Catlin, “but I was anxious about Major Berry and it seemed necessary for me t  get as 
near his command as possible and to keep an eye on the whole proceeding.”16  
 The battalion fanned out in the wooded area on the southeastern outskirts of the town of 
Lucy-le-Bocage.  According to Private Scarbrough, “Most of the regiment was deployed in this 
shallow trench area about 500 yards from the woods, more or less, that afternoon.  It was to be a 
timed assault.”17  The formation had two of the battalion’s companies abreast from each other 
moving two waves per company.  Each wave was composed of two platoons, an assembly 
perfectly obsolete against the awaiting machine gun defenses.  Major Sibley’s diary entry reflects 
the details of the battalion’s layout.  “The 82nd Company and 84th Company in the front line-
Lucy-le-Bocage to Bouresches and the 84th Company being on the right of this ravine.  The 83rd
Company was placed in support of the 82nd Company and the 97th Company in support of the 
84th Company, all companies were in a four-wave formation.”18 (See Appendix F)  This 
configuration maintained a wide front and spread the ranks out to cover a broad amount of 
ground.  The ranks were in wide rows and men had attached bayonets to their rifles; intending o 
engage their adversaries at close quarters.  The extended front of the formation provided a large 
target for the defending Germans.   The idea of the assault was to close upon the enemy and 
maintain liaison with the flanks.  This method did not take into account the capability of machine 
guns defending an enemy position nor the great distance over open ground required to obtain he 
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objective; a deadly miscalculation.  The tactic was obsolete by World War One standards, but the 
Americans had not yet learned that lesson (See Appendix G).19 
   
Appendix F. Map of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines attack on Belleau Wood 
            
Appendix G. Formation of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment during attack on southern edge 
of Belleau Wood June 6, 1918 
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 From the narrow ravine the battalion looked across the flowing field of wheat nearly 500 
meters toward the edge of Belleau Wood.  Private Scarbrough recalled the moment the battalion 
began the advance.  “Then at 5p.m. somebody at the top gave the signal and it worked its way 
down to the lieutenants and sergeants and we with echoing hollers and the blowing of whistles, 
we moved out.”20   The battalion advanced at a steady pace in what Private Scarbrough 
remembered as, “wheat that was almost up to our shoulders.  I remember going into the whea , 
the sun shining and the stalks crunching under hundreds of boots.  I watched Lieutenant 
Timmerman plodding through the stalks, his gas mask around his chest and cane in his hand, 
stepping high like he was in deep mud.”21  Private Scarbrough smiled at the display, amused.  He 
then shifted his attention to Corporal Edwin J. Larsen who walked next to Private Scarbrough as 
if to get a reciprocated reaction at Lieutenant Timmerman’s awkward move ent through the 
field.  “Larsen sternly reminded me to keep my eyes front.”22  
Far beyond the battalion’s advance, Corporal Rendinell, who had earlier been sent 
forward to locate the enemy machine gun emplacements, cautiously moved into the seclusion of 
the gorge.  Together with Privates Allen H. Howe, Wilbur F. Moore and another Marine 
advanced along the ravine concealed along the northern bank.  The three men crawled further 
along, keeping a distance of several yards between each other, Private Moore far back.   If the 
other three men were killed or wounded, Private Moore could make a run for it and get word 
back to the company.  Creeping slowly, Corporal Rendinell came to a corner in the gully.  “We 
hunched along with our heads down.  I spotted a bunch of Heinies around the bend of the ravine.  
I signaled back to Private Moore, he rushed back to headquarters and then the attack started.”23 
Major Sibley’s men had barely begun to descend the sloping field toward the woods 
when the pounding beat of distant machine guns emanated from the far tree line.  Taken by 
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surprise, the battalion immediately suffered casualties.  The 84th Company on the front right of 
the battalion formation had advanced parallel to the roadway, which ran down along a ravine, as 
they pushed towards the town of Bouresches.  The sunken path gave little cover, but one plato  
from the 84th Company tried to seek shelter in this depression.  The enemy fire from the woods 
had torn into their flank and the company had to deal with the heavy enemy machine gun fir
before they could push toward the town.   
Private Bernard Kallin remembered, above the thundering pulsation of machine guns, 
orders came for the platoon to advance to the left, towards the woods.  The battalion began to 
move toward the tree line a few men at a time.  About twenty-five meters away, Private Kallin 
watched Corporal Earl M. Collier labor his way up the grade carrying his autom tic rifle.  Near 
Collier, Corporal Harry W. Elliot also struggled up the slope.  Private Kallin recalled, “As they 
came out of the roadway, a machine gun opened up on them and both of them fell.”24  
Numerous rounds struck Elliot, instantly killing him.  Private Wilfred R. Le Beau saw Collier 
fall and immediately realized he was dead.  Struck several times, bullets had blown his head 
open and shattered his lower jaw.  Before his lifeless body fell to the ground, the same volley of 
rounds hit him in the left side of his chest, shattering the shoulder blade as well as his eft lower 
leg.25  The front two companies scampered toward the woods in small groups.  The open field 
offered no cover from the storm of enemy bullets.   
The 83rd and 97th, trailing behind the 82nd and 84th Companies also advanced into the 
teeth of the enemy gun fire, which swept the field from left to right.  “I remember thinking the 
bullets sounded just like crickets, loud crickets,” remembered Private Scarbrough.26  The 
screams of men shouting orders and calling for medical attention mixed with the pounding sound 
of machine gun fire.  The battalion’s field of view became greatly hindered by the tall wheat.  “I 
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saw a man fall in front and to the right of me, and right away the man behind him stepped up to 
take his place.”27  Sergeants and officers yelling above the whine of bullets cracking over-head, 
urged their men to continue the advance.   
 The front two companies suffered heavy casualties, littering the field as the two rear 
companies continued to advance on the southeastern tree line of Belleau Wood.  Private 
Scarbrough remembered, “Nobody stopped to help the fallen, we were ordered to keep up the 
lines and replace the gaps.”28  Private Carl Williams was in front of Private Scarbrough during 
the advance.  “He fell right in front of me, and I double-timed into his spot, looking down at him 
as I went.  I couldn’t see where he was hit, but he didn’t move.”29  Private Edward A. Graham, 
standing next to Private Williams, saw him fall after a machine gun bullet went through Private 
William’s chest.30 
 The battalion moved on the left side of the ravine where the ground was lower than the 
ridge and they made perfect targets for German gunners inside Belleau Wood.  Major Sibley’s 
men had nowhere to hide in the open field, while deep inside the forest, a thickly-wooded hill 
provided perfect concealment in the for the Germans firing down on the advancing Mar es.   “It 
was un-nerving,” Private Scarbrough thought in vain, “why weren’t we taking cover?”  “I could 
hear sergeants shouting ‘keep moving! Fill in!’ It’s funny I found myself praying, but not for 
safety.  I was praying for the nerve to keep going, not to give up, not to let my unit down.”31 
           The experience was indelible.  In a 1990 interview, 100-year-old John Groff, who was at 
the time a twenty-eight-year-old Gunnery Sergeant in Lieutenant Timmer an’s platoon, vividly 
recalled the horror.  “Men were bleeding and begging that something be done for them, and we 
couldn’t do it.  We had to go forward or we would have been wounded.”32  Captain Alfred H. 
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Noble above the roar of the battle shouted, “Straight ahead, what are you waiting for,” recalled 
Groff.  “We were more afraid of our senior officers than we were of the Germans.  It was pretty 
bad business.”33  The battalion had to keep moving in order to seek the cover of the tree line and 
have a fighting chance against the Germans.  The open field was too dangerous and offered n  
concealment. 
           The battalion pressed on amidst the withering fire.  Private Scarbrough tripped over 
something in the middle of the field.  When he looked over his shoulder he realized he had 
stumbled over the body of another Marine.  “It was a lucky too, because as I hit the ground I felt 
the shockwave of a string of bullets run right down my neck.  That’s no exaggeration either. I 
had on a light backpack and at least three rounds ripped right through my pack.”34  Suddenly he 
felt like something had just hit him in the face and stunned him.  The incredible pain in his head 
and neck convinced him that he had been shot.  “I felt around my neck and I wasn’t hit.  Then 
my knuckles scraped against the jagged rim of my helmet and I understood what had tried to 
snap my neck.  A machine gun bullet had come so close to hitting me that it went through the 
rim of my helmet.”35 
           Private Scarbrough lay there shocked and looked again at the body he had just fallen over.  
The corpse was riddled with bullets.   “It scared the hell out of me.  I felt like I was right there at 
death’s doorway and this guy was inside while I was still outside.”  Before Private Scarbrough 
could gain his senses Corporal Marion M. Collier, advancing nearby, violently grabbed the 
scared Private’s shirt and screamed for him to get on his feet and push forward.  “I stood up to 
one knee, pushing myself away from the dead man with my other leg.”  Private Scarbrough, in 
the fog of chaos, began advancing the opposite direction of the attack.  He noticed the rest of the 
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company coming towards him and recalled, “Somehow, in the bullets and fear, I still had time to 
be embarrassed for my disorientation.”36    
            Private Scarbrough sprinted to Corporal Collier to find out where to get back in 
formation.  “I hollered to him but he didn’t hear me, so I ran up to him and grabbed his shoulder.  
‘Corporal!’ I yelled.”  Suddenly Collier fell back into him.  As he looked at the corporal, Private 
Scarbrough saw the round hole in his chin.  “It looked like a dimple in his lower chin except that 
his jaw had shattered and his lower teeth were now a jagged line of chips, bone and blood across 
his face.  He didn’t move at all and his eyes were absolutely as clear as they had been a minute 
ago when he spoke to me, but he was gone, no doubt.”37 
 Private Havelock D. Nelson, whose platoon had been delayed in joining the rest of the 
97th Company, recalled approaching the battalion as they advanced on the woods.   
About half way across, a tremendous uproar of artillery, machine gun and rifle 
fire burst loose and continued without a break.  The attack had started and we 
were not there!  Faster we walked toward the woods ahead of us.  I caught a 
glimpse of the skirmish lines moving to the northeast through the wheat fields on 
the other side of the woods.  Shells were bursting in those lines so rapidly that 
they could not be counted, but the lines appeared to me to be as straight as on a 
drill field.  I did not know then that only a few minutes before those two lines had 
been four lines!38 
The 97th Company began to advance in rushes of fifteen yards at a time, following behind 
the 84th on the right side of the ravine.  The torrent of machine gun fire laid waste to the left 
flank of the company in addition to the devastating German artillery that began to inundate the 
field.  Immediately a machine gun bullet struck Corporal Neil S. Shannon passing through the 
muscle of the left leg, entering the inside thigh of the right leg and shattering he femur bone.  
Bleeding severely from his wounds, Shannon slowly dragged his Chauchat rifle with him 
through the wheat for several yards.  Eventually the twenty-eight year old managed to make his 
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way to safety along an embankment skirting the lower tree line of Belleau Wood.  Corporal 
Shannon remained with his company until evacuation became possible.39  
The artillery fell with increasing ferocity on the battalion, and the 97th Company bore the 
brunt of it.  Despite the danger, Private William H. Saylor crept forward in the field dragging his 
telescoped-rifle with him.  He eventually positioned himself prone in the open field and began to 
search for targets nestled in the distant tree line.   Suddenly, heavy German trench mortars 
known as “minniewihffers” announced their arrival with their terrifying signature scream.  They 
crashed to the earth with horrendous results.40   
Burrowed down in the field, Corporal Joseph L. Burns was fifteen yards away from 
Private Saylor when the earth shook underneath him.    A trench mortar made a direct hit on 
Private Saylor.  Sergeant William J. Delany recalled, “I saw Private William Saylor actually 
blown up in the air about twenty feet by a German Minniewhiffer, like one of our trench mortar 
shells.  He had his insides blown right out and died at once, never knew what hit him.”41  The 
explosion had literally decapitated him, blasted his torso apart, and removed his right foot.42  
Sergeant William T. Scanlon, situated about twenty feet from Saylor, recalled the sight.  “His 
body goes up in the air like the roots of a blasted tree.  I can pick out his legs, arms and body.  
My eyes seem fixed and follow the upward movement and watch the parts coming down.  Bits 
fall on me.  It is the first direct hit I have seen.”43  The man known by his comrades as “Alarm 
Clock Bill” died in the most horrific way and those that were there never forgot it.  “Everybody 
remembered his death because he was the first man to be killed by direct hit,” rememb red 
Captain Thomas T. McEvoy, commanding the 1st Platoon of the 97th Company.44  
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The German artillery fire quickly turned the open field into a perfect kill-zone as deadly 
chunks of shrapnel flew sailed through the air.  Men cowed under the barrage.  Movement across 
even the smallest open stretch took extreme courage.  The torrential incoming of shells became 
too much for Private William R. Cassady to emotionally handle.   He was slightly wounded and 
began to psychologically breakdown from the debilitating condition commonly known as “shell 
shock.”45  Virtually paralyzed by fear, Private Cassady got his focus back in a matter of minutes 
and advanced through the shrapnel-strewn field.46    Sergeant Scanlon remembered, “I don’t want 
to get up, but I force myself.  I see other figures move.  We are just starting forward when Major 
Sibley’s voice comes to us, clear across the field from the woods: ‘Ninety-Seventh Company, 
stand fast!’” 
Held up, the company decided to dig in just south of the middle of the tree line of Belleau 
Wood.  “Here we halted and were told to lie down,” remembered Sergeant Havelock Nelson. 
The company had begun to dig in when he heard Private Harry R. Hensell cry out in pain.  “This 
was almost as big a surprise to me as it had been to him, because I had been feeling reasonably 
safe and had noticed nothing coming our way but some stray overhead shots.”  Grasping his 
knee, Private Hensell writhed in pain.  Sergeant Nelson tore open the pant leg of his trouser and 
found a bullet had lodged into the skin above the knee.  “The bullet was so near the surface that 
it could easily have been lifted out with a sharp knife.  However amateur surgery being 
prohibited, I took his first aid packet and tied the wound up for him.”47 
The remnants of the company took refuge behind the protection of a crest at the forest’s
edge.  Survivors looked back toward the field and saw several wounded men struggling to make 
it to safety.  A few men braved the gun fire to assist these casualties.  Privates William T. 
Nappier, Paul S. Dreyer and Walter L. Burroughs worked their way through the field as machine 
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gun fire continued to snap overhead. Miraculously they escaped the deadly barrage.  Privat s
Leon D. Huffstater and John M. Worrell realized that their assistance in aiding the wounded was 
also desperately needed.  Both men crawled to their commanding officer and above the howl of 
gun fire, asked permission to help bring in the wounded.  Permission was granted.  Both men 
then crawled out into the kill-zone and managed to drag several men towards the cover of the 
tree line.  While traveling through the fire-swept field a shell detonated behind Private Worrell; 
knocking him to his stomach.  A large piece of shrapnel tore into his back along the lower 
lumbar region and embedded next to the spine.  The injured Private lay partially paralyzed.48  
 While the 97th Company halted in the ravine south of Belleau Wood, survivors of the 
other three companies entered the dark tree line of Belleau Wood.  Private Scarbrough recalled 
lying in the field contemplating his next move.   
I pulled myself up by my rifle again and felt this intense pain, like I had a sharp 
rock in my shoe.  Only it wasn’t in my shoe, it was my knee.  I sat back down and 
then quickly thought it better to lie flat.  I felt down and lifted my knee up to see 
what was wrong.  It was swollen like a grapefruit and my pants were torn.  I 
decided to give it a go and see if I could get to the woods.  I started at a crawl for 
a couple hundred yards.49   
 
Eventually the battalion’s survivors were immediate deterred from attacking Bouresches, 
the initial objective, and entered the ominous tree line of Belleau Wood to look for the hidden
enemy machine gun emplacements.50 
 
Moving simultaneously with Major Sibley’s battalion, Major Thomas Holcomb’s 2nd 
Battalion 6th Marine Regiment initiated their advance, centered on Captain Donald Duncan’s 96th 
Company.  The battalion’s assault intended to conform to the right half of MajorSibley’s 
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battalion to seize the town of Bouresches.  The 79th Company under Captain Randolph T. Zane 
had orders to move behind Captain Duncan’s Company.  The 80th Company, according to the 
assault plan, received directions to move in behind Major Sibley’s Marines.  The right half of the 
80th Company, led by Captain Bailey M. Coffenberg, were to advance east parallel to th  
southern tree line of Belleau Wood while the right half would follow the right wing of Sibley’s 
men into the southern edge of the forest.51 
Earlier in the morning, Captain Duncan’s company moved into a patch of woods about a 
mile south of the town of Bouresches.  According to First Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates most of 
the men believed the company had moved to the rear to get a rest; they would soon be sorely let
down.  At about 4:30 p.m., thirty minutes before the attack was to commence, orders detailing 
the attack reached the company commanders who were spread out over a great distance.  Major 
Holcomb recalled an even more precarious announcement.  “We received orders to attack at 
4:55p.m., and the order stated that the Second Battalion would go over the top at five-five.  This 
gave us only ten minutes to issue the necessary orders to the troops concerned, an apparent 
impossibility, although it did not prove to be so.”52 
Pandemonium rippled through the 96th Company on receiving the orders.  They had a 
great distance to cover in order to be in position to begin the assault.  Details about the assault 
remained incredibly unclear since most officers did not even know the objective.  First 
Lieutenant Cates recalled the orders had been “very ambiguous,” but there was no time for 
clarification.53 First Lieutenant John West, who commanded the 3rd Platoon of the 79th Company, 
stood with his men in a cluster of woods situated away from the rest of the company.  A courier 
ran up to the lieutenant with a message ordering him to report to the company command post 
immediately.  When West arrived he found the other three platoon commanders with Captain 
132 
 
Randolph Zane situated around a map sprawled out on in the grass.  Captain Zane quickly 
delegated orders to the men.  First Lieutenant West’s 3rd Platoon was told to advance towards the 
southern face of Belleau Wood and make an oblique movement behind Major Sibley’s men and 
follow them at a 500-yard interval into the town.54   
The attacking platoons immediately moved into position.  Corporal Lloyd Pike of the2nd 
Platoon, 79th Company noticed members of the 96th Company who had made the tiring journey 
to their jump-off point with the utmost haste huddled among the trees waiting for the initiation 
the of the assault.  Several German observation balloons remained silhouetted on the eastern 
horizon and an occasional shell fell upon this patch of forest.  The Marines remained perfectly 
visible on the high crest, overlooking the open field they were about to cross.55  Corporal Pike’s 
platoon reached the cover of some trees as the 2nd Division’s artillery, positioned several 
kilometers behind the front line, responded to the enemy guns. 
Last minute details of the pending advance reached Captain Zane and in order to convey 
the new information to his platoon commanders, he tasked his second-in-command, First 
Lieutenant Graves Erskine, to take the new data over to the 2nd and 4th Platoons.  Erskine, who 
formerly command the 2nd Platoon, arrived just as the first supporting artillery shells collided 
into the distant southern edge of Belleau Wood.  From the seclusion of their wooded jump-off 
point, the men of the 2nd Platoon cheered above the distant crash that echoed across the valley, 
content that the Germans were finally on the receiving end of misery.56  
The supporting fire did not go unanswered.  Sergeant Romeyn P. Benjamin recalled 
several shells landing among the 2nd Platoon of the 79th Company.  Sergeant Benjamin lay prone 
and buried his head into the ground as the terrifying and familiar scream of an incoming shell 
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permeated the air.  The explosion, which Benjamin remembered being softer than he anticipated, 
sent dirt and debris in all directions.  As he cautiously raised his head he saw the lifeless bodies 
of Privates Rozaire D. Rivard and Edward H. Wendell sprawled nearby.  They had not tken 
cover in time and the blast had blown both men’s heads to pieces.57  Near the mangled body of 
Private Wendell, Private Harvey S. Brown found the dead man’s mess kit blown out of his pack.  
He ran over to pick it up and placed it in his own satchel for later use.  Corporal Glen G. Hill 
remembered a shell exploding just behind him where his brother, Corporal Sydney Hill, stood. 
Fearing that the blast had killed Sydney, he ran over to find his brother, Sergeant Robert E. 
Barrett and several other corporals casually sitting in a dugout.  The men were hastily eating a 
last-minute meal of Argentine beef and French bread as shells exploded nearby.   One man inside 
the foxhole said to Corporal Glen Hill, “Come on down and join the party.  You might as well 
die on a full stomach.”58   
Just before the anticipated jump-off, Second Lieutenant Clifton Cates scrambled together 
his 4th Platoon of the 96th Company and began to move his men west along the battalion’s 
position to a starting point where they could best advance to make up the battalion’s extreme left 
platoon.  Earlier, Second Lieutenant Cates received orders from Captain Duncan to move toward 
Major Sibley’s men and maintain liaison.  Moving through the ranks of the 79th Company, 
Captain Randolph Zane wasted no time in snarling at Second Lieutenant Cates to clear his men 
out of the way.59  The rest of the 96th Company emerged into the open field sloping 600 yards 
towards the valley below where the red-roofed and walled buildings of Bouresches cam  into 
view through the haze of smoke blanketing the field as occasional shells burst in the wheat.  As 





Appendix H. Map of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines attack on Bouresches 
The 96th Company advanced from the tree line in a formation where each platoon made 
up four skirmish lines.  Enemy machine guns began working over the ranks of Marines as thy 
emerged from the tree line and several men in the first waves fell wounded.  Sergeant Benjamin 
of the 79th Company watched as the columns of 96th Company men pressed out of the woods into 
the open field.  Sergeant Benjamin remembered, “There was a tremendous noise and a conti u l
hum of bullets.  I could not think.  I felt as though my stomach was melting in my body.”60  
Corporal Glen Hill watched the advance from the seclusion of a shell hole while he at a quick 
meal with his brother Sydney.  “As they were crossing the field you could see the xploding 
shells and incessant whine of machine gun bullets and the men dropping along the way.”61 
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The 1st Platoon of the 96th Company, commanded by First Lieutenant George B. 
Lockhart, advanced on the company’s extreme right.  The rest of the 96th Company pivoted on 
the advance of Lieutenant Lockhart’s platoon.  Moving through the field, the company veering to 
the right, the 1st Platoon advanced ahead of the rest of the company.  First Sergeant Al Sheridan, 
a childhood friend of Captain Donald Duncan, the company commander, recalled, “I was in the 
1st Platoon and our platoon was on the right flank of the company, so we advanced a little too 
fast for the rest of the company and Don came over and made us halt ‘til the rest of th  company 
got on line with us.”62 
Captain Duncan stayed with and advanced on the right flank of the company along the 
sector of Lieutenant Lockhart’s men.  Smoking a straight-stemmed pipe from the side of his 
mustached mouth, Duncan carried a cane and was, according to Sheridan, “the coolest man on 
the field” as machine gun bullets began to snap over head.63   Above the thud of exploding shells 
and hissing rounds, Captain Duncan walked adjacent to First Lieutenant Lockhart when First 
Sergeant Sheridan turned to his old friend and sarcastically hollered, “Do you think we will see 
much action?”  Captain Duncan, smiling, said, “Oh yes we will give and take but be sre you 
take more than you give.”64  Moments later an enemy round tore through Captain Duncan’s 
abdomen and his pipe slipped out of his lips as the thirty-five-year old captain slumped to th  
ground.  Immediately First Sergeant Sheridan ran to his aid, followed by First Sergeant Joseph 
A. Sissler.65   
Lieutenant Junior Grade Weedon E. Osborne, a naval dental surgeon who had already 
pulled several men of the 96th Company out of the firing line, saw the two men struggling to get 
the wounded captain to safety.  He ran over and helped move Captain Duncan to shelter.  T  
gravely wounded company commander grasped his stomach in agony as litter bearers reached 
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the shelter of a nearby tree line.  “We no more than laid him on the ground when a big eight-nch 
shell came in and killed all but myself,” recalled Sheridan.  The explosion knocked First 
Sergeant Sheridan to the ground, his life spared only by the helmet on his head which deflected a 
large shell splinter.66  The concussion of the blast killed Lieutenant Junior Grade Osborne 
instantly.    The same explosion dismembered First Sergeant Sissler.67  Stunned by the horrific 
scene and the divine intervention that spared him from so much as a scratch, First Sergeant 
Sheridan regained his composure and ran quickly back toward the advancing 1st Platoon.68   
The enemy guns situated in the town laid waste to the first wave of the 96th Company.  
Several German guns were situated in front of the southwestern wall of the town and still more 
were situated along the rising high ground behind the town just in front of the small-gauged 
railroad track.69  One particular Maxim fired from the bell tower of the village church.  
According to Second Lieutenant Jospeph C. Grayson of the 79th Company, most of the first wave 
of the battalion fell dead or wounded within the first three minutes of the assault.70 
Casualties grew exponentially as the second wave of the 96th Company filled the 
vacancies left by the decimated first wave.  Shells exploded with increasing ferocity.  Private 
Harold I. Turney recalled, “I had gone perhaps one hundred yards from our starting point, when 
bang!  There was an explosion before me, and I dropped with several pieces of shrapnel in my 
groin and leg.”71 Men immediately went to the prone position as the intensity of the German 
machine gun fire increased with every advance.  Private John T. Miller remembered th  screams 
of wounded men crying for help above the roar of battle.72   
On the right edge of the 96th Company, Second Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates’s men 
remained pinned to the ground.  “The machine gun bullets were hitting around and it looked like 
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hail, hitting around so my first thought was to run to the rear.  I hate to admit it, but that was 
it.” 73  Second Lieutenant Cates then noticed Lieutenant James Robertson advancing the 
remaining members of the company to the right into the cover of the ravine that ran to he edge 
of the village.  Robertson, evidently aware of the danger facing the company while they lay 
exposed in the field stood up amidst the snapping bullets and waved his pistol in the air in order 
to get everyone’s attention.  He signaled for the remnants of the company to follow him into the 
ravine.  Second Lieutenant Cates looked over to the right and saw Robertson rallyingthe 
company.  Second Lieutenant Cates recalled, “We really didn’t know where we wre going but 
this town was right in front of us with a ravine on our right.”74   
As the survivors of the 4th Platoon began to maneuver to their right, Private Earl Belfry, 
who had suffered a slight wound, struggled through the wheat as rounds continued to search the 
crest of the hill.  Private Raymond Ross ran toward the ravine as a stray bullet perforated his left 
leg just above the knee sending the twenty-year-old stumbling to the ground. Second Lieutenant 
Cates worked his way to the right as the other survivors of his platoon also ran half-hunched over 
towards Lieutenant Roberts.  Halfway across the open field, Second Lieutenant Cates felt a 
tremendous impact that knocked him to the ground and soon lost consciousness.  A single 
machine gun bullet hit the young Second Lieutenant on the crown of his helmet.  As he fell to the 
ground, Second Lieutenant Cates landed on the rim of his helmet knocking it off his head.   
Simultaneously the 79th Company began the advance just as the last wave of the 96th 
Company cleared the seclusion of the woods.  Corporal Glen Hill watched the spectacle of he 
96th Company’s advance and noticed Lieutenant Wallace M. Leonard attempt to roll a Bull 
Durham cigarette as his shaking hands caused most of the tobacco to fall out.75  Still stunned by 
the spectacle of seeing Privates Rivard and Wendall killed in front of him, Sergeant Benjamin 
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heard the voice of Lieutenant Leonard shout, “All right 2nd Platoon, stick with me!”  The twenty-
three year old Lieutenant led the columns of his platoon out of the woods.  Sergeant Benjamin 
immediately recovered his composure and took over half of his platoon leading them out of the 
woods in columns of twos.76 The other half of the platoon, led by Sergeant Roland D. Baldwin, 
advanced to the edge of the starting line in a similar formation.77  Out of the woods, Lieutenant 
Leonard drew his pistol and fired a shot into the air and according to Corporal Hill, “with the 
most unmilitary command said, ‘Come on men, for God’s sake don’t fail me now.’”78 
As the platoons of the 79th began their advance, Captain John A. West ran from the 
company headquarters back to his men to find the other platoons already advancing on his right.  
Captain West’s orders called for him to advance behind Major Berton Sibley’s battalion.  
Immediately Captain West summoned Corporal Alfred O. Halverson.  Squatting near the 
corporal and pointing across the open field, Captain West ordered him to take his squad of 
twelve men across the open ground to fall in behind Major Sibley’s 3rd Battalion.   Following 
close behind Corporal Halverson’s group, another squad advanced followed by the remaining 
two squads of Captain West’s platoon.  The platoon pressed forward into the teeth of the enemy 
fire at intervals.  Each squad moved a few meters and then dropped into the wheat.  The platoon 
advanced north toward the southern fringe of Belleau Wood (See Appendix H).  Second 
Lieutenant West fell into the formation next to Gunnery Sergeant August T. Ziolkowski in the 
center of the platoon.79  
From the town of Bouresches, enemy guns tore into the right front flank of Captain 
West’s platoon while fire from the high ground inside Belleau Wood took a tremendous toll.  
Major Sibley’s men had passed across the front of Captain West’s men; most of them had 
disappeared into the southern fringe of Belleau Wood.  As the platoon pushed south in desperate 
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attempt to link with the 3rd Battalion, Captain West recalled coming upon numerous dead and 
wounded men from Major Sibley’s battalion.  German artillery eventually targe ed this sector of 
the field and began to drop shells with increasing intensity.  “Our own wounded were crying fo  
first aid and stretcher bearers.  There were none.  I remember tying the puttee strings to stop the 
blood of a Third Battalion man.  He had been shot through the calves of both legs by machine 
gun fire from Belleau Wood.  Just a kid he was, crying hard.”80  Captain West continued to work 
his way along the line of his men now pinned to the ground.  Eventually he worked his way back 
to the area of this wounded man only to find that a shell had killed him.  West starred 
momentarily at the lifeless body sprawled out in the wheat, both legs blown off.81  
Several men of the 3rd platoon worked their way through the lines to help the wounded.  
No stretcher bearers were available.  Sergeant Ziolkowski and Private Luth r A. Ersland 
desperately attempted to treat wounded men whose screams emanated from everywhere.  
Captain West came upon a ghastly scene when he discovered the mangled bodies of Privates 
John H. Kaiser and Horace Ward.  Both men died instantly when a single enemy shell burst 
nearly on top of them.  The two men lay next to each other.  Captain West remembered Privat  
Ward’s vigorous spirit and enthusiasm, and now the smallest man in the company lay lifeless 
among the waving fields of wheat with a massive hole through the right side of his head.82   
Further down the line Captain West found Private Roy A. Trow, a grenadier.  Captain 
West recalled the terrible scene when he saw Trow’s “stomach and testicles hot away by a shell, 
a mass of blood.”  He tried to help him but soon Trow lost consciousness.  Believing he had 
expired Captain West moved to another wounded man.  As he passed back over the seemingly 
lifeless body, he heard Trow cry out for help.  Four other men came to assist, using adi carded 
pack in the field, formed a make-shift stretcher.  Amidst the hellacious fire, the Marines dragged 
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Trow away through the wheat several hundred meters back to the jump off point where a 
makeshift field hospital catered to the increasing flow of horribly wounded men.83   
Back at the jump-off point next to this field hospital, a dugout in a cluster of trees, 
members of the battalion’s thirty-seven millimeter gun crews, under the command of First 
Lieutenant Clyde P. Matteson, fired a tremendous barrage into the distant buildings of 
Bouresches.  The fire of these guns commonly known as “one-pounders,” attracted the attention 
of numerous enemy shells.  Privates Alton R. Vanlaningham and Alva C. Tompkins and 
Corporal Carlos E. Stewart pushed their gun crews forward to a more exposed position and 
continued to unleash withering fire on the enemy-held town.  Among these crews was Private 
Ronald T. Chisholm, who had suffered a minor wound the day before.  He chose to remain with 
his gun crew instead of seek evacuation to an aid station.84   
Shells continued to explode in the open field and Privates Edmund T. Smith, Walter E. 
Rider and Walter A. Gross continued to run out into the open to supply the thirty-seven 
millimeter guns with ammunition despite the terrific volume of artillery fire.85  As the gun crews 
continued to fire into German positions a cluster of shells landed in succession near one gun
crew.  An exploding round riddled Private Alvin H. Harris with shrapnel.  Fragments of the shell 
penetrated the twenty-four year old Marine’s stomach and legs in fourteen places.  Despite the 
terrible pain, he refused to be treated and maintained a continuous volume of fire from his gun.86 
As First Lieutenant Leonard’s 2nd Platoon advanced in the center of the company, 
Corporal Glen Hill surveyed his men to ensure the platoon front was even.  He moved out next to 
Corporal Lloyd Pike and Corporal George P. Hunter.  Corporal Hunter, an unshaven Marine 
who, at any given time, seemed to have a mouthful of chewing tobacco, had always boasted that 
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he’d be home in time to celebrate Thanksgiving.  As shells exploded and machine gun bullets 
cracked overhead, Corporal Pike turned to Corporal George P. Hunter and shouted, “Say Hunter, 
do you think you’ll be back in Washington for Thanksgiving dinner?”87  
Corporal Pike recalled the two columns of the platoon advancing over a gradual incline.  
Since Corporal Pike’s automatic rifle crews were dispersed among the various squads, he had no 
specific assignment.  As the platoon surmounted the crest of this ridge everything broke loose.  
“The column seemed to disappear in front of me,” recalled Corporal Pike.  Survivors spread out 
into skirmish formation.88  Corporal Hill recalled two men in his squad fell wounded.  One man, 
shot through the chest, and the other hit in the stomach, asked Hill what they should do.  
Corporal Hill, helplessly yelled at his men to lie down and try and crawl back toward the 
platoon’s jump-off point.89  The man next to Sergeant Romeyn Benjamin fell wounded when a 
bullet entered his shoulder and exited the side of his body.  Sergeant Benjamin crawled over to 
this wounded Marine and began to apply pressure dressing to the wound.  “In doing so I exposed
my head and promptly received a bullet that glanced off my left jaw and severed my hel et 
strap.”90  As soon as he dressed his own wound, Sergeant Benjamin resumed care to the 
wounded man.  Several other wounded men crawled back towards the line, attracting the 
attention of distant enemy machine guns.  Sergeant Benjamin decided that he would wait ntil 
darkness to attempt to bring in his wounded comrade.91    
Corporal Glen Hill had advanced about halfway across the field when he suddenly felt a 
terrible concussion underneath him.  “My left leg crumpled under me.  I tried to get up but fell
over.  I was out for a little while and when I came to was too weak to open my first aid kit.  So I 
lay with my head down hill, wrapped my thigh and knee as tightly as I could with my puttee.”  A 
single bullet had hit Corporal Hill directly in the knee cap and shattered his lower femu and 
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exited through the back of the thigh.  As the blood poured out of his leg saturating the puttee, he 
began to lose consciousness.92 
The platoon remained pinned as German machine guns inundated the tops of the wheat 
stalks.  Corporal Pike recalled:   
I don’t believe we lay there in that hail of machine gun bullets and artillery shells 
very long before we heard the voice of Colonel Albertus Catlin shouting through 
his field megaphone, ‘Dig in where you are and hold what you’ve got.’  The 
words were quite clear when he turned his megaphone towards us, and then grew 
weaker as he turned his megaphone in other directions.93  
 
Sprawled prone on the ground, he removed his pack to find a tool to dig into the ground.  
He had long since discarded his cumbersome entrenching shovel only to regret that decision.  As 
he rummaged through his pack he found his mess kit, a suitable instrument to scoop out clumps 
of earth.  Corporal Pike noticed that a lone bullet had punctured his pack and gone clean through 
his mess kit.  Examining the rest of his body, Corporal Pike realized how close he’d come to 
being hit when he discovered bullet holes in his left cuff and right trouser leg, one of which 
grazed the inside of his right leg leaving a red burn on his skin.94 
Shortly after Colonel Catlin ordered the 79th Company to dig in, his observation post 
came under intense fire.  With no field phone to get updates on the advance, Colonel Catlin 
resorted to standing atop a small rise of ground protected only by a cluster of hrubbery.  Near 
the road leading out of Lucy-le-Bocage, Colonel Catlin’s position was extremely exposed.  He 
watched the assault through his binoculars oblivious to the numerous bullets snapping, flingi  
dirt in the air as they hit the ground around him.  Several guns of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion 
continued to fire an enfilading barrage along the southern edge of Belleau Wood as well as into 
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the distant village of Bouresches.  Their fire continued to draw a reply from the unseen German 
guns in the woods.95   
Suddenly a sniper’s bullet struck Colonel Catlin in the chest.  “It felt exactly s though 
someone had struck me heavily with a sledge.  It swung me clear around and toppled me over on 
the ground.  When I tried to get up I found that my right side was paralyzed.”96  Captain Thibot 
Laspierre, a French officer attached as a liaison to the Regiment, stood by Colonel Catlin.97  He 
immediately tended to the wounded Colonel.  Pharmacist Mate 3rd Class Oscar S. Goodwin and 
Sergeant Sydney Colford Jr. ran toward the wounded officer as enemy bullets kicked up earth 
around them.98      
Private John L. Tunnell, a runner from the regimental headquarters company, headed out 
very early in the assault looking for Colonel Catlin carrying a message tht the German shell fire 
included gas rounds of which many of the masks were ineffective against.  Smoke from the 
artillery shells blanketed the field, causing the young private to become disoriented.  Eventually 
he reached regimental headquarters only to learn that Colonel Catlin had advanced toward the 
front to witness the assault.  Finally he came to Colonel Catlin’s forward command post 
moments after he had been wounded.  Private Tunnell recalled blood streaming from the 
Colonel’s chest.  Bullets snapped all around as leaves from the shrubbery gently drifted to the 
ground.  Colonel Catlin, with men at his side looked up and saw the stunned Private and in a 
feeble voice said, “Down here lad, quickly.”99 
Eventually word that Colonel Catlin had been wounded reached the nearby dressing 
station in Lucy-le-Bocage where Lieutenant Frederick R. Hook, a Navy surgeon, and his 
assistant rushed northeast of the town with a stretcher towards the wounded officer. When the 
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two men reached the wounded Colonel, Lieutenant Commander Wrey G. Farwell, the 
Regimental surgeon already on the scene, had just administered a hypodermic dose of analgesic 
to ease the pain.  Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, second-in-command of the regim nt, soon 
arrived at Colonel Catlin’s side.  When Lieutenant Colonel Lee asked if he could help, Colonel 
Catlin simply replied, “No, just carry on and carry out the previous arranged plan.”  Colonel 
Catlin then asked for his dispatch case and maps.  These documents were scattered about and 
Lieutenant Hook’s assistant rushed over the gather them.  They were given to Liutenant Colonel 
Lee who immediately headed out to oversee the assault on Belleau Wood and Bouresches, whic 
was still underway.100 
Most of Major Holcomb’s men remained pinned down in the field.  The 2nd Platoon of 
the 79th Company had dug in, impatiently waiting for someone to assume control of the situation.  
Many of the wounded men exposed in the field were hit again as the enemy guns repeatedly 
swept the field.  Several of the dead, littered along the pasture, were hit again as their lifeless 
corpses twitched each time a barrage of rounds hit the bodies.101  Deluged by enemy gunfire 
from the town of Bouresches as well as from the southern fringe of Belleau Wood, Lieutenant 
Leonard noticed one particular enemy gun in the edge of the woods had significantly obstructed 
the advance.  He crawled over to Corporal Pike and crouched low in the undergrowth, trying to 
point out the position to him.  The two men removed their helmets to be less conspicuous and 
popped their heads up above the short ground cover for only a few seconds to avoid drawing the 
enemy gunners’ attention.  “I couldn’t see the machine gun,” recalled Corporal Pike. Lieutenant 
Leonard extended his arm and pointed towards the tree line as Corporal Pike looked intently at 
the edge of the forest.  Suddenly the gun position fired and the foliage around it vibrated n the 
wake of the muzzle blast.   
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“I do not recall any orders being issued, but obviously the lieutenant wanted me to silence
that enemy machine gun, if possible.  I do not recall my feelings at the time, but in retrospect I 
can see that nothing I might do would leave me in any more precarious position than the one I 
was already in.”102  Corporal Pike, crawling on all fours, managed to rally his gun crew from the 
meager shelter of the stalks of wheat.  Shouting above the bedlam of incoming shells, Corporal 
Pike, an automatic rifleman, and an ammunition carrier made a quick fifteen yard dash through 
before collapsing to the ground as a barrage of enemy bullets sailed overhead.  The three m n 
continued this daring escapade until they found a large shell hole about seventy-five yards away 
from the tree line concealing the enemy position.103   
The crater provided scanty concealment, but the three men dug in deeper using mess kits 
and other improvised tools to improve the cover the depression provided.  Each time one of them 
raised their head above the edge of the hole there was a swift and violent reply of enemy 
machine gun fire.  The men had long since discarded their helmets believing it provided little 
protection and simply gave off a glare visible to the lurking enemy.  In the mad rush toward the 
shell hole, the automatic rifleman had been shot in the face and bled profusely.  Corporal Pike 
and the ammunition carrier tried to stop the bleeding.  The crater provided very littl  room to 
maneuver and each time someone attempted to move positions, they had to crawl over one of the 
other occupants, drawing the wrath of the enemy guns.  Corporal Pike vividly recalled his 
concern regarding the slow pace of the ammunition carrier.  “Each time he raised his head to 
look out, he withdrew so slowly I was afraid he would be hit.”104 
Eventually Corporal Pike pulled the Chauchat automatic rifle up to the edge of the crater 
and fired a quick burst at the enemy, again receiving a violent reply.  Corporal Pike continued to 
fire short bursts and ducked to avoid the expected retort from the enemy.  The ammunition 
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carrier decided to take over the weapon and maintain the steady fire on the German position.  
Maneuvering to change position required one of the men to hop over the other and briefly expose 
themselves to the enemy. The wounded automatic rifleman remained out of action and lay in the 
hole bandaged and bleeding while the other two men valiantly attempted to silence th  en my 
gun.  Again the ammunition carrier moved slowly each time he fired a burst.  His final 
movement proved to be too slow as a burst of the enemy machine gun struck him in the head 
instantly killing him.    The tightly confined position left the dead man’s body pressed against 
Corporal Pike and the wounded gunner.  Eventually Corporal Pike pushed the corpse away, and 
it flopped lifelessly to the edge of the crater.  The commotion again drew a hail of enemy bullets.  
Corporal Pike remained the only man in the group capable of firing the weapon, but the enemy’s 
fire superiority left little hope that the present strategy of silencing the enemy gun would be 
successful.  Corporal Pike took the dead man’s rifle and slowly sighted in on the grey-clad figure 
just inside the tree line and fired a single shot.  “Perhaps I got the enemy gunnerwith the first 
shot.  I only remember seeing his head drop forward to the left side of his gun, and the little grey 
top to his cap looking toward me like a bull’s-eye on a practice target.”  Corporal Pike fired 
again at the top of the enemy gunner’s exposed cap.  He noticed that the grey cap got dark as it 
became saturated with blood.  Even though the main enemy threat had been neutralized, 
Corporal Pike realize that his position remained dangerously exposed and with one severely 
wounded man to tend to, he decided to wait until a few hours until darkness to attempt any 
movement.105 
The remainder of the 2nd Platoon, 79th Company remained pinned down in the field.  First 
Lieutenant Graves Erskine noticed a wounded man crawling back toward the rear area.  This 
young man was trying to evacuate himself.  As the wounded man got closer, Lieutenant Erskine 
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saw the severity of the injury.  A bullet had blown the young man’s nose off.  Erskine 
immediately dressed the man’s wounds up and told him to take a message back to Captain Zane 
stating that the platoon was pinned down under horrific fire.106  Twenty minutes later, with the 
blood-soaked bandage still plastered across his face, the young Marine braved the withering fire 
once more to make his way toward Lieutenant Erskine.  The exhausted man looked at him and 
said, “I told the Captain what you said and he said, ‘get going goddammit!’”107 
Pinned down near Lieutenant Erskine, a squad of grenadiers led by Corporal Thomas A. 
Gragard sought cover in the field.  The Grenadiers were tasked with carrying satchels of 
grenades or mills bombs in order to destroy lightly fortified enemy emplacements.  Gragard rose 
above the stalks and walked forward to find a good position for his squad. Suddenly, a bullet 
struck Gragard who fell mortally wounded next to Private Elmer Asher.  Private Harvey S. 
Brown recalled, “I saw him killed.  He was right in front of me.   I was taking a message back 
and passed right by him.”108  “After that,” remembered Corporal Harry Fletcher, “he was 
delirious and moaning.”109  Private Oscar H. Rankin, one of Gragard’s dear friends, saw his 
comrade slump into the wheat.  Private Rankin, a school teacher who left his career to enlist in 
the Marine Corps, earned the nickname “the preacher” by his platoon.  He had a peaceful 
reputation and often led religious services for the platoon.   After Gragard fell dead, according to 
Lieutenant Erskine, Private Rankin “sprang to his feet and swore as no person had ever sworn.”  
Private Rankin took over the squad and pressed forward, enraged at the loss of his friend.110   
On the extreme east side of the 79th Company, Captain Charles Murray’s 4th Platoon 
came under the same terrible fire.  According to Sergeant Vernon M. Guymon and Private O a 
R. Allen, Lieutenant Murray suffered severe gunshot wounds to both arms and remained pinned 
to the ground unable to move.  About the same time, enemy snipers targeted the wounded and 
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anyone who unduly exposed themselves.  Private Elbert E. Brooks saw the wounded Lieutenant 
struggling to move, but without the use of his arms, he remained dangerously helpless and 
exposed.  While Sergeant Guymon dressed Lieutenant Murray’s wounds, Private Brooks 
immediately came to the Lieutenant’s side, removing all the equipment restricting his 
commanding officer while in the prone position.  Bullets continued to crack in the air just above 
the men’s heads.  Suddenly two stray rounds struck Private Brooks in the hip.  Oblivious to the 
wounds he continued to work on the wounded officer and succeeded in removing all of 
Lieutenant Murray’s gear.  Private Brooks then managed to hoist and strap Lieutenant Murray on 
his back using the officer’s gear as a harness.  Private Brooks then crawled through the wheat 
toward the battalion aid station.  Miraculously the two men arrived at the aid station where the 
Lieutenant received immediate medical attention and Private Brooks was marked for evacuation.  
The wounded twenty-three-year old refused to leave and immediately made his way back toward 
the company’s pinned down position.111 
While the 79th Company remained pinned in the open field, casualties mounted rapidly.  
A shell exploded next to Private Raymond W. Boone and a piece of shrapnel abruptly amputated 
two fingers on his right hand as another piece lacerated the back of his right hand.  Another 
fragment sailed clean through the twenty-three-year old’s upper lip.112  Another round exploded 
near Corporal David L. Spaulding and Corporal Harry B. Fletcher but both men refused to go to 
the rear.113  Several rounds struck First Lieutenant William A. Worton, the company’s executive 
officer.  He first suffered wounds in the neck and shoulder.  While he lay wounded enemy 




While The 79th Company remained pinned in the open field, the 96th Company continued 
to move east toward the concealment of the ravine on the battalion’s right.  Led by First 
Lieutenant James Robertson, the survivors quickly followed their commanding officer without 
any idea where they were headed.  Second Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates, who lay brief y 
unconscious from the machine gun round that glanced off his helmet, recovered his senses. “I 
put the helmet on, looked around and my first thought was to run like hell to the rear cause I 
couldn’t see anyone around me except wounded and dead.”  Suddenly, he saw four men in a 
ravine to his front right.  He got on his feet and ran towards them, staggering to the gr und two 
or three times.  Second Lieutenant Cates eventually reached the ravine where one of the men 
noticed a large swollen knot on the Second Lieutenant’s head.  He began pouring a smuggled 
canteen of wine over it.  “Don’t pour that over my head, give me a drink of it,” remarked Second 
Lieutenant Cates.115 He picked up a discarded French lebel rifle and took the four men down into 
the ravine towards the town of Bouresches.  Several enemy troops came into view and the five 
men fired on them, but missed as the German soldiers disappeared out of view.116     
Lieutenant Robertson emerged from the western edge of the village with the remnants of 
Cates’s 4th platoon.  From the outskirts of the center part of town, Cates hollered out towards 
Robertson.  He evidently could not hear the Second Lieutenant’s shouts so Cates blew his 
whistle immediately grabbing Robertson’s attention.  Looking intently towards the sound, he 
spotted Cates waving him over.  He took his men toward Cates’s position and turned them over.  
“All right take your platoon in and clean out the town and I’ll get reinforcements,” said 
Lieutenant Robertson.  Cates thought the order was, “a hell of a thing.”117 
Second Lieutenant Cates entered the town to find Corporal Nicholas C. Flynn and 
Sergeant Earl Belfry manning an automatic rifle.  Most of the German troops that still occupied 
150 
 
the town remained in the northern edge.  The village was segmented into three streets: one going 
north, one northeast, and one northwest.  Second Lieutenant Cates tasked Gunnery Sergeant 
Noyes V. Moore to take eight men to clear the street that meandered towardhe northwest corner 
of the village.  He then ordered Sergeant Earl Belfry, who had already been wounded, to take the 
northeastern corner of the town.  Second Lieutenant Cates took the remainder of the platoon 
straight north through the center of the village.  “We’d gotten just about half way down when we 
ran into some enemy and a machine gun opened up on us,” recalled Second Lieutenant Cats.118 
Instantly a bullet went through the brim of his helmet and grazed his ear.  He lunged for the 
cover of a stone wall as another round glanced off the top of his shoulder, nicking his second 
lieutenant’s insignia.  Another enemy gun crew on the northeastern side of the town opened fire 
while men moved from house to house.  A bullet hit twenty-year old Sergeant Belfry in the arm, 
fracturing the humerus bone.  Several other men fell wounded.119 Private Herbert D. Dunlavy 
saw one enemy gun open fire down the street and managed to single-handedly charge the enemy 
position and capture the crew.120 
Second Lieutenant Cates pulled his men back out of the firing line and established four 
defensive posts until reinforcements could arrive.  Twenty minutes later the remnants of the 96th 
Company entered the town.  Soon thereafter survivors of the 79th Company made their way to 
the edge of the town.  Privates James H. Hale, Oscar H. Rankin, Mike F. Lindsey a Lee Patton 
advanced beyond the rest of the company and took up position along the left flank of the town 
opening fire on the exposed enemy.  Sergeant James J. McClelland led a small group of 
automatic riflemen toward another flank of the town and directed a deadly barrage on several
exposed enemy positions.  Lieutenant Leonard entered the town with several survivor of the 2nd 
Platoon.  They maneuvered down one of the streets beyond the defensive positions established 
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by Second Lieutenant Cates’s men.  Lieutenant Leonard’s group came upon a German machine 
gun position and spread out as it fired.  Maneuvering from wall to wall and building to building, 
members of the 2nd Platoon succeeded in killing the enemy crew and captured the gun.  
Immediately, the deadly pulsation of gun shots echoed off the sides of the buildings as another 
enemy gun fired from the bell tower of the village church.  Lieutenant Leonard ad three men 
immediately charged up the narrow stairway of the structure, swarmed through the opening into 
the bell tower and, using bayonets, killed the crew of the enemy position.121   
Eventually Lieutenant Graves Erskine brought up the remnants of the 2nd Platoon of the 
79th Company.  As he entered the outskirts of the town several of the enemy guns had already 
been captured, except one on the edge of town, which continued to fire.  Lieutenant Erskine, with 
his pistol drawn, approached the enemy gunner from behind and kicked him in the shoe.  
Startled, the German soldier stood up, slung his weapon over his shoulder, and surrendered to 
Lieutenant Erskine.  With a shaking hand, Lieutenant Erskine trained his pistol on the husky 
adversary.  He turned the enemy soldier over to the control of Private Frank L. Slattery who 
escorted the German to the rear.  When Private Slattery returned soon after, Lieut nant Erskine 
grew suspicious.  “Slattery, you shot that prisoner,” inquired Lieutenant Erskine.  Astounded by 
the Lieutenant’s accusation he replied, “How did you know?”  Lieutenant Erskine gave the 
young man a tongue lashing to which he replied, “Yes, but I haven’t had a chance to kill one of 
those bastards all day, all they are doing is killing us, and I can’t go back to Minnesota and tell 
them I didn’t kill a German.”122   
Frustration got the best of the men who had been on the receiving end of the German 
guns all day.  Hatred took over and prisoners were often disposed of as inhuman elements.  “Th  
Hun is a queer breed.  They’re all alike.  We have them in Massachusetts and we’re sorry for it,” 
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commented Lieutenant Leonard to a reporter a few days after the engagement at Bouresches.  
“When things are going their way and they have a great unbroken organization they are all right, 
but leave them to their own resources, with an ebb tide, and they turn tail because they’re 
cowards.”123 The better part of two German companies had inflicted severe casualties on a 
battalion of American Marines only to flee the town.   The majority of the enemy stragglers had 
been killed or captured by the survivors of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, but no 
definitive figure exists explaining the number of German casualties.  In the wak  of the assault, 
the field behind the American survivors inside of the village was dotted with 110 wounded men 
the bodies of twenty of their dead comrades.124 
The sun slowly set on the western horizon and the crescendo of distant gun fire tapered 
off.  Several of the dead and dying lay scattered throughout the fields fronting Belleau Wood and 
the village of Bouresches.  Numerous wounded lay helpless in the pasture during the assault as 
any movement in the open view of the enemy gunners meant almost certain death.  “One man in 
particular,” recalled reporter Floyd Gibbons, “had a long, low groan.  I could not see him, yet I 
felt he was lying somewhere close to me.”  With darkness setting on several of the walking 
wounded made their way to safety.  Gibbons and his escort Lieutenant Hartzell remained pinned 
down in the field for nearly three hours before attempting to get back to the rear sector for help.    
“I thought that hour between seven and eight o’clock dragged the most, but the one between 
eight and nine seemed interminable,” recalled Gibbons.  “The hours were so long, particularly 
when we considered that a German machine gun could fire three hundred shots a minute.”125  At 
one point in the field, Gibbons, unsure whether he would survive the ordeal after losing his eye 
earlier that afternoon, gave Lieutenant Hartzell some final words to tell his wife.126 
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 Confident that the sky remained dark enough to move, Gibbons began to shout through 
the field in order to locate Hartzell.  Weak from loss of blood, Gibbons remained on his stomach 
and every time he turned his head, the pain became almost too much to bear.  He requested the 
Hartzell crawl towards him while Gibbons did his best to move toward the sound of Lieutenant 
Hartzell’s voice.  When Lieutenant Hartzell reached the gravely wounded reporter he asked him 
to raise his head up so that he could see the wounds.  Gibbons hesitantly worked up the energy to 
get up and look through a hazed sense of vision towards his comrade.  “I wanted to know how it 
looked myself, so I painfully opened the right eye and looked through the oats eighteen inches 
into Lieutenant Hartzell’s face.  I saw the look of horror on it as he looked into mine.”127 
 For nearly twenty minutes the two men crawled through the field toward the point that 
they advanced from earlier that day.  The journey was an agonizing one for Gibbons who 
continued to lose blood from his ghastly wound suffered earlier in the day when a stray enemy 
machine gun bullet ricochet off the ground, entering his left eye, and exiting out of his f rehead.  
With every step upright, the pain increased as he moved with the assistance of Lieutenant 
Hartzell through the looming shadows of the woods on the opposite side of the field in front of 
Belleau Wood.  The two men stopped momentarily and Gibbons removed a soiled handkerchief 
from his pocket as Hartzell bound the wound on Gibbon’s head.  The two men finally reached 
the safety of a dugout about a mile behind the woods where a Navy corpsman tended to 
Gibbon’s wound.128 
 In the pasture west of Belleau Wood, the cries of wounded echoed through the darkness 
enticing numerous men to head out in effort to locate anyone still alive.  Corporal Charles J. 
Bonifacino and Drummer John Balogh of the 45th Company stealthily crept through the shadowy 
field looking for survivors of their company.  The two men stumbled across Private Charl y 
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Frehse who had been severely wounded by three machine gun bullets earlier that day.  Corporal 
Bonifacino and Drummer Balogh attempted to lift the injured man up onto the stretcher but 
Private Frehse objected.  “I won’t live let me die here,” cried the terribly injured man.  The two 
litter bearers knew that there was a minimal chance of his survival so they obliged his request 
and sometime during the night Private Charley Frehse died from his wounds.129  
 Sergeant Merwin Silverthorn, who had suffered a gunshot wound to the knee, remained 
secluded in the tree line of Belleau Wood.  Since the darkness now provided Silverthorn 
concealment from the enemy guns, he worked his way back through the field to the road leading 
to the village of Lucy-le-Bocage.  Once inside the deserted town he located the dressing station 
in the basement of a building where he had his wound treated.  Silverthorn refused to return to a 
rear hospital until he had gone back out to find his gravely wounded friend Sergeant Luther W. 
Pilcher who he promised he would locate after dusk.  Sergeant Silverthorn took a stretcher f om 
the aid station and convinced another Marine to accompany him as he hobbled out of the 
building into the streets of Lucy-le-Bocage towards the field that sloped down towards Belleau 
Wood.130   
 When Silverthorn closed on the edge of Belleau Wood he began to holler out Pilcher’s 
name.  Enemy guns, which had been silent since the sun went down, fired in the general 
direction of Silverthorn’s careless summons.  “Of all the screwy situations,” thought Silverthorn, 
“here you got out of this thing once.  You’re right back where you started from.”  He 
immediately ceased the vocal search for his comrade.  Slowly creeping throu h the wheat in the 
estimated area where Pilcher had been earlier that day, he finally found him.  Silverthorn 
exclaimed, “Pilcher, here we are.  I’ve got a stretcher.  We’re going t take care of you now.”  
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He knelt beside his friend and shook his motionless body.  He quickly realized that he had 
already died.  “That was quite a shock,” remembered Sergeant Silverthorn.131   
  Inside the town of Bouresches, survivors of the 79th and 96th Company assembled into 
formation in an effort to figure out which men were still present.  Lieutenant John West arrived 
in the village just after darkness.  His 3rd Platoon assembled for an informal roll call.  West began 
to read off the names.  A brief silence followed after West shouted the name “Miller.”  He called 
the name out a second time.  Then an unknown voice from the assembly stated, “He’s in town, 
Lieutenant.”  Immediately Corporal Clarence J. Wante, a hard-nosed Irishman from Chicago 
sarcastically shouted, “To hell he is, what hotel he is stopping at?”  The men in formation burst 
out into laughter.  Lieutenant West could not believe that after all the horrors of that day his men 
could ever find anything to laugh about.  In about four and a half hours, Captain West’splatoon 





Conclusion and Aftermath of a Costly Day 
The day had been a very costly one for the Americans.  Not only had they failed to 
capture Belleau Wood, the Marine brigade continued to pass on grossly inaccurate informat on 
regarding these objectives.  At 6:23 p.m. a wireless message from 5th Marine Regimental 
headquarters falsely stated that the town of Belleau had been captured.1   At 7:10 p.m. the 4th 
Marine Brigade headquarters relayed a message stating that “the attack went very well indeed-
even beyond our most sanguinary expectations.  Marines have taken Torcy, Bouresches, 
including the railroad station.  They are on the Belleau Road.  Casualties have been light.”2  
These dispatches relayed dangerously inaccurate information.  This information would be taken 
into consideration when committing reinforcements and carrying out future attacks.  The 
Marines had not captured the railroad station.  They had not captured Torcy nor had they made it 
to the road that ran from the town of Belleau to Bouresches.  Belleau Wood remained very much 
in enemy control, and the casualties were the heaviest the Americans had suffered in the war to 
that date.  All the information emerging from the chaos and confusion of battle paint d  very 
different picture than what actually occurred. 
Aid stations situated along the rear of the lines were overwhelmed.  Lieutenant Colo el 
Richard Derby, the division surgeon, described the scene when he entered the dressingstation of 
the 6th Marine Regiment.  “Passing through several overlapping ponchos hung in the doorway to 
conceal the interior lighting, I was first blinded, and I mean literally, by the bright candle-light 
from within.  The small room was the scene of intense activity.”  Everywhere inside the small 
facility wounded men received medical attention.  Lieutenant Colonel Derby noticed the clamps 
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on the arm of a badly wounded man whose brachial artery remained severed and exposed.  Major 
Farwell worked day and night without a pause to tend to the wounded.  Those stabilized men 
were taken to the cellar to await an ambulance to remove them back to a rear area to rec ive 
sustained treatment.  The aid stations remained under artillery fire throughout the day and late 
into the night.  Nearly 750 men passed through this single station in less than twenty-four hours. 
Derby noted, “Having exhausted their strength they worked on their nerves, automatically doing 
what instinct dictated.  These were days in which men worked until they dropped and then rose 
to work again.”3 
The division was largely unprepared for the number of casualties suffered.  Managing the 
logistics of caring for casualties proved a daunting task.  Even burying the dead was an 
overwhelming duty as many of those killed lay where they fell for days.  The battle continued as 
the burial process began.  As the fighting persisted for weeks, men remained unburied for days, 
weeks, and even months.   
Private Elton Mackin, a replacement in the 67th Company who arrived two days after the 
attacks on June, 6, 1918, recalled that one of his first tasks along the front lines was one of the 
most unforgettable.  On June 10, 1918 the 2nd Engineer battalion dug a long shallow trench to 
serve as a mass grave for the numerous dead from the assault four days earlier on Hill 142.  
Corporal Earl P. Wilson stood in the trench while a few men passed the bodies down to be laid 
out.  Private Mackin remembered Corporal Wilson’s patience regarding the squeamishness that 
overcoming some of the replacements of the company.  Private Mackin came aross the body of 
a Marine who had been shot above the eyes.  He noticed the chinstrap of the dead man’s hel et 
remained tightly in place.  When he picked the body up by the shoulders of the tunic and swung 
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the corpse towards the stretcher, the man’s helmet fell off as his brains splashed across Private 
Mackin’s shoes.4 
The remains of Corporals Anthony Kowalak and Joseph C. Toulson were located on 
August 1, 1918.  The two men had advanced well beyond the remainder of their company on the 
morning of June 6, 1918 when the 1st Battalion 5th Marine Regiment was tasked with taking Hill 
142.   The two men had been recorded as missing in action until their remains were found in a 
depression in a farm field outside the town of Torcy.  Today Corporal Joseph Toulson rest i the 
Aisne Marne Cemetery on the northern part of Belleau Wood.   
The remains of Private James Irving Dodd, who died in the late morning of June 6, 1918 
on Hill 142, remained unburied for five days.  Sergeant John Nelson remembered that Private 
Dodd’s remains lay in the open for days and some of the other men tried to cover his mangled 
body with brush, even using the dead man’s overcoat but the artillery fire remained intense for 
the days following the assault and they could not bury him.5   
  The process of notifying loved ones began as soon as the identity of the dead could be 
verified.  In Ohio five days before the fateful assault on June 6, 1918, Private James Dodd’  
mother sat down to write him a letter in which she stated, “I will answer your welcom  letter 
dated April 14th surely was glad to hear again from you and to know you are well and enjoying 
life as best you can.”    On June 28, 1918 a telegram arrived at the Dodd house in Akron, OH 
informing the family of Private Dodd’s death.  Nearly two months later, the undelivered l tter 
arrived back in Ohio.   On the afternoon of June 17, 1918 a Western Union delivery boy brought 
a yellow envelope to the house of Corporal Robert M. Fischer’s Aunt Minna Fischer.  T letter 
sent from the office of the commandant of the Marine Corps said: 
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Deeply regret to state that a cablegram received from abroad advises that 
Corporal Robert McCaughlin Fischer, Marine Corps, was killed in action on June 
sixth.  Body will be interred abroad until end of war.  Please accept my heartfelt 
sympathy in your sorrow.  Corporal Fischer nobly gave his life for his country.6  
 
A few blocks from the Fischer residence on Colfax Street the father of Sergeant Stephen 
Sherman received a similar telegram notifying him of his son’s death. Sergeant Sherman was a 
classmate at the University of Minnesota with Corporal Fischer.  The two men had enlisted 
together along with over 100 other students.  One June 8, 1918 Caroline Carpenter sent two 
letters to her son Private Stanley D. Carpenter.  One of the letters accompnied a tablet of blank 
paper and envelopes for him to write letters home.  Twelve days later she receiv d a Western 
Union telegram at her home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania stating that her only son had been killed 
in action June 6, 1918.  On August 4, 1918, the unopened parcel she sent her son two days after 
his death arrived back to Ms. Carpenter, forcing her to relive the heartache felt months before 
when she initially received the devastating news.7  The family of Corporal Joseph Toulson 
received a telegram on July 16, 1918 informing them that their son remained missing in action. 
These same scenarios played out thousands of times across the country.  The death of sons, 
husbands, and brothers spelled out the true cost of this new age of warfare.   
Amidst the carnage and tragedy of June 6, 1918, dispatches from the battle continued to 
propel a misled and inaccurate picture of the American baptismal in this war.  MARINES IN 
GREAT CHARGE OVERTHROW CRACK FOE FORCES donned the front page of the June 
7th edition of the New York Herald.8 The Reno Evening Gazette claimed, HUNS TAKE FLIGHT 
BEFORE FIERCE ADVANCE OF UNITED STATES MARINES.9  In a June 9, 1918 New York 
Times article entitled, DECLARES OUR MEN DOMINATE GERMANS.  An unidentified 
160 
 
correspondent went so far as to claim, “The operations on June 6 in advancing our line gave us a 
view of the enemy which permitted us to exploit the situation.”10 
The attention devoted to the battle also made Floyd Gibbons a house hold name.  News 
of his wounds reached the United States and appeared on numerous front pages nation-wide.  
When Gibbons returned to the United States he assumed a near celebrity status and cause a voice 
for the war effort.  He participated in numerous speaking engagements and made public 
appearances across the country.  His interpretation of the battle, perhaps more than any other 
account, dictated the context which the engagement would be placed by the American public.  
Gibbons summed up the beginnings of a misunderstood legacy when he wrote:  
On that day [June 6, 1918] and in that event there materialized the German 
fears which had urged them on to such great speed and violence.  In the eleventh 
hour, there at the peak of the German thrust, there at the climax of Germany’s 
triumphant advances, there at the point where a military decision for the enemy 
seemed almost within grasp, there and then the American soldier stepped into the 
breech to save the democracy of the world.11 
 
The attack of June 6, 1918 was doomed from the beginning due largely to the haste with 
which it was carried out.  Although the attacks did not entirely fail, it fell short of its main 
objective, Belleau Wood.  An advance with limited success came at an exorbitant cost.  Several 
issues contributed to this fact.  First, delayed communication methods between units proved 
obsolete in this fast-paced style of war.  Most of the 2nd Division’s field telephones remained out 
of service due to the heavy volume of enemy artillery fire that severed unburied lines, resulting 
in the obsolete use of messengers carrying correspondence on foot.   
Secondly, the limited artillery fire incorporated into the strategy of assault was largely 
ineffective and not used in an advantageous manner.  The swiftness which assaults were plann d 
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and the short notice given to the attacking battalions, did not allow for proper coordinatin and 
planning with the artillery.  The method of employing artillery did not seek to destroy enemy 
positions but merely harass them enough to allow the infantry to close in on their position while 
meeting limited resistance.  Since news of the planned assaults usually reached the attacking 
companies at the last minute, this method of artillery bombardment failed.   
Finally the tactics used by the infantry were ineffective against the desire  objective and 
contributed largely to the high number of casualties suffered.  They were designed to delay rifle 
fire until assaulting men could engage the enemy at close range even though these formations 
had to traverse hundreds of yards of open field.  This tactic relied on the use of several wa s of 
troops in depth grouped close together in order to maintain better command and control while 
remaining extremely exposed.  The proximity of the men in rank inadvertently catered to the 
defense of the enemy who utilized machine guns and quick-firing artillery to overwhelming 
effectiveness.   
  The haste with which French General Jean Degoutte pushed the counterattack accounts 
for the disarray and confusion that caught so many of the Marine battalions and companies off 
guard.  The assault on Hill 142 was carried out with half the intended number of Marines due to 
the inability to effectively communicate within companies, battalions, and regiments in a timely 
manner.  An attack order arrived only a few hours before the offensive was to begin and with his 
battalion divided, Major Julius Turrill had no option but to carry out his orders with very limited 
strength.  There was also no time to orient platoon commanders as to the desired objectives nor 
were an abundance of maps available for the men to familiarize themselves with the terrain.   
Similar communication breakdown affected the assault of the western fac of Belleau Wood later 
on that day.  Many of the platoon commanders in the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment did not 
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even receive the order to attack until minutes before the scheduled advance, long after the
preliminary artillery bombardment ceased.     
The decision to limit the preliminary artillery that precluded the assault and ineffective 
deployment of the little artillery that was directed on the enemy lines, enabled to the Germans to 
remain in position and heavily resist the American assault.  For reasons unexplained, the concept 
of rolling artillery was not used by the Americans.  The meager presence of artillery batteries and 
the haste with which assaults were carried out may have disabled any calculated oordination 
between the infantry and artillery. This idea places the most intense fire in a front of an 
advancing column of troops and increases as the formations advance upon the objective.   Instead 
the obsolete idea of interdiction fire was used to isolate the target and prevent any reinforcements 
from getting to the point of attack.  Thirty minutes before the attack was to occur, the supporting 
artillery barrage was to shift focus to “fires of preparation and destruction.”12   
In some cases, such as the assault on Hill 142, artillery support was replaced by brief
machine gun fire concentrated on the objective; this had little effect on damaging enemy 
positions.13  The limited artillery placed on the German positions was scant at best and not 
heavily concentrated on enemy positions in accordance to the prevailing idea that Belle u Wood 
needed to be taken by surprise since General Degoutte’s headquarters believed the woods were 
lightly held.   
The artillery methods, as obsolete as they were, also had no definitive targets to focus n 
since virtually no reconnaissance seems to have occurred which may have alluded to where 
German fortifications might have been.  The supporting fires also ended much too soon before 
the advance of American troops, allowing the Germans time to effectively engag  the assault, but 
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gave the alert that an attack could be expected.  German Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Otto, a 
participant in the battle remarked, “The enemy’s intentions were obvious, as his artillery fire 
became more intense, particularly in the region east and north of Bouresches.  The attack of the 
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 6th Marines, late that evening, was 
therefore not at all unexpected by the Germans.”14  The results turned into disaster for the 
advancing columns of Americans. 
June 6, 1918 was the costliest day for the American military in the First World War to 
that point.  The first large-scale American counterattack of the war amassed  toll unlike 
anything experienced in the twentieth-century.  On June 6, 1918 1,087 Marines of the 2nd 
Division fell in battle, of which over 350 died or went missing in action.15  The 3rd Brigade of the 
123 soldiers of 2nd U.S. Infantry Division also died.  An unknown number of soldiers were 
wounded.  Before the battle ended nearly a month later, the Second Division suffered nea ly 
9,784 battle casualties.16  Never before had the Marine Corps suffered such tremendous loss of 
life.  In fact, the Marine Corps had suffered a combined 878 battle casualties in all of the nation’s 
major military engagements since the American Revolution.17   
June 6, 1918 more than any other day baptized the United States military into the way 
modern combat were waged since tactics, communication methods, and hastily planned assaults
transferred into poor coordination and led to extremely high casualties.  The American public, 
however, were exposed to a portrayal of the battle shrouded a misunderstood context born of the 
propagandistic approach in covering the engagement. The battle remained an ineradicable 
memory for the men who fought. The industrious and inhuman capability of twentieth century 
warfare brought unprecedented killing efficiency to the battlefield and created a terrifyingly 
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